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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the political implications of the integrated development 
planning process embarked upon by South African municipalities in the period 
1998-2004. Through the use of case study methodology that focuses on the 
Eastern Cape municipalities of Buffalo City and Ngqushwa, the conventions of 
municipal planning are examined. This inquiry into municipal planning draws 
upon official government documents and reports and publications from the non-
government sector. The thesis is particularly focused on the claims made in 
policy documents and related secondary sources and compares these to more 
critical reports and publication as well as the author's personal experience of the 
integrated development planning process. Of key interest is the possibility that 
planning serves political interests and the material needs of an emerging municipal 
elite and that this is seldom acknowledged in official planning documentation or 
government sanctioned publications on the topic. The primary findings of the thesis 
are as follows: 
• That the 'reason' of expert policy formulations that accompanied integrated 
development planning has weakened political economy as a prism of 
understanding and separated itself from the institutional reality of municipal 
government 
• That the dominant critique of planning and other post-apartheid municipal 
policy is concerned with the triumph of neoliberalism but this critique, while 
valid, does not fully explain successive policy failures especially in the setting 
of Eastern Cape local government 
• That function of policy and its relationship to both the state and civil society 
is usually understood only in the most obvious sense and not as an instrument 
for wielding political power 
• That planning still derives much of its influence from its claim to technical 
rationality and that this underpinned the 'authority' of the integrated 
development planning project in South Africa and reinforced its power to make 
communities governable 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This paper will analyse change in the procedures for planning in South African local 
government from 1998 to 2004 and the manner in which this change is represented 
in the dominant literature and policy instruments. The research will draw upon both 
political and social theory to explore how local government practice, particularly 
in the Eastern Cape and especially that practice that relates to Integrated 
Development Planning, falls short of the standards and practice prescribed in 
national policy developed by the state between 1995 and 2002. It will investigate 
gaps between the "ideal" i.e. the predominant policy framework of the time and the 
"reality" experienced by local municipalities and various sectors of civil society. It 
will also explore at a theoretical level, the manner in which planning is represented 
by the state and non-government organisations (NGOs) and specific instruments 
and models that fall within an approach known as Integrated Development 
Planning. 
The term 'a local government policy framework' embraces a huge range of 
legal and administrative instruments and less formal 'guidelines'. Policy for 
local government is contained in the Constitution, the White Paper on Local 
Government, two national laws relating to institutional matters and operations (the 
Municipal Systems Act and the Municipal Structures Act), and the Demarcation 
Act (which has not just shaped municipal space but patterns of institutional power 
and responsibility within that space.) There are laws governing municipal finance 
and draft legislation on the imposition of property tax. Then there is national level 
legislation by other line departments on the environment, transport, energy and 
its usage, bulk water supply and a host of other matters. In addition there is a 
different sphere of policy framed by provincial ordinances that give more substance 
to national frameworks and bring a regional specificity to policy design (although 
the import of these ordinances has been greatly reduced by overarching national 
legislation.) Lastly there are the internal policies, by-laws and regulations of 
particular municipalities that give a final form and character to policy before it is 
enacted and experienced by the public. 
The new political and civic leadership were responsible for shaping these laws 
after 1994 had been confronted with the very palpable challenge of turning around 
a set of largely discredited and certainly unpopular societal values and norms 
that shaped apartheid South Africa. For the post 1994 South African leadership, 
the dominant value system, at least overtly, were the norms and principles of 
democracy, non-racialism and social equality that for several decades prior to 1994 
5 
bound them together in their mission to overthrow the apartheid state. 1 The status 
quo they confronted was a society shaped by state violence, government enforced 
segregation, gross economic inequality and racial suspicion and hostility. What 
made this status quo even more complex were the various political and economic 
reforms invoked by the apartheid government from about the mid 1970s in an effort 
to prolong its grip on political power2 
For, at the level of administration, policing, and individual consciousness, the 
legacy of apartheid is likely to persist stubbornly in endless petty and profound 
ways for many years to come. Breaking it down will require not only educating 
and empowering the victims of apartheid, but also re-educating its former 
practitioners , and promoting dialogue between these two groupS.3 
Some would argue that in the post-RDP phase, the value system of the elected 
leadership had been fatally contaminated through a clandestine marriage with 
neoliberalism incorporating values like 'new realism' in public administration, 
cost reduction and performance management. Portrayed as a stealthy triumph of 
the 'New Right', GEAR finds few defenders amongst even centrist analysts and 
becomes a ready explanation for successive policy failures .4 While undoubtedly 
bringing a problem of coherence into the policy framework, it is an all too easy to 
blame GEAR for all forms of weak policy implementation. 
It is certainly more politically acceptable to discuss 'impossible' attempts to 
reconcile irreconcilable social and economic values within policy than to confront 
the awkward reality that many politically correct policies are nonetheless hopelessly 
out of kilter with the institutions that are supposed to implement them. An emotive 
addition to this turbulent mixture of policy, is the suggestion that a return to 
sustained consultation, deeper participation, social justice and more enthusiastic 
partnerships with civil society5 would somehow ameliorate the more objectionable 
aspects of GEAR. This is to be achieved whilst retaining GEAR's limited but much 
valued benefits like fiscal savings directed to infrastructure spending, tax cuts for 
individuals and businesses and a sharply reduced percentage of the budget spent 
on servicing debt. 6 
Research Aims 
The research will attempt to describe an unfolding planning framework for local 
government and its interpretation within the mainstream South African local 
government policy debate. It will also look at the enactment of policy amongst 
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smaller non-metropolitan municipalities and in a very limited way draw upon some 
of the theoretical constructs framed in chapter one, to explain the gap between the 
ideal and the reality. 
In empirical terms, the main point of the dissertation will ultimately be to explore the 
adequacy and suitability of legislation and policy provisions for local government 
and the impact of high order technical/scientific interventions that flow from that 
policy. My main thesis is that these provisions are often ill suited to the operational 
challenges faced by most non -metropolitan municipalities. As municipal practice 
falls increasingly behind the objectives outlined in policy, either through neglect, 
incompetence or willful abuse, symptoms of a weak state begin to emerge. On the 
other hand it will also be shown that policy and planning frequently serve, by design 
or accident, other less disclosed interests. The discourse that has elevated issues 
of local governance including planning into a realm of techno-science? and scientific 
management has little bearing on the day-to-day challenges of local governance 
but may well help to maintain the authority and the credibility of the state and the 
(local) ruling class. Even when the interests of the latter become antithetical to the 
broad principles of the local government project, they may be able to manipulate 
planning and technical interventions to maintain their ascendancy through a new 
and distorted form of rationality. 
The research will also be based on the following methods: 
• Highly detailed documentation analysis: The research makes extensive use of 
the unpublished documentation held by the Local Government Transformation 
Project at Afesis-corplan, an NGO based in the Eastern Cape, other NGOs 
around the country and the government agencies with which these NGOs 
interacted. These documents include NGO and government resource and 
training materials, official planning guides, policy directives, planning 
documents including municipal integrated development plans and budgets, 
media statements, working papers, journal articles and official reports by 
government & non-government agencies. 
• In depth participant observation: The candidate has been deeply involved in the 
subject under discussion and thus carries an insider awareness of the issues. 
This creates the basis for unique insight but also imposes an obligation to be 
self-aware i.e. to recognise the difficulty of achieving objectivity and the need to 
constantly clarify the observer's own assumptions and proclivities on the issues. 
• Case studies: A case study approach involving Buffalo City municipality and 
Ngqushwa municipality is used. The term case study is used in the loose sense 
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that most (but not all) of the illustrative material comes from these two 
municipalities. The paper draws out particular issues from each case study on a 
selective basis and does not purport to offer a full overview of all municipal 
functions or even the planning exercise as a whole. 
Synopsis of the Study Areas 
Buffalo City municipality is a category B municipality and constitutes the second 
largest urban area in the province. It is centrally located within the province and 
stretches from the port city of East London in the East to Dimbaza in the West.s 
Buffalo City Municipality (BCM) estimates its population at 888 0009 with 80% 
residing in the urban areas of East London and King William's Town and 20% 
residing within interlinking rural areas. Although it constitutes the economic core 
of the sub-region, BCM is relatively poor with 71 % of the population earning less 
than the household subsistence level of R1,500 per month.1o BCM nevertheless 
represents the second most well resourced municipality in the province with 
a significant revenue base and a reasonably well-established municipal 
administration. 
Ngqushwa municipality is predominantly rural and comprises the small towns 
of Hamburg in the East and Peddie in the West. Most (95%)of the 93 997 
population reside within 20 757 households mainly located in rural villages.11 
About 72% of the employed population earn less than R800 per month. Ngqushwa 
municipality is has a very weak revenue base and relies on financial transfers 
from national government. Although its administration has grown over recent 
years and is reasonably well resourced , it lacks key competencies and like many 
other rural municipalities in the province, seems incapable of delivering effective 
administration and municipal services. 
1.1 Key elements of Planning Theory 
Before considering aspects of planning and urban development that appear to 
have special significance in the South African context, it is worth overviewing a 
selection of writings that form a useful theoretical backdrop to the examination of 
Integrated Development Planning. In this regard the paper will look at the work of 
Robert Fishman, John Friedman, Richard E. Klosterman, Richard E. Foglesong, 
Robert A. Beauregard , James C. Scott, Charles Lindblom, Paul Davidoff and Bent 
Flyvbjerg. I have found the writing of Beauregard to be particularly interesting in 
exploring planning as a force of modernity. Lindblom's frank observations on policy-
making as a science of "muddling through" brings some sense of reality to the 
often lofty world of policy-making and Scott's warnings about the operation of "high 
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modernism" seem particularly apt in describing authoritarian trends in planning 
such as the work of the Municipal Demarcation Board 1999-2001. Throughout the 
paper there is at least implicit reference to the insights of Arturo Escobar's and 
his critique of planning which seems particularly relevant to the lOP programme in 
South Africa : 
But development experts have been blind to these insidious aspects of 
planning .... One cannot look on the bright side of planning, its modern 
achievements (if one were to accept them), without looking at the same time on 
its dark side of domination. The management of the social has produced modern 
subjects who are not only dependent on professionals for their needs, but also 
ordered into realities (cities, health and educational systems, economies etc.) 
that can be governed by the state through planning. Planning inevitably requires 
the normalisation and standardisation of reality, which in turn entails injustice 
and the erasure of difference and diversity.'> 
The theoretical part of the dissertation will also explore the characterisation of 
planning and related legal and policy instruments as 'techno-science' and the realm 
of what Timothy Mitchell calls "calculability"13 as a reinforcing rationale for a new 
political order at the local level. Mitchell comes from a post-structuralist school of 
writers who draw upon Foucault in examining the idea of the political economy and 
the manner in which this has shaped thinking about management as a function 
of government and politics. Where Mitchell presents the map as epitomizing the 
power of the coloniser or the modern state, this dissertation suggests that planning 
has been used in a similar manner by the South African state in extending its 
hegemony and rendering populations governable in the Foucaudian sense.14 The 
thesis will try to show how the 'reason' of these expert policy formulations has 
weakened municipal institutions and produced a rationale for democracy and 
development that is in many respects deeply irrational. 
The research has been motivated firstly by the concerns I have felt when working 
as an NGO consultant in the field of local government and its transition to 
democracy over the last twelve years. I have had an increasing sense that the 
project for democratic and developmental local government is beginning to derail. 
Other attempts to understand this have either been deeply instrumentalist i.e. the 
perspective of consulting engineers, accountants and planners or else have come 
from social analysts steeped in a critique of neoliberalism and its impact on the 
state. I have no quarrel with the contention that this is the most meaningful analysis 
and goes to the core of local government's woes however as an NGO worker 
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who is also obliged to frame interventions to address the problem, I have found 
the dominant neo-Marxist approach to have many gaps in its epistemology and to 
readily embrace a form of technical modernism that easily becomes authoritarian. 
The left discourse also fails to take proper responsibility for its prior influence over 
the local government project and in some respects seeks to reinterpret historical 
features of the process to suit the thesis of neoliberal capture. The left critique 
of the state is limited since it portrays development in South Africa as a stealthy 
triumph of the New Right. The critique, while valid at many levels, becomes a 
powerful but blunt instrument for explaining successive policy failures. 15 
Planning Theory and South African Integrated Development Planning 
To the extent that there has been any theoretical analysis of the lOP programme, it 
has been mainly in terms of its holism, its integrationist capabilities and the extent 
to which it has involved public participation. '6 This section of the paper draws upon 
fairly mainstream planning theory to highlight apparent gaps in the theoretical 
critique of recent lOP programmes in South Africa Five main threads of the 
discourse are considered, namely: 
• whether planning serves the public or private realm. 
• how and why planning is often able to achieve a virtual omnipotence and how 
its utopian nature can serve to channel key social forces. 
• the conceptual issue of modernism and postmodemism and how planning 
seems especially tied to modernism and its promise of order and progress. 
• policy choices, how these are made, and critical differences between ideal and 
real decision-making in public policy matters. 
• finally the section turns to planning as an instrument of authority, espousing 
developmental objectives whilst often serving more political agendas 
A limitation regarding the relevance of mainstream planning theory to the South 
African Integrated Development Planning (lOP) experience is that most of the 
theory has been developed around planning activity that has the city as its 
primary focus. After 2000 however the re-demarcation process shifted municipal 
boundaries to a scale that incorporated both urban and rural, thus planning had 
to embrace entire 'districts' or 'sub-regions.' Planning theory has in general paid 
less attention to planning at this scale. Robert A. Beauregard suggests that this 
is a global dilemma for planning because modernist planning was dependent on 
the "economic dynamics of the industrial city and the rise of the middle class" for 
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its holism,17 Thus the legitimacy of planning remained bound up with notion of 
progress in an urban environment. For the working class this meant the promise of 
"embourgeoisement" - a rise to affluence through the taming of capital, a properly 
organised city and the consequent spread of prosperity. 
1.2 The Origins of Planning 
There is broad agreement that planning emerged in response to social problems 
located within19th century discontent about the industrial city, the functioning of 
market forces and the political outcomes from what many regarded as a poisonous 
mix (squalor, exploitation and corruption.)18 A significant body of opinion now asks 
whether planning can address the social problems in a world of post-modernity. 19 
Planning theorists like Scott Campbell and Susan S. Fainstein stress the holism 
and eclecticism of planning i.e . a mix of fields that include design, civil engineering, 
local politics, community organisation and social justice.20 With roots in architecture 
and landscape architecture and a concern to improve the performance of public 
utilities21 , planning has come to be regarded as a "quasi-profession" and has 
increasingly been associated with public sector bureaucracies 22 Campbell and 
Fainstein note that while planners tackled substantive issues like the need for 
public health reform, their response, for example the Garden City or the City 
Beautiful were visions of something more.23 This capacity to conjure a vision of 
something new and emblematic is an important element of the lOP process in 
South Africa and will be discussed in more depth later. 
Richard E. Klosterman suggests, that the essence of planning lies in the belief 
that the public interest cannot be adequately served by the groups and individuals 
that comprise ordinary society - planning is the independent "4th power" to do 
this .24 This notion of planning as embodying the power of expertise is particularly 
useful when understanding the role of the Municipal Demarcation Board (MOB) in 
the mid to late 1990s and draws upon the traditional or classic case for planning. 
Furthermore the model is based on the centrality of space and a concern to 
coordinate public and private use of land with the realisation that individual uses 
of space have consequences for adjoining private and public space.25 The guiding 
hand of the expert with its sense of removal is critical to understanding how 
planning derives its professional authority. It is based on the belief that: 
" ... the conscious application of professional expertise, instrumental rationality, 
and scientific methods could more effectively promote economic growth 
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and political stability than the unplanned forces of the market and political 
competition. "26 
The planner must therefore work comprehensively and look at the external effects 
of individual and group action and the projection of the consequences of these into 
the future. Robert A Beauregard terms this the "modernist project of planning. "27 
Modernist because " .. . it engaged the city of industrial capitalism and became 
institutionalised as a form of state intervention ." Whereas this school of planning 
is widely regarded to have faltered because the " .. . response to the turmoil of 
modernization" was "shrouded in modernism", many of the core assumptions of this 
thinking still prevail in the planning process, namely28: 
• Reality can be controlled and perfected 
• Planning works in a malleable world where an inherent logic exists that can be 
uncovered and manipulated 
• Alienation can be reduced by addressing social problems 
• Experts can drive society forward along a uni-linear path of progress - the 
planner liberates through enlightenment 
• Planning achieves objectivity by maintain ing a critical distance from social 
problems 
• The logic of planning is able to transcend the interests of capital , labour and the 
state 
• A coherent urban form that overcomes the contradictions and conflicts of 
capitalism is possible - the planner's task is to capture this in a 'master plan' 
For Beauregard the manifestation of this thinking was in the various master forms 
of city plans that begun to emerge at the turn of the century. Housing began to 
be regulated with a move towards the provision of publ ic housing.29 By the 1920s 
transport planning saw the emergence of highways and later, after World War 2, 
the advent of zoning that restricted land use to certain functions in particular areas. 
Urban renewal became a concern and by the 1960s planning specialisations like 
environmental, manpower, social, health, transport, energy and regional planning 
began to emerge.3D Increasing concern for the social aspects of planning led to 
a questioning of the dominance of the spatial, especially the fixation with the city 
as "the common object of interest" .31 Beauregard describes this reformist shift 
in planning as a mix of common sense, emerging middle-class values of social 
responsibility and organisation with elements of sociology and economics. It was 
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however "all flavoured with" a sense of classical order related to architecture and 
the city. 32 
In his paper Toward a Non-Euclidian Mode of Planning33 John Friedman argues 
that to break with its historical ties to a past dominated by science and engineering 
(now in a state of collapse), planning has to be defined in relation to real action in 
the public domain.34 This call for more 'applied ' planning however begins to chip 
away at one of the key tenets of planning i.e. the notion that its unique value lies 
in being principle-driven and independent in a world fixated by the expedient and 
the short-term. The expertise-authority of the Municipal Demarcation Board and its 
failure to come to terms with some of the mundane realities of local government is 
discussed later and is probably a good example of an imperfect achievement of this 
balance. 
The Possibilities of Progress 
Large scale planning projects, like the Integrated Development Planning 
programme in South Africa and the municipal demarcation process (1998-2001) 
are invariably infused with some sort of vision of urbanism. This serves to galvanise 
the necessary social and political support for the planning project. Robert Fishman 
has compared the approach of three key figures in planning, namely Ebenezer 
Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier and has analysed the roots of their 
radical and all-embracing response to industrial society.35 According to Fishman 
these three "icons of planning" shared little in the manner of political outlook -
all three had very different interpretations of what the ultimate industrial society 
would look like; Howard's garden cities" were significantly different to Wright's 
strongly ind ividualistic planned city of 'Broadacres'37 which was a far cry from Le 
Corbusier's hierarchically organised "radiant City38". 
Fishman reminds us however that these three planners were driven by at least 
three common motivations when embarking upon their projects . One, they feared 
and were repulsed by the 19th century metropolis, secondly they shared a sense 
that improvements in technology would allow new urban forms to emerge which 
had hitherto been considered impossible and th irdly they anticipated a significant 
real ignment of human society or in Fishman's words: "a revolutionary age of 
brotherhood and freedom was at hand ."39 Thus whether the problem manifested 
itself as the 19th century city expanding out of control due to the "blind force of 
chance and profit"40 or the irrational urban patterns left by apartheid, the pre-
conditions for the ascendancy of planning are notably similar. 
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Fishman also suggests that the three iconic planners built upon the optimism of 
19th century utopian socialists like Charles Fourier, Robert Owen and Henri de 
Saint-Simon .41 Whereas the latter had tried to build utopian communal societies 
free of class struggle and irrational separation of urban and rural, Howard, Wright 
and Le Corbusier brought technology to the hope and optimism of the utopians. 
Fishman however readily accepts that the 19th century philanthropists and their 
colleagues in planning "almost always assumed the continued poverty of the poor 
and the privileges of the rich ."42 Thus planning was dismissed by Marxists and 
consigned , in Engel 's view to, "part of the superstructure of capitalist society."43 
The Marxist critique of planning is expanded later in this section but it is worth 
noting that Marxists were impressed by the exercise of technocratic authority 
and expertise that implied a notable concentration of power. This tendency to 
reliance on collective organisation of the economy and society on a scale that that 
rarely proves workable, is described by Fishman as, "the concept that the entire 
productive capacity of a nation could be managed as if it were one huge trust. "44 
Public or Private: Who does Planning Serve? 
The dominant hypothesis in planning theory, is that planning is caught up in the 
duality of public sector regulator and the demands of the market. Campbell and 
Fainstein offer two interpretations of this relationship. In the first, planning acts 
as a check upon the worst outcomes of the market ("chaos and uncertainty")45. 
In the second , planning is caste as the problem itself i.e . the irrational force that 
created, and finally led to the collapse of socialist societies in Eastern Europe 46 
In this instance it is market forces that in fact 'rescue' society from the irrationality 
imposed by planning. A third idea, explored later by examining Marxist thought on 
the issue, is that planning acts as an important 'prop' to the market and that the 
apparent 'checks' it exerts are simply to preserve the necessary harmony between 
otherwise competitive capitalist interests. These Beuaregard refers to as "fractions 
of capital "47, and although their immediate interests may differ in relation to built 
environments, they remain bound by the logic of 'the economy.' 
Campbell and Fainstein offset these foundation principles with the more complex 
reality of overlap between the public and the private sector and the increasing 
privatisation of what were traditionally public sector functions.48 As the democratic 
rights and obligations of citizens are increasingly reduced to issues of consumerism 
and 'who can pay for what', so planners are confronted with more complex 
questions of who they are serving and what values underpin the process of 
planning. However this 'dilemma' also lends the planner a form of power. This 
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power derives from professional or expert discretion and is attributable to the 
freedom to choose which imperative to serve and to what degree. This latitude 
gives rise to the possibility that in many instances, planning serves those who plan. 
Intersections between Market and State 
Richard E. Klosterman sets out the rationale for the first and most common 
planning paradigm viz. the familiar notion of planning as a periodic and pragmatic 
response to the shortcomings of the free-marke!.49 The second model described 
by Klosterman, (the pluralist view) proposes planning as an improved form of 
representing the public interest, in a context of imperfect political systems. The 
third model returns to some of the foundation ideas of the iconic planners i.e. the 
search for rationality set apart from ideology and material interest or the planner as 
'expert'. Here knowledge and instrumental rationality allow the planner to function 
autonomously from the dictates of interest groups or societal pressures.50 
As Klosterman notes, the cause of planning is enhanced by weaknesses in the 
classical and neo-classical economists faith in market forces, rule of law and 
individual rights as the systems and values for effectively allocating society's 
resources S1 The classical liberal tradition has long argued that planning and other 
forms of state regulation serve only to stifle entrepreneurial energy and stand in the 
way of innovation. This argument focuses on the financial costs and administrative 
burdens that government bureaucracy inevitably imposes upon entrepreneurial 
initiative. The classical argument is that only the economy can allocate society's 
resources effectively.52 
In a now well-established line of critique, Klosterman points towards the 
simplifications in this representation of the "ideal marke!. " Examining concepts like 
public goods, externalities and spill over effects that are linked to public and private 
investment in built environments , Klosterman argues that the ideal market is in 
fact impossible. Its validation requires it to be "perfectly competitive", and it relies 
on large numbers of traders with identical goods and services , rational choices by 
buyers and sellers. It further assumes that labour, production and consumption is 
mobile .53 Both classical and neo-classical economists now recognise that this ideal 
world does not exist and thus arises the rationale for state intervention to correct 
the failures of the marke!.54 
The need therefore arises for instruments like building codes and the mandatory 
maintenance of buildings. It is self-evident that some degree of government 
intervention is required to reduce incompatible land use, to coordinate private 
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development and public infrastructure and to preserve public open spaces and 
historic buildings. Klosterman concedes that the rationale for planning cannot be 
based on the deficiencies of the market alone, which is in many respects more 
effective than centralised coordination by government.Ss 
Klosterman also sets out the pluralist argument where the economic argument for 
planning prevails but the scale and reach of planning is curtailed by the system 
of representative politics. s6 Long-range planning and large-scale coordination i.e . 
the sense of an engineered society are avoided and instead the "existing political 
bargaining process" guides government.57 That formal political process suggests 
Klosterman, is seldom played out on 'playing fields' that are level in terms of 
citizen's power. 
By thus tying individual's political voice to underlying disparities in political power 
and resources, current political processes exacerbate existing inequalities in 
income and wealth and fail to provide adequate information for fully informed 
policy-making.s8 
This also raises the fundamental question of whether any planning can occur from 
"a position of value neutrality."s9 Paul Davidoff's asserts, "values are inescapable 
elements of any rational decision-making process".60 
The recommendation that city planners represent and plead the plans of 
many interest groups is founded upon the need to establish an effective 
urban democracy, one in which citizens may be able to play an active role 
in the process of deciding public policy. Appropriate policy in a democracy is 
determined through a process of political debate. The right course of action is 
always a matter of choice, never of fact.61 
This last point is critical in recognising deficiencies in the lOP programme in South 
Africa which invariably limited rather than expanded public policy solutions to 
complex social problems. Planning therefore becomes a conduit to a limited set 
of state-sanctioned remedies . Charles Lindblom suggests that the relationship 
between citizens' values and technocratic decision-making is in fact quite complex. 
Administrators who retreat to the position of "majority preference" ignore the fact 
that preference has not been registered on most issues. Even when the importance 
of values is recognised, different values come into play in different decisions 
(especially matters of social policy) and may be judged to be of greater or lesser 
importance.62 
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Lindblom concludes that choices between values and policy options are made at 
one and the same time and not in sequence (as ideal planning scenarios suggest) . 
This inter-twinning of marginal analysis and empirical analysis is both inevitable 
and relevant since the hard distinction between ends and means is a myth. The 
only way for administrators to truly assess policy is to ask whether the objective 
could have been better served through an alternative policy. In democracies the 
issue at hand is more about how to achieve the policy than the policy itself.63 
Lindblom also suggests that the problem of comprehensiveness in planning may 
be resolved by simply allowing certain values to be safeguarded by watchdog 
institutions. These institutions, provided they are strong and articulate, will ensure 
that key values are not lost in the policy-making process. In a somewhat idealised 
notion of the United States system, Lindblom suggests: 
A policy nevertheless evolves and one responding to a whole variety of 
interests. A process of mutual adjustment among farm groups, labour unions, 
municipalities and school boards, tax authorities, and government agencies 
with responsibilities in the field of housing, health, highways, national parks, fire 
and police , accomplishes a distribution of income, in which particular income 
problems neglected at one point become central at another point.64 
Thus a convincing case is made for a rough process of trial and error where social 
scientists, politicians and administrators "".do not know enough about the social 
world to avoid repeated error in predicting the consequences of policy moves."65 
This form of incrementalism stands in stark contrast to the bold high modernist 
systems described with much trepidation by James Scott. In the former there is at 
least the opportunity as Lindblom notes to avoid the "big disasters" and remedy 
error before it becomes fatal. 
Pluralistic and Participatory Planning 
Davidoff makes the case for citizen's participation in planning as a counterweight 
to bureaucratic dominance and other forms of centralisation that occur when a 
'unitary' or comprehensive plan is espoused.66 Davidoff suggests that public agency 
planners have no place seeking loyalty from independent planners or interest 
groups because "Lively political dispute aided by plural plans could do much to 
improve the level of rational ity in the process of preparing the public plan ."67 Public 
awareness of alternative choices, competition within the planning process itself and 
devolved responsibil ity to outside interests (non-establishment) to produce better 
plans (rather than simply criticize) are some of the envisaged benefits of pluralistic 
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planning. Davidoff goes on to propose a strong role for advocacy planners 
- planners who align themselves with a particular set of values or interests. At the 
same time Davidoff also laments the circumstances, namely expanded roles for 
government bureaucracies and weakened party politics at the municipal level, that 
made it necessary to invoke highly organised forms of citizen's participation. 
There is something very shameful to our society in the necessity to have 
organised "citizen participation." Such participation should be the norm in an 
enlightened democracy. The formalisation of citizen participation as a required 
practice in localities is similar in many respects to totalitarian shows of loyalty to 
the state by citizen parades.B8 
These misgivings could well be applied to the many orchestrated forms of 
participation, currently regarded as 'cutting edge local democracy' in South Africa, 
notably representative forums for planning, public hearings around proposed 
developments and for environmental scoping and ward committees for ensuring on-
going contact between elected municipal representatives and their constituencies. 
Pure pluralist formulations thus neglect the reality of small powerful groups 
pursuing strongly vested interests on a playing field that is strongly biased towards 
their success. The fact that the influence of such groups is disproportionate to their 
numerical significance is less important than the fact that the policy they influence 
spills over to groups whose interests are very poorly represented.69 
Advocacy Planning 
This dilemma provides much of the rationale for Davidoff and Klosterman's 
focus on advocacy planners i.e. planners who do not adopt the mantle of 'value 
neutral' planning but explicitly set out to serve a set of interests considered to be 
underrepresented - frequently society's poor. For Davidoff the social advocacy 
planner is one who is 'engaged' both in the sense of acting as an agent for a 
particular interest group but also because the planner is 'hands-on' and probably 
identifies with the values being served. Thus the planner is able to abandon the 
myth of neutrality and become a proponent of "specific substantive solutions."7o 
The advocacy planner also has the function of the cross-examiner i.e . providing a 
fresh and usually critical perspective on mainstream planning and revealing existing 
bias. Thinking mostly in terms of organisations and well-defined interest groups (for 
example down-town neighborhoods threatened with relocation), Davidoff suggests 
that the advocacy planner should also assume responsibility for the education of 
such groups, supporting them to better formulate and articulate their ideas.71 
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Klosterman however makes the obvious point that advocacy planners are also 
prone to problems of representivity. It is easier to represent narrow interests and 
preserve the status quo than to advocate on behalf of "diffuse and widely shared 
interests."72 This is one of the main critiques that has shaped the development 
of planning theory - planning's pretension to serve a collective public interest 
whereas the track record indicates its service to the "needs of civic and business 
elites".73 However it is possible that Klosterman counter poses the "shared interests 
of the community" versus the "private interests of individuals and groups"74 too 
simplistically. Clearly these are interwoven and untangling the former from the latter 
is difficult. 
The Marxist View 
In South Africa, the lOP process did not attract a strong Marxist critique despite 
the relatively strong left discourse that was generated around local government 
transformation . Perhaps this was because the lOP sufficiently resembled the state-
led planning historically favored by socialist states. Marxist writers on planning 
insist that any understanding of planning can only emerge from recognising how 
modern capitalism relates to space and the physical environmenP5 Questions 
of what constitutes the public interest are irrelevant because the social and 
political institutions of capitalist society promote the interests of those who control 
productive capital over the interests of society in general.76 Planning is little more 
than a system for managing class conflict, and providing for the needs of the 
working class in a manner that ensures that the capitalist order holds together and 
is maintained. 77 Planner's use of scientific techniques is simply an attempt to mask 
this reality and leg itimate the state's actions in the service of capital JB Similarly 
the reformist tendencies in planning, like advocacy planning or planning with a 
particular social mission are dismissed as a co-optative strategy invoked to pre-
empt more fundamental reform.79 
For Marxist analysts like Francois LamarcheBo, the existence of "fractions of capital" 
is key to understanding the significance of planning. Sometimes termed 'property 
capital', and comprised of real estate developers, construction firms, mortgage 
lenders etc, this group is threatened by the need for social control of space and 
would be in constant conflict with other elements of the capitalist order (who seek 
an expanded role for government in planning and using space) were it not for the 
mediating role of planning . The "central contradiction of capitalist urbanisation" 
according to Foglesong is the "social character of land and its private ownership 
and control. "B1 Foglesong cites manufacturing capital 's need for state intervention 
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in the arena of worker housing and public infrastructure whereas urban developers 
will seek as little state intervention as possible to maximise land as simply a 
commodity (albeit a commodity that is not moveable) and thus the generation 
of profit. 82 These constitute some of the competing imperatives that capitalism 
imposes on the urban environment. 
The fact that the market cannot produce an urban built environment capable of 
maintaining capitalism obliges the capitalist order to create the legal space for 
state intervention. This however brings with it a reliance on formally democratic 
institutions and the danger of passing control on to a non-landowner majority.83 
The capitalist order is thus constantly searching for a legitimating political system. 
The system must deliver that which the market cannot, namely the reproduction of 
labour and public infrastructure. 
Marxists therefore see some vindication in the post-modern failure of planning. The 
grand strategies and vision of the reformists and the utopians, which served only to 
ameliorate the worst effects of the market and defuse the potential for class conflict, 
have now been exposed in their inadequacy. Thus in Foglesong's view, the political 
agenda of planning i.e. urban renewal , education, health, transport, crime etc have 
largely failed to meet expectations. In the post-Fordist era, planning has returned to 
its true function, namely a managerial I administrative vehicle for tactical decisions 
dedicated to preserving the capitalist order. 84 
Beyond Modernist Planning? 
For David Perry social or advocacy planning has been succeeded by a focus on 
economic development as a response to de-industrialisation and the growth of 
the service sector. Local government tries to attract new industries by offering 
incentives like land and financing. Development planning now focuses on growth 
rather than redistribution . Questions of equity and the contradictions of capitalism 
no longer concern planners. According to Perry, this thrusts the planner into the 
role of the developer or the "entrepreneurial deal-maker."85 Generating economic 
growth is the new legitimating factor for planning and the basis for measuring its 
success.86 The contradiction between planning and capital is eliminated through a 
"new abstract code in which private advantage is equated with public benefit." 
There is no longer a tension between accumulation and redistribution : it is 
assumed that accumUlation will ultimately generate redistribution. 87 
Perry warns that even as planning becomes more ubiquitous, the "wild city" is 
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beginning to re-emerge with conditions of hopelessness, new forms of under-
employment and unemployment, spaces of decline and 'zones of fear.' These 
"disfigured" spaces exist in contrast to the 'regulated space' of the concentrated 
central business district, the city-edge malls and the mixed use industrial/office 
parks. Thus urban space becomes "splintered."BB 
Beauregard shares this view, noting the abandonment of the emancipatory 
potential of planning and a reluctance to embrace social theory89 The emphasis on 
production of high technology products, the mobility of capital matched by flexible 
workplace procedures and the reality of defensive and weak labour, have redefined 
the task of planning BO As the state has become weaker and more ideologically 
conservative, it has deepened its pact with capital and the balance between welfare 
and economic growth has shifted entirely towards the latter. In this view, one of 
planning's key principles, that of critical distance, is lost. Complex partnerships 
between public entities and the private sector emerge to "isolate development 
politics from democratic politics".91 Urban development initiatives are thus removed 
from public scrutiny. 
At the same time the increased mobility of capital removes property and industrial 
development from the local sphere and makes it a matter of regional, national and 
even global significance. 92 Decisions on location and local quality of life are more 
ephemeral and publ ic authorities compete to 'sell place' or attract investment in 
ways that commodify local social conditions and amenities. Local consumption 
patterns and lifestyle are therefore shaped by the global dictates of capital and 
middle-class values. This occurs against the failure of the modernist planning 
project - evinced by the lack of any consensual notion of urban development and 
persistent inequalities of class, race and gender. In Beauregard's view, the post-
modern city is layered with historical forms, i.e. industrial , post industrial, formal 
and informal, thus making the identification of the unitary public interest more 
difficult.S3 
Reduced state controls and the enhanced power of capital consequently drive cities 
along a "seesaw" path of uneven development comprised of cycles of growth and 
decline where the costs and benefits are unevenly distributed and where the main, 
albeit contested purpose is consumption.94 Evidence of the failure of modernist 
planning lies in the abandoned hopes for "orderliness, functional integration and 
social homogeneity". Planners therefore find themselves in a state of "post-modern 
helplessness" according to Beauregard .95 
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Post-modernism and the Return to Pedagogy 
Robert Beauregard suggests that in the face of a failed modernist planning 
project, modernist planners turned back to pedagogy rather than confront the 
social real ity of planning .96 The succeed ing school of thought, postmodernism, 
reflects on the "demise of the master narrative, the bankruptcy of positivism, and 
the political deficiencies of technical expertise" but presents little in the way of a 
new and clear political agenda. It may well be that the modernist planning agenda 
has "disintegrated but not disappeared" and in fact re-emerges in various forms 
to impose 'expertise' on democracy and a new grand vision built mainly around 
pragmatism.2 
This nascent principle - the idea of technical rationality, remains a key 
element of planning despite the subsequent development of transactive and 
communicative planning models. John Friedman writes of the Euclidian order with 
its predominance of engineering and planning sciences and its emphasis on the 
"time-space continuum".97 It is the world of "stable entities and common sense 
assumptions that have governed our understanding of the world for the past two 
hundred years ."96 It is in this world that planning is able to operate as a 'vanguard 
profession' using its own inherent logic and knowledge of science to shape society 
and seek new intellectual boundaries.99 The demise of this approach to planning 
may be clearly evident in the discussion of planning theory and the crisis that 
has befallen modernist planning but the actual functions of planning in particular 
circumstances, for example lOP in South Africa, reveals much reliance on the 
techno-modernist approach. 
Planning as Authority 
Why then do municipal and other government authorities rely on a demonstrably 
failed modernist planning paradigm? James C. Scott proposes that historically 
the state or dominant elites experience social and economic circumstances that 
set the scene for the preponderance of high modernism.'oo High modernism is 
the confidence in scientific and technical knowledge associated with Western 
European and North American industrialisation. True to modernist principle, it 
embodies a faith in continued uni-linear progress , the expansion of production 
and the possibility of rational social order in all aspects of human activity, through 
state regulation'o, Scott observes that 19th century optimism around improved 
human conditions possible through science and industry created expectation for a 
"continuing stream of new marvels." 
2 J am para-phrasing Beauregard here 
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Simplification and rationalisation previously applied to forests , weights and 
measures, taxation and factories were now applied to the design of society as a 
whole. Industrial strength social engineering was borne.102 
From th is emerged scientific ways of describing population (demographics) and 
scientific readings of society that mimicked long-standing scientific conventions 
for understanding nature. This faith in progress based on science and technology 
seems to be a 'super-charged ' version of the inspiration that drove the early iconic 
planners and the utopian reformists . In Scott's view it was greatly boosted by 
German mobilisation during World War II when it became evident what could be 
achieved through planned and well-serviced mass production.'03 It has one critical 
difference however in that it is not content to flourish on its own merits and seeks 
instead to use the authority of science and knowledge to silence other 'authorities' 
like received tradition .104 Thus emerges the defining trait of high modernism 
- its authoritarian nature, manifest in Lenin and Ie Corbusier, which creates the 
propensity to sweep aside those who cling to tradition or remain 'untransformed." 0s 
At its most radical , high modernism imagined wiping the slate utterly clean and 
beginn ing from zero. 106 
In this view, nature has no inherent merit in its untransformed state and exists 
merely as a drawing board on which to sketch out the grand designs of the 
planners, engineers and arch itects .107 Thus socialist intellectuals were fascinated 
with capitalism's grand projects, like the Suez and Panama canals, regarding these 
projects as evidence that it was man's destiny to "tame nature." 
In fact, this promise, made plausible by capitalist development, was for Marx the 
point of departure for socialism, which would place the fruits of capitalism at the 
service of the working class ... 10B 
But high modernism is not in Scott's view the exclusive preserve of socialist 
regimes. Scott offers the examples of Nazism, social engineering under apartheid, 
modernisation plans of the Shah of Iran, villagisation schemes in Vietnam and other 
great colonial ventures to show that the only ideology attached to high modernism 
is that of modernity and the unquestioned authority of the expert. High modernism 
flourishes in colonial and revolutionary settings for different reasons. The common 
thread however is the concentration of authoritarian power . 
. .. the great state-sponsored calamities of the 20th century have been the work of 
rulers with grandiose and utopian plans for their society.''109 
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In Scott's formulation it is the combination of 3 key social conditions that gives rise 
to episodes of high modernist planning: 
1. The desire for an improved and radical re-configuration of society to be 
achieved through administrative ordering and re-engineered social life in all its 
aspects. Thus the importance of change as an end in itself - the promise of a 
break with the past. 
2. The existence of the modern state with its power for administration and 
coercion are key. 
3. Civil society must be weakened or "prostrate" and therefore incapable of 
resisting these plans. " O 
Modernist planning in this vein is thus frequently the domain of progressive or 
revolutionary elites whose power lies in their comprehensive critique of existing 
society and a popular mandate to transform that society. The conditions for such a 
planning approach to emerge are crises of the state i.e . war, economic depression, 
revolution or significant shifts in power. According to Scott, such planning is 
only dangerous when it is in the hands of elites that cannot be held in check by 
democracy or civil rights ."1 
The past is an impediment, a history that must be transcended; the present 
is the platform for launching plans for a better future. A key characteristic of 
discourses of high modernism and of the public pronouncements of those states 
that have embraced it is a heavy reliance on visual images of heroic progress 
towards a totally transformed future."2 
But there is invariably a gap between the planned ideal and the reality - a 
contradiction commonly present in societies undergoing transformation . This is 
particularly evident in the lOP wish list approach in South Africa and the grinding 
bureaucratic indifference of municipal government on the ground. For Scott this is 
very much the formula of high modernism i.e. the promise of a better future justifies 
short-term sacrifices required to achieve that future. 
This vision of a great future is often in sharp contrast to the disorder, misery and 
unseeming scramble for petty advantage that the elites may very likely see in 
their daily foreground. 113 
High modernism does not concern itself with competing values in the planning 
process but by its own reliance on technical rationa lity, is by definition obl iged to 
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deliver something more than "muddling through ." This ability to re-invent challenges 
and goals is an essential component of modernist planning exercises, along with 
the ability to badger a "technically backward and unschooled"114 population into 
accepting the role of the governing elite as technical and cultural educator. This 
was arguably one of the crowning achievements of the Municipal Demarcation 
Board and the official exponents of lOP in South Africa . However tendencies 
towards high modernism are invariably constrained where distinctions between 
state and society remain strong - the liberal democratic emphasis on pluralistic 
models of government and civil liberties, freedom of expression and sensitivity to 
trends in polling, all stand in the way of unmitigated high modernism"5 
Some concluding thoughts on planning theory 
Planning is in a significant crisis with the advent of post-modern scepticism and 
the rise of neo-liberal values and neo-conservative economic policy. Part of the 
response entails a return to modernist traditions with some indication the Euclidian 3 
impulse is not forever buried. Trends towards pluralism and the acceptance of 
advocacy planning are bound to weaken in a general shift back to technical 
rationality. The prescription that planners cannot be agents of change in a capitalist 
order is difficult to contest, however the alternative notion of serving the working 
class in bringing about real transformation seems equally improbable. The problem 
however is not the intellectual binds that confront planning theory but the fact that 
in the world of realpolitik and formal government, planning still exerts huge authority 
based on its foundations in techno-science and its manipulation of rationality. 
There is little reason to believe that authoritarian manipulation of planning will not 
inflict further calamities on societies desperately seeking remedies to untenable 
human settlements and unworkable political / economic regimes. In the following 
descriptive sections of this paper this understanding of why planning is undertaken, 
who it serves and its potential as an instrument of state power, are critical if we are 
to move beyond the idea that planning is simply a technically informed response to 
a particular set of local circumstances. 
3 John Friedman's term 
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CHAPTER 2: APARTHEID ERA PLANNING 
Urban policy under apartheid was not simply a technocratic process for protecting 
white interests and the middle-class lifestyle, it was also a powerful mechanism for 
framing a vision of society based on segregation and a version of modernity that 
was racially exclusive and protected by space. Apartheid offered an alternative to 
the problems that typical ly beset modernisation in developing countries : 
. .. the Verwoerdian paradigm (which) postulated that unrestrained black 
urbanisation would inevitably lead to overcrowding, the proliferation of squatter 
settlements, urban and industrial strife and decay, regional inequalities and a 
rise in the levels of social pathology in urban areas"6 
Urban policy under apartheid had elements of integration that often go 
unrecognised by critics who focus upon its more obvious shortfalls. The urban 
policy of segregation and restricted movement of black citizens, known as influx 
control , was matched by supportive pol icies for labour and its mobil ity, housing, 
and industrialization. Verwoerdian policy indeed amounted to a comprehensive 
exercise in social engineering which fundamentally restructured the urban 
environment: influx controls were systematized and refined , an elaborate system 
of labour bureaux were established with the purpose of channelling African labour 
more effectively between the agricultural and industrial sectors, huge modern 
townships were constructed , and black people living in inner-city areas and 
squatter camps were relocated to these tightly regulated townships designed to 
accommodate only the legitimate labour requirements of urban employers .117 In the 
1960s and 1970s industrialists were induced to relocate to decentralised growth 
points by the imposition of limitations on labour and industrial land supplies and by 
the offer of attractive financial incentives in the new areas. 118 
Industrial decentralisation policy was linked to the political policy of establishing 
self-governing homelands - a doomed from the start strategy for deflecting black 
political aspirations. Patrick Bond describes the underlying motives for this policy 
and its implications: 
There was, additionally, apartheid 's own supposed geographic antidote to 
the glut of domestic manufacturing capital: the homelands-inspired 'regional 
decentralisation' policies and subsidies which picked up steam during the 1970s, 
and which turned during the 1980s to three dozen specific 'deconcentration 
points.' Aside from the policies political purpose, namely propping up the 
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Bantustans, decentralisation also played a (temporary) role as a form of spatial 
fix, by promoting a qualitative new degree of 'competition in laxity' (dramatically 
lower wages, tax holidays and other incentives) which fuelled capital mobility.119 
These policies undoubtedly established a link in the minds of many black South 
Africans between the politics of racial dominance and state intervention in favour 
of capital. Business would no doubt claim that most of its members did not benefit 
from this policy and opposed both its political and economic dimensions. However 
it is also true that there were those who were not opposed to apartheid per se 
but sought a more liberalised economic environment in which to do business. 
The liberal opposition argued that the policy meant restricted labour supply in the 
context of growing black unemployment and that not all industrialists were able 
to follow the route of increased mechanisation. There were also limited options 
for industrial expansion due to non-market regulation of industrial land. A liberal 
business perspective suggested that less regulation of black urbanisation might not 
only ease the supply of labour but "promote industrialisation, economic growth and 
modernisation ... "12o Nevertheless as Stack notes, untrammelled urbanisation risked 
bringing increased poverty, joblessness and decayed infrastructure and facilities 
from the rural into the urban.121 Clearly inevitable, urbanisation needed to managed 
if the predominantly white middle-class were to be protected. 
2.1 Reform 
By the mid 1980s the apartheid state had begun to reform its urbanisation policy 
with the assistance of bodies like the Urban Foundation . Stack described the broad 
principles of this policy as follows: 
The proposals advocate an urbanisation strategy aimed at accelerating economic 
growth and achieving a comprehensive and systematic approach to both urban and 
rural development. Effective urban management is emphasised, with greater local 
political autonomy, increased financial support for cities and reconstituted local 
govemment boundaries defined according to functional criteria. The acceptance 
of informal settlement, the promotion of large-scale job creation , a non-racial 
rural land market, inter-city competition for public and private investment, state 
assistance to bring the poor into the urban system, and community participation in 
urban and rural development programmes ... 122 
In the late eighties, the rapid crystallisation of these policies, amid massive 
pressure on the organs of the state charged with urban planning and development, 
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effectively 'pulled the rug from under' the liberation movement as it appeared 
to answer many of the demands of street level engagements between state 
and popular township-based organisations. Staff of the Urban Foundation, 
teamed up with newly recruited community leaders in the Eastern Cape as 
housing technocrats, and began to play the role of both mediators between civic 
organisations and the state , and agents of housing and infrastructure programs 
within the new policy framework. Some activists experienced a growing disquiet 
that their moment of triumph had been quietly usurped by neoliberal forces 
acting in cahoots with select elements of the out-going government. Bond for 
instance, describes how the Urban Foundation used its considerable resources 
to lure formerly progressive academics who had served the liberation struggle 
intellectually, to 'switch sides.' 
One leading UF strategist, Jeff McCarthy (formerly the leading Marxist scholar in 
South Africa) had hoped that local alliances between local civic associations and 
developers/financiers would 'hasten the prospect of alliances on broader political 
questions of "vision" '123. 
This wariness of an urban development agenda captured by neoliberal forces 
operating through the Urban Foundation and the Independent Development Trust 
was not new. In 1991 Louise Stack, then a researcher at the Centre for Policy 
Studies at the University of Witwatersrand had recognised this sense of unease 
filtering through activist circles. 
Underlying part of this ambiguity is a fear that the state and private sector have 
a shared vision of the future city in which the market, rather than the state, is 
to playa dominant role. Suspicion runs deep that this amounts to a strategy to 
avoid any substantial redistribution of wealth and reparation of the economic 
imbalances that have resulted from apartheid policies. Also of concern is the 
prospect that the proposed new strategies may merely replace racial barriers 
to the benefit of the urban environment with economic ones, thereby sharply 
dividing urban black communities along class Iines.124 
It nevertheless became clear that after 1994 planners would be confronted by 
massive urbanisation in a limited number of viable metropolitan centres with 
huge internal disparities in services, facilities and economic infrastructure and 
irrational spatial design. In surrounding rural areas, particularly in the Eastern 
Cape, small towns with already decaying infrastructure and in cyclical or long-
term economic decline, would become the focus of a lesser influx of rural people 
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seeking livelihoods and public services whilst maintaining a tenuous link to the rural 
homestead. 
Accelerating rates of growth and an overwhelming concentration of people 
in metropolitan areas will require fundamental changes in the urban planning 
process. In future planners will have to plan on a scale and with a degree of 
co-ordination with other government and private bodies not seen before in 
South Africa. 125 
The ascendancy of planning and the increased scope of what needed to be 
planned, at this crucial juncture in South Africa's history, seemed the logical step 
forward, specifically in response to the kind of spatial and development failures that 
had occurred under apartheid. Swilling 's description of the key settlement issues to 
which apartheid contributed have already been touched upon but are worth quoting 
verbatim: '26 
• Concentrations of people in the five metropolitan areas which are, in turn, 
dispersed and sprawling conurbations characterised by extremely inefficient 
land use, long travel times highly unequal access to services between richer 
and poorer areas and the distribution of the urban poor on the peripheries in 
both formal townships and increasingly in sprawling squatter settlements that 
provide shelter for at least seven million people; 
• the distribution of the non-metropolitan population in some 300 settlements 
outside the homelands; 
• growing urban populations in 293 towns inside the former homelands, many of 
whom had economic bases supported by government's industrial 
decentralisation policies; 
• the proliferation of semi- and peri-urban informal settlements located inside the 
homeland boundaries, but located on the peripheries of metropolitan economies 
from where they derive some of their income; 
• the survival of a rural population that is expected to increase from 11,4 million to 
15,3 million between 1985-2010. 
Swilling goes on to describe the other major feature of urban settlements, namely 
the fact that all major industrial and commercial investment had been in the areas 
of the former white local authorities thus providing a significant source of subsidy 
to property rates and service charges that was not available to residents in former 
black townships .127 Considerable moral authority was generated by analysts on 
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the left and leaders of the mass democratic movement by being able to show that 
township dwellers, far from posing a chronic problem of non-payment, had in fact 
been subsidising white service costs by virtue of their labour and spending in white 
controlled areas which had contributed towards a viable commercial tax base for 
middle-class white suburbia that former township areas lacked .128 Thus emerged 
the call for a single tax base for the city as a whole that would not allow taxes to be 
trapped and preferentially expended in those racially defined areas that had already 
enjoyed decades of advantage. The impact of this argument on subsequent policy 
design cannot be over-estimated especially in respect of the metropolitan options 
where the idea of the 'Uni-city' as the only answer to administrative and financial 
fragmentation and protection of privilege by predominantly white areas, loomed 
large in the minds of the new municipal leadership. 
The imperative for unification was a policy issue that both politicians and their 
constituencies could understand and the argument carried its own moral weight in 
the light of the historical injustice already described. As discourse about municipal 
models evolved and policy options became more complex with criteria and values 
that sometimes conflicted, a few core principles like 'the need for unification', 
became an increasingly blunt instrument that had less to do with equitable 
distribution of public resources and more to do with concentrating power. 
Another peculiarly South African policy issue emerging from the immediate post 
apartheid period was the irrational location of the urban poor and working classes 
in neighbourhoods that are most distant from places of work. 
In most urban centres internationally, the poorer residents generally reside 
close to their places of employment in central city areas where transportation 
costs are minimised. South Africa on the other hand, has a partially distorted 
dual settlement pattern. In contrast to the international model, the poorer black 
residents live on the city peripheries whereas the white urban settlement pattern 
conforms with the general norm: lower-income whites reside in the central areas 
of the city while higher-income whites live in the outer surrounding suburbs. 129 
This too is a fairly easy to understand and visually obvious aspect of spatial 
planning, and yet it featured much less powerfully in the imperatives of the new 
municipal leadership once they have secured their own residence in middle-class 
suburbia. In some urban conurbations the potential to settle poor residents closer 
to the central business area and industrial areas is constrained by existing and 
planned land usage that may be difficult to revise. In 1991 Stack predicted that this 
would allow little scope for dramatic changes in racially defined suburbs: 
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No rapid or massive transition in the racial dimension of the physical layout of 
the cities can therefore be expected. Rather, a limited black in-migration into 
existing white areas, accompanied by an expansion of both formal and informal 
black urban areas, is more Iikely.13o 
Nevertheless within the constraints mentioned above there is little indication that 
new municipal authorities have looked at the problem in a more creative and 
visionary manner. The Propnet owned land known as the 'sleeper site' in East 
London central business district is a case in point. At an Afesis-corplan seminar 
in East London on February 7 1996 the largely dormant site was identified by 
local architect Jeremy Watson as essential space required for a CBD that was 
'choking' on limited parking, unregulated informal trade, poor public transport 
facilities and a general decline in the aesthetic appeal and functionality of the 
city core for working people and ordinary citizens. 131 Watson proposed four basic 
development objectives for the site that would improve commuter flows and 
reintegrate an alienated seafront area back into the city. 132 These proposals were 
refined and adjusted in a number of plans and featured prominently in the then East 
London Transitional Local Council development pledges throughout the nineties. 
By October 2003 the site remained utilized and none of the proposals had been 
implemented, despite the 2002 completion , with huge fanfare and expense, of the 
Integrated Development Plan for Buffalo City. In general housing development for 
the poor still tends to be planned on the edges of what is already acknowledged as 
unacceptable urban sprawl and it is often left to informal civic leadership to raise 
objections to the fact that their communities are being dumped on the periphery. 
Patrick Bond puts the problem in stronger terms: 
The geographic locations of new projects were in far worse locations than 
apartheid era townships (further from the city and job opportunities, with no 
hint of community, school, clinic or shopping facilities in most new housing 
projects }. 133 
By 1996 little had changed in cities like East London and researchers at Afesis-
corplan felt obliged to note that: 
To urban planners, East London is a sprawling, poorly performing social, spatial 
and economic environment. As a result of its spread out structure, this city is 
very inconvenient for most of its inhabitants. The average commuter joumey is 
too long, too expensive, too dangerous and difficult unless one has access to a 
private car. The poorest of the poor are forced to spend much of their meagre 
income just on getting to and from work.134 
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These largely unheeded calls by both NGO and private sector planners constituted 
one of the early indications that a fresh policy approach to planning and 
development would not immediately deliver the fundamental changes required 
in actual urban morphology. Indeed the Afesis-corplan researchers warned that 
the planning authority, in this case the municipality, might battle to win broad 
endorsement for a vision that seemed obvious to the planners. Even if it achieved 
consensus on the vision, it still lacked the resources and autonomy to make 
the vision happen - property developers for instance would exercise their own 
influence over the urban morphology. These sobering reflections did little to stem 
the ambitions of those who looked to the planning discipline to comprehensively 
re-engineer what apartheid had wrought. Faith in planning as a panacea to a 
host of urban and rural dysfunctionalities, reached unprecedented levels. These 
expectations of planners were qualified by the insistence that the discipline itself 
had to be transformed to tackle a programme that now had ambitions far beyond 
the fairly technical and spatial conventions of town and regional planning. Alan 
Mabin suggests that these high expectations of the discipline and perceived need 
for change in its approach are not unique to South Africa. 
Planning history indicates that the urgency of overcoming the damage wrought 
by war and by repressive regimes creates conditions in which planning systems 
grow and change. At times of reconstruction , planning has often been proposed 
as the means to accomplish such rebuilding. In such periods, existing planning 
systems are almost always considered obsolete and useless for the new task. 135 
Indeed one of the points that NGOs like Afesis-corplan tried to make in the wake 
of a February 1996 seminar on planning in East London was that the planning 
profession had served apartheid well and to expect it to adapt overnight to the new 
mission for planning was naIve: 
The structure , function and development of East London have undoubtedly 
benefited a wealthy elite in the past, while immeasurably disadvantaging the 
poor. The planning frameworks which were central to achieving this, did not 
emerge organically - they were consciously introduced to fragment the city. 136 
Mabin confirms the view that planning in South Africa entered the 1990s with 
unfortunate political baggage and further points out that apartheid era planning was 
based on a configuration of the state and its institutions which was bureaucratically 
complex and subordinated the planning function of municipalities to different and 
sometimes uncoordinated line functions of provincial and national departments. 
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Most agencies became perverted to the apartheid vision of the National Party 
during the 1950s, which also saw the creation of separate bureaucracies for 
transport and environmental planning, again with divisive consequences for 
municipal planning activity. 137 
From Mabin's description it is clear that planners not only served the bold social 
programme encapsulated in apartheid, they were able to significantly enhance the 
importance of their profession and generate increased volumes of planning work, 
because space and its differentiated and highly regulated usage was so important 
to the success of apartheid . 
The massive impact of apartheid on South African towns and rural areas 
involved, of course, a great deal of planning. While local governments 
contributed in many ways, by and large they were not the main instruments of 
apartheid planning .138 
This increase in the perceived importance of a particular profession and its 
consequent impact on public policy is little recognised but an important insight 
when considering how policy is shaped. The thinking of planners became obvious 
in the two key Ministries charged with local government matters, namely Land 
Affairs and Constitutional Development however it can also be argued that the 
planning industry benefited from the emphatic shift of planning, as a government 
function, from provincial and national spheres to local government post 1996. 
Whilst national and provincial departments could usually afford to employ in-
house planners, cash-strapped and institutionally weak municipalities below the 
large-medium city level had little prospect of retaining their own professional 
planners and were inevitably forced to look to the private planning industry to 
meet the technically complex requirements of Integrated Development Plans and 
Land Development Objectives. The period from 1997-2002 thus became a boom 
period for the planning industry although many consultants were to discover that 
weak municipalities made for frustrating and risky clients. The more conventional 
explanation for this shift in planning responsibility relates to the enhanced status 
of local government in the 1996 Constitution - a sphere on an equal footing 
with national and provincial government bound into an interactive framework of 
cooperative governance. 
Underlining local government's increased significance was the international trend 
towards urban management that the United Nations promoted in its attempt to get 
to grips with increasingly chaotic cities in the developing world. These factors and 
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the post apartheid government's global obligation to pay homage to the principles 
of decentralisation have dominated policy at the rhetorical level. What is mostly 
understated is the need for new policy-makers to find a new institutional home for 
planning in largely symbolic terms, where provincial and national government had 
become tainted by apartheid planning conventions. In a more pragmatic analysis 
it would be recognised that municipalities and their planners were more often than 
not, enthusiastic collaborators in carving up communities into racially defined and 
unequally serviced areas. 
But many municipalities did make major inputs to the national government 
agencies responsible. For example, planners working for the East London City 
Council developed detailed plans for the application of the 'the Group' (Group 
Areas Act) which were broadly accepted by national government. 139 
One irony went unrecognised by policy-makers in the crucial 1997-2002 period 
when planning once again offered another bold programme of promises related 
to social and spatial integration and expanded and equitable municipal services. 
The irony was this: many of the longer serving planning consultancies that were 
employed by government to identify and resolve spatial and social dysfunctions 
in urban areas resulting from apartheid, had previously been the architects of that 
dysfunctionality.'40 
2.2 The Scope of Planning 
Another illustration of the thoroughness of the policy shift as it effected planning 
was the increased scope of what referred to as 'development planning' in non-
professional jargon. Before 1996, planning was conventionally the domain of 
professionals and technicians who worked with land and its possible uses. It was 
a rational discipline of strategic choices made on the basis of verifiable data and 
empiricism where the social and the human were allowed to impinge only to the 
extent that such influences were measurable and relevant to the use of space, 
land, facilities or natural resources. Anyone who met the trusted planners of the 
state in the often tense forums of negotiated urban upgrading in the early nineties 
would have encountered the quiet self-assurance of men4 who 'knew it all' when it 
came to planning roads, clinics or mass housing development. Anything that could 
not be reduced to the variables understood and manageable within the profession, 
was regarded as irrelevant or something to be taken up with the 'welfare office'. 
4 The term is used advisedly since very few women appeared in these forums 
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Planning in local government though, was overwhelmingly a matter of land use in urban 
areas, conducted under a plethora of laws and in association with enumerable provincial 
and national institutions. It was a confusing picture in which about a thousand professional 
planners (almost exclusively white and mostly male) qualified in 'town and regional 
planning', occupied a dominant position ... 141 
Mabin suggests that, internationally, a shift in planning on spatial terms to planning as a 
form of urban management emanated from the 1976 Habitat conference in Vancouver. The 
United Nations and the World Bank had begun to focus on improving the performance of 
local government and concluded that strategic, budgetary and effective management issues 
posed the key challenges to an institution that had been absorbed with traditional and largely 
irrelevant functions, particularly in the cities of the developing world. Thus planning through 
the Urban Management Programme became concerned with improving the performance 
of local authorities. These trends only began to seriously impact South Africa in the late 
eighties with the opening up of the political environment and the acceptance that a new local 
government dispensation would have to be negotiated. Playing a guiding hand in this as 
already mentioned, were agencies like the Urban Foundation whose staff had been exposed 
to urban managerialism. '43 
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CHAPTER 3: POST·LlBERATION SOUTH AFRICA AND THE 
RISE OF lOP 
Upon its formal liberation, the future of South Africa's post-apartheid cities attracted 
the attention of academia within the country and international agencies like the 
World Bank. 
Overcoming apartheid spatial designs and the unjust I irrational placement of 
infrastructure and facilities was one of the obvious challenges but planning also 
had to tackle the challenge of getting more value from public expenditure and more 
effective use of facilities and infrastructure. By explicitly setting out the options 
for redistribution and economic growth, Integrated Development Plans (lOP) also 
created the political space for diverse local interests to be identified and become 
subject to a local process of mediation and ultimately prioritisation. ' 44 
In addition the architects of the new municipal dispensation had to ensure that 
the local state grew into an increasingly comprehensive form of government with 
constantly expanding responsibilities and powers - this in global terms was the 
vision of the future . Some might argue that in the face of these challenges, the 
planning industry 'bit off more than it could chew.' 
The first piece of post-apartheid planning legislation was the ambitiously titled 
Development Facilitation Act (DFA) (Act No. 67 of 1995). When first presented 
to civil society groupings and NGOs the Act seemed to have multiple and often 
confused objectives. One of its principal requirements was that all local authorities 
should draft land development objectives (LDOs). This plus the key role played 
by the Department of Land Affairs suggested that planning legislation would 
continue to be concerned with land and its usage. However the LDO label proved 
to something of a misnomer and while the more conventional planners tended 
to follow the thread of land and its importance, officials outside the planning 
discipline stressed the broad strategic function of these plans. Then Director of 
Land Administration in the Department of Local Government and Housing (Eastern 
Cape) Christelle Bartlett explained that LDOs were "".really strategic development 
plans" and "" .concentrate on spatial budgeting and development time frames." 145 
On the other hand, the DFA was also a simple piece of trouble-shooting legislation 
that made special provision for 'development tribunals' to cut through red tape and 
get stalled development moving again: 
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· .. the forward-looking , wider planning aspect of the provision had been dumped 
into a piece of legislation mostly concerned with speeding up land development 
decision-making, but also carrying a large range of provisions for change. The 
complexities of the new law completely bamboozled many professionals , let 
alone officials, community members and local politicians. 146 
Later with the 1997 amendment of the Local Government Transition Act, the 
emphasis on municipal planning leg islation shifted to the rationalisation and 
streamlining of local and national level planning procedures. Hitherto as both 
Mabin and Stack note, planning obligations were imposed on municipalities 
through different line departments, each with its own concerns and demands. Thus 
integrated development plans (lOPs) set out to draw together and coordinate a 
number of line function plans:147 
The draft Housing Bill in circulation in 1997 required municipalities to plan for 
and set housing goals and identify appropriate land as well as planning the 
necessary infrastructure and the initiation and running of projects. 
The National Land Transport Bill 1997 required municipalities designated as 
transport authorities to develop transport plans. 
The Water Services Bill required municipalities designated as water services 
authorities to compile a water development plan including targets for service 
accessibility and financia l and institutional components . 
Regulations contained in the Environmental Conservation Act (73 of 1989) 
A number of other departments including health and education were also preparing 
legislation that would impose their own line function concerns on local government. 
Implicit in the lOP model was the idea that local government was an appropriate 
level at which to bring together and coordinate not just a number of different sector 
plans in its own sphere of influence (sometimes regarded as the 'functional ' aspect 
of planning), but that of different state institutions and departments (the vertical axis 
of planning) located further up the ladder of what remained essentially a hierarchy 
of power despite the rhetoric of 'equal and inter-dependent spheres.' Furthermore 
municipalities were also expected to consider integration across geographic 
localities framed by municipal boundaries (horizontal integration.) The merits of this 
assumption are explored later. What was ironic about the rhetoric of 'rationalisation 
and integration' was the fact that initially at least, the DFA provisions for land 
development objectives (LDOs) driven by the Department of Land Affairs were not 
rationalised with the Department of Constitutional Development sponsored Local 
Government Transition Act (1993) requirements for lOPs. Considerable behind the 
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scenes wrangling and negotiation, that sometimes spilled over into public forums, 
took place before the two legislative frameworks were presented, somewhat 
unconvincingly as different components of a single planning programme. Thus 
two different ministries attempted, at least initially, to impose their new planning 
frameworks on municipalities in an uncoordinated and often competitive manner, all 
in the name of more rational, integrated planning. Afesis-corplan researcher David 
Savage, a planner by profession observed of planning prior to this new policy: 
A major reason for the lack of integration in planning at present is the attitude 
adopted by different authorities (in all spheres of government) who argue that 
they alone have sole responsibility to plan for a particular issue or area. This 
argument would seem to suggest that the authorities exist for their own sake, 
and not to serve the community. If we look at planning from a community 
perspective it becomes less important who provides a service and more 
important that the service is provided effectively and efficiently.'48 
A second key provision of the DFA which was geared towards unblocking 
bureaucratic bottlenecks, was the creation of a review body known as the 
Development Tribunal comprised of experts within and outside of government, 
who had the power to fast-track development which might otherwise be held up 
by bureaucratic red tape or the short-sighted application of dated or irrelevant 
legislation. Analysts like Ivor Chipkin have argued that the main impetus for the 
DFA came from the slow implementation of the Reconstruction and Development 
Program (RDP) 
As the implementation of the RDP became bogged down in bureaucratic 
delays it was deemed necessary to provide a 'fast-track' for development. 
This arose from two concerns . Business and civics complained that projects 
became caught up in lengthy administrative procedures. The legal profession 
worried that, on the other hand , that a myriad of laws and regulations embroiled 
developers in complicated and sometimes parallel legal processes. 149 
In the light of the longer term problems associated with the legacy of apartheid 
planning and development procedures, it is important to recognise that the delays 
in RDP roll-out were simply the most recent manifestation of what were more 
deeply rooted problems and unhelpful conventions . However the increased rate of 
delivery expected by the RDP certainly brought the problem to a head. The Tribunal 
was intended to operate in parallel to existing development screening procedures 
which it would attempt to streamline and if necessary, circumvent. 
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The Eastern Cape Development Tribunal was therefore characterised as an 
independent decision-making body that functioned to speed up development in 
the Province.15o 
A very useful dimension of the DFA which was possibly under-utilised and remains 
valid although the Act itself is largely obsolete, is the specification of unusually 
clear principles for development: 151 
1. Promote integration with respect to social, economic, institutional and physical 
development 
2. Promote the integrated development of rural and urban areas in ways that are 
mutually reinforcing 
3. Promote the proximity and integration of residential and employment 
opportunities 
4. Optimise the use of existing resources 
5. Promote diverse and mixed land use 
6. Contain urban sprawl 
7. Ensure towns and cities become more compact 
8. Correct the historical distortions in the use of space and the use of 
infrastructure 
3.1 Questions of Local Autonomy 
Thus the DFA and other legislation provided local government with a set of 
benchmarks against which to evaluate its own plans and policies. Chipkin argues 
that the DFA and the LGTA by setting out specific policy criteria like integration; 
prioritisation of basic needs remove a large degree of political discretion from 
municipalities in the exercise of their duties. Municipalities can work out ways to 
best perform their developmental mandate but the value system that has shaped 
that mandate is set out by national government. '52 This calls into question the fine 
line between imposed political values and universally accepted developmental 
criteria. While the latter may be regarded as a paradoxical in the academic realm, it 
has a key role in the more tangible world of development projects and programmes 
where movement would be impossible without a core of well-understood and 
largely incontrovertible principles. Clearly planning and other 'sciences in the 
service of development', allow select political values to be depoliticised and as a 
consequence, shift into the realm of uncontested 'development criteria.' In South 
39 
Africa, the Constitution frames those broad values which are held to be non-
negotiable, both binding on and endorsed by the majority. National legislation 
obviously has to be wary of elaborating basic Constitutional principles into 
restrictive legal frameworks that eliminate all forms of discretion and judgment at 
local level. This is the issue to be critically considered when Chipkin , for example, 
goes on to argue that since the 'how to' is left to the discretion of local government, 
municipalities retain the right and indeed the obligation to playa hegemonic role 
in relation to development, provided they serve the political objectives outlined in 
national legislation and the Constitution.153 Nevertheless, hegemony, limited to 
systemic options and choices in institutional and administrative policies would seem 
to be a rather hollow concept. 
Mabin on the other hand suggests that the key planning provisions, namely the 
specification of Integrated Development Plans within the LGTA, coincided with 
the finalisation of the 1996 Constitution and thus carried forward the notion of 
local government's enhanced status as a 'sphere of government.'154 Although 
the IDP provisions may have drawn upon local government's new Constitutional 
standing, in more practical outlining of functions and exploration of necessary 
inter-governmental relations, the IDPs acted in their own right to boost at least 
the symbolic status of local government. Since the emphasis was entirely on 
demonstrating decentralization and what 'could be achieved' and not on what local 
government had proven itself capable of, IDPs tended to load municipalities with 
functions and responsibilities that had little bearing on real capabilities or what had 
evolved as municipal functions. Indeed, as a new policy provision which embodied 
the important principle of 'breaking with the past' and escaping the bounds of 
convention, integrated development planning set out to shatter what had become a 
comfort zone of functional responsibility for municipalities. 
3.2 Urban management and decentralisation 
Meshack Khosa ' 55 has described certain forms of policy being a propagandistic 
exercise and operating within the world of symbolism. Turner and Hulme156 
confirmed that this is indeed not unusual and conforms to acknowledged universal 
trends. Given the focused nature of planning policy and legislation - at least at the 
outset, and having to come to grips with the spatial and social consequences of 
apartheid, this would not always be a valid critique. As Mabin notes earlier in this 
chapter, responding to apartheid was a very reactive and applied form of policy / 
planning design. The DFA maintained this convention of focusing on immediate 
urban development problems and working from the known. It was at the level of 
forward-looking, projective and sometimes speculative planning policy that serious 
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political speculation and scenario guessing began to take hold. In this respect 
Integrated Development Plans out did themselves. 
Why integrated plans? Apart from the anticipated merits of the three forms of 
integration already described, Integrated Development Planning confirms the 
centrality of the municipality in urban management and planning and thus signified 
a break with apartheid conventions of national and provincial government acting 
in a paternalistic manner. Another reason that may not have been apparent to that 
sector of civil society, particularly NGOs who so enthusiastically embraced IDPs, 
was that certain sectors of society looked to the experience of central government 
in the developing world and decided that national government was not to be 
entrusted with planning that could shape the lives of local communities. 
There is a strong connection between the idea of urban management as 
an approach to local government activity in poorer cities and the concept 
of decentralisation - really a way of shifting development and management 
responsibility from national government to local government - perhaps based on 
the charitable concern that that if national government could not do the job then 
local government provided the alternative. 1s7 
This is a very limited reading of the forces behind decentralisation and is 
characteristic of the 'developmental local government' discourse that attempts as 
far as possible to depoliticise issues of local government. The entire movement 
for enhanced local government status was undoubtedly seen as a check on a 
unitary state with a strong dominant party in control of parliament. On entering 
the world of formal parliamentary politics, the ANC initially embraced the idea 
of decentralisation, indeed it had little choice as concessions to federalism and 
increased autonomy for local government had been key to the peaceful settlement 
reached at CODESA. On the face of it, integrated development planning as a new 
and powerful framework for planning based in municipalities, and with an expanded 
range of development and service responsibilities to be covered by municipal 
planning, was confirmation of local government's enhanced status. Indeed it is held 
up in countless government documents as proof that the new state was serious 
about decentralisation. This commitment was not simply to appease South Africa 's 
minority parties in their quest to limit the power of central government. It was also 
part of an international shift in development thinking prompted by the mounting 
evidence during the 1980s that development initiated from the centre had failed . 
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A broad-based consensus emerged that democratic decentralisation will 
produce effective local government that is responsive to the needs of the poor 
and can provide opportunities for participation around issues that matter most in 
people's lives. ,s8 
One of the reasons why the lOP policy appealed to the NGO / civil-society sector 
was because of the more radical values implied in decentralisation, namely 
an enhanced status and role for civil society and a state increasingly open to 
democratic participation. , s9 Nor were the lOP policy provisions an isolated example 
of recognition of these values; "In South Africa, these conceptual strands prevail in 
almost all of the policies produced across government departments between 1994 
and 2000."160 Thus while lOP policy may have been naIve in the competencies it 
expected of local government, it never tried to supplant central government with 
local government on the basis that local government would be more effective. The 
decentralisation benefits held out by lOP policy had two key elements, firstly that 
of giving local municipalities the power and resources to resolve local development 
needs as co-equal spheres of government acting with enhanced autonomy and 
secondly, putting control of these municipalities in the hands of a local populace. 
However local government has also been created as a 'wall-to-wall' sphere of 
government charged with implementing the national programme for reconstruction 
and development. The political discretion exercised in drawing up local 
development plans is subservient to a set of national principles and guidelines that 
shape the minimum outcomes that these plans have to deliver. Local autonomy 
is thus balanced by a broader vision of 'developmental local government' and 
the latter policy is overseen by national government. Is this anything more than 
a 'spin' exercise by government spokespersons and their sharp-witted advisors? 
Considering state-society relationships and the problem of casting these as 
dichotomous relations of weakness and strength, Sophie Oldfield suggests that 
the concept of "embedded autonomy" better explains the tension between local 
autonomy and national interest. 
The balance between local autonomy and national and provincial intervention 
reflects the state's imperative to enforce the vision and regulatory framework of 
developmental local government as the primary delivery mechanism of services 
and infrastructure, the foundation to the national goals of reconstruction and 
integration .161 
How robust is this notion of embedded autonomy? If the national framework for 
developmental local government has become all-embracing and pervasive in all 
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. aspects of municipal functioning, can 'local autonomy' still be talked about with 
any degree of credibility? Few South African analysts of the new local government 
system seem concerned with this issue although some seem to regard national 
government's control over financial transfers to local government as a potential 
check on local autonomy. Oldfield for example asks, " Is the 'iron fist' of the 
national government disguised by the 'kid glove' of embedded autonomy? Will the 
'equitable share' of funding from the central state be employed to curb recalcitrant 
local authorities dominated by opposition parties?,,162 Thus far there seems to be 
little evidence that the state has even considered resorting to such crude forms 
of intervention to assert its political will. Indeed it could be argued that the tight 
meshing of policy frameworks like the Integrated Development Planning chapter 
contained within the Municipal Systems Act and the principles of spatial and 
physical development contained within section 2 of the Development Facilitation 
Act, are in fact a check on local autonomy that make cruder interventions 
unnecessary. 
What makes these policy tools particularly effective is not just the subtlety of the 
framework of consensual norms and standards that they embody but the ability 
to reach outside of the sphere of government and the party and to draw in civil 
society as a whole . Thus lOP policy explicitly creates a particular legal space for 
the participation of the public through planning committees and most recently, 
representative forums. In th is way, suggests Oldfield, the idea of embedded 
autonomy is also a feature of community - state interdependence. '63 
The problem with this as a general rule for local government policy, is that it 
requires an 'across-the board" application. The phenomenon must be valid for all 
municipal-community relations to retain significance, whereas in reality, as Oldfield 
notes, it is locally specific. Oldfield's view of the defining element of autonomy is 
that it requires acknowledgment of the differentiated capacity of government and 
community to "take up the challenge of developmentalism at the local level ... "164 
Th is widely accepted supposition in local government policy tends to overlook the 
extent to which civil autonomy survives and finds expression in these partnerships 
and the extent to which th is varies from locality to locality - in other words it is 
largely blind to the possibility of a hegemonic state . 
3.3 NGOs, Civil Autonomy and the Allure of Planning 
The NGO sector, illustrated in the following example by the well-established Cape 
Town-based NGO, the Foundation for Contemporary Research '65, readily endorsed 
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Integrated Development Plans as a new instrument to regulate and direct local 
government activities in the late 1990s: 
· .. municipalities should act in a pro-poor manner, maximising the development 
and growth impacts of activities '66 
NGOs were also anxious to ensure that municipalities became more strategic in 
their analysis of local issues and possible responses. However they tempered this 
endorsement of local responsibil ity by noting that: 
The development of strategic capacity and orientation is arguably the primary 
'macro' - level concern of the current pol icy framework, and a key intention 
behind the introduction of IDPs.167 
Thus even NGOs, reputed champions of decentralisation and de-concentration, 
had concerns about placing strategic decisions about planning and development 
entirely with in the realm of autonomous local decision-making. Thus we are 
confronted with the unusual prospect of NGOs, a key sector of civil society, 
drawing from its long history of loose alliance with the African National Congress 
and the new government of the day, arguing strongly that the guiding framework 
of (government designed) policy would ensure that local plans had the right 
developmental orientation. Initially this was motivated less by concerns about 
the capacity and abilities of local municipalities and more about the anticipated 
influence of other social forces who would either seek alliances with the new local 
state or use their superior power to influence gull ible local authorities. The NGOs 
sector clearly felt that this somewhat patronising stance was justified as they 
represented the interests of 'poor communities'. The concern for civility and some 
role for autonomously civil bodies was clearly present. The remarkable aspect is 
that NGOs looked to central government to protect the status of civil society with 
respect to local authorities: 
... municipalities should seek to co-ordinate and integrate rather than to displace, 
control or dominate actor's contributions. Rather than regulate and control in 
response to diversity, social exclusion and marginality, municipalities should 
tolerate community solutions and enhance joint or collective problem solving 
and decision-making and service delivery.16B 
Thus the NGO sector acted as an invaluable vehicle for gaining broad endorsement 
of the new planning policy. This happened in two ways. Firstly the overarching 
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government policy framework was supported and elaborated as necessary for 
carrying key principles and values into the municipal realm. Secondly NGOs 
emphasized the importance of community involvement in planning and ensured 
that the necessary clauses and legal provisions were introduced into relevant law 
and policy. This not only gave professional NGOs a stake in facilitating 'community 
participation', it also ensured that local community organisations were incorporated 
into the planning process and became jointly responsible, with the municipality, for 
the outcome. Potential dissidents were often effectively co-opted or incorporated in 
this way. 
Public participation in planning came to be a key principle of the new lOP policy 
framework. There was little concern that citizens 'hands-on ' involvement in 
planning might blur the responsibilities of the state and elected civic leadership. 
The only real limitation on such participation was identified as the refinement of 
such plans into operational programmes. 
Citizens would be involved in devising plans where programmes are largely 
seen as the mere translations of the plans best left to experts to draw 
up. Councillors and the administration would be involved in formulating 
programmes. A monitoring and evaluation framework is an exception to this: it 
is a point of overlap between the plans and programmes. It is seen as the key 
instrument through which the municipality is held accountable for implementing 
the plan.169 
It would be a mistake however to regard this as simply a clever ruse by the state 
to make civil society complicit in rolling out government policy. Development 
planners, NGOs and the new planning regime as a whole, were highly sensitive 
to the criticism that planning had conventionally done little to address issues of 
economic justice and usually served the prevailing configuration of social forces 
and marginalized the poor and those who lacked the capacity for meaningful 
participation (see Chapter 1 discussion of planning theories related to plural ism and 
advocacy planning for elaboration of this critique.) 
The approach is also specified to be "participative". Participation is defined to 
encompass a broadening of collective decision-making as well as a broadening 
of participation in the local economy includ ing the municipal services economy. 
"Pro-poor" is a description that is also applied ; "pro-poor" action should result in 
increased social participation in mainstream political and economic processesHO 
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But the NGO sector went further than simply functioning as a watchdog of 
participatory I pro-poor values in the new lOP framework. They readily partnered 
with the state in the roll-out of the lOP programme and became vehicles for the 
propagation of planning dogma. To understand this it is necessary to review 
specific examples of NGO programmes involving lOP. 
NGOs like Afesis-corplan had attempted to use the newly created lOP framework 
in a flexible manner, inserting their own concerns with the social and participatory 
aspects of development and trying to create as much local responsibility as 
possible for the design and operation of planning. In 1997 Afesis-corplan and other 
NGOs concentrated on honing participatory planning techniques and influencing 
local municipalities like Nqgeleni and Bizana to use such techniques . Other 
NGOs like the Johannesburg based Planact, concentrated on the production of 
comprehensive and often detailed planning resource documents like the booklet 
Integrated Development Planning: A Handbook for Community Leaders. First 
published in October 1997 the handbook found fairly wide usage within the Urban 
Sector Network - an increasingly formalised network of NGOs that sought to 
shape the transforming South African local government and urban development 
system, according to its own ideals and social aims. Having worked extensively 
with township-based civic leaders and community-based organisations that had 
resisted apartheid, these NGOs now saw the opportunity for on-going social 
change through their allies who had since become the policy-makers and civil 
servants of the post-apartheid state. Their established relationship with the new 
political leadership and shared vision would, many believed , virtually guarantee 
their influence over the policies and systems of post-apartheid South Africa. The 
lOP programme of government presented these NGOs with the ideal vehicle. 
Policy makers adopted an optimistic view of lOPs, endorsing the idea that local 
lOPs are capable of fundamentally transforming local government through 
the aggregation of local change processes. In other words, a single extensive 
planning process can restructure and reorient the institutions that constitute 
local government. Local government, for the reasons outlined in previous 
chapters, was seen by many as deeply problematic and therefore in need of 
intensive transformation . According to this logic, nearly every activity needed to 
be reoriented . The new policy for lOP was seen as the main tool to define this 
reorientation and to police it. 171 
The new vision of local government, endorsed by both the NGOs and government 
policy-makers was known as developmental local government. Its main 
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elements have already been outlined but it is useful to record an explicitly NGO 
interpretation, in this case the Johannesburg-based Planact: 
The active promotion of social and economic development by municipalities 
A more equitable and efficient shaping of municipal space 
• Municipal government that is strong in policy-making and strategy 
• Municipal restructuring that allows for both community participation and 
effective service delivery 
• Municipal government that serves the interests of the poor172 
The influence of this NGO thinking is carried through to the 1998 Local Government 
White Paper which describes developmental local government thus: 
Developmental local govemment is local government committed to working with 
citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their 
social , economic and material needs and improve the quality of their lives.173 
The White Paper outlines four key qualities of developmental local government 
which are similar to those suggested by Planact: 
1. Maximising social development and economic growth 
2. Integrating and co-ordinating 
3. Democratising development 
4. Leading and learning174 
The Planact handbook argued for better strategy and holism in municipal 
development endeavours and an overt bias towards the interests of the urban poor. 
The handbook was very broadly targeted at "local government councillors, officials 
and civil society structures. "175 Unlike other more technically orientated handbooks 
by the state and various parastatals, the Planact handbook attempted to provide an 
abbreviated schooling in planning, the social and political issues thrown up by the 
South African urban environment and recent attempts to improve its governance 
and administration. Thus the handbook covered an ambitious range of topics from 
the history of urban development in South Africa, the techniques of integrated 
development planning as a specific approach to development, the challenge of 
getting all spheres of government to work in a coordinated manner plus fifteen key 
themes which were deemed critical to understanding the urban environment. These 
included land use, housing, transport, roads and storm water, water, sanitation, 
electricity, waste management, safety and security, health, welfare, education, arts 
and culture, local economic development and environmentY6 
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Within each of these topics Planact attempted to frame its own social assumptions 
and those of like-minded experts thus offering the users of the handbook a 
discursive outline of the issues at stake and the prevailing thinking by policy-
makers. Like many lOP resources at the time the Planact handbook saw its 
primary undertaking as the undoing of apartheid: 
During the years of apartheid , cities and towns took on a particular structure and 
character, which was characterised by segregation and inequity. Overcoming 
such a legacy will require interventions that that address its root causes, and not 
simply its symptoms.177 
In two pages the handbook sought to give its target group (councillors , officials 
and civic leaders) a snapshot of South African political history. Describing the 
familiar racial peculiarities of the apartheid city, Planact went further and tried to 
contextualise the underlying causes.178 Key elements of this background included 
the racial allocation of land, includ ing the 1913 Land Act, the 'pass laws' that 
controlled the movement of urbanised Africans, homelands policy, the impact of 
mines on the urban economy and the emergence of labour migrancy.179 Planact 
briefly discussed the impact of housing and infrastructure under the Group Areas 
Act with matching policies like subsidised transport for African workers and the slow 
loss of control of African urbanisation by apartheid authorities.'8o The handbook 
explains the mid 1980s attempt by the state to set in place a less explicitly racial 
urbanisation policy and to withdraw from responsibility for township housing and 
the resultant "spread of shack settlements around South African cities ."18' It outlines 
the financial dilemma faced by the apartheid directed Black Local Authorities 
and their role in sparking civil disobedience and ultimately well-organised urban 
political resistance . In outl ining the fragmented economic and social features of the 
apartheid city Planact reminds its target readers how planning played a key role 
in realising the apartheid vis ion of segregated suburbs , amenities and economic 
facilities: 
The process of planning itself was a crucial tool which was used to achieve 
apartheid objectives. The ownership, use and distribution of land in particular, 
enabled the apartheid city to develop in as (sic) segregated manner as it did.' 82 
Ostensibly the purpose of such observations seems to be to create a stronger 
condemnation of apartheid policy and it's architects by showing that racial 
inequality and exploitation were not simply the consequences of poorly framed and 
misdirected policies but were the direct and intended objectives of the apartheid 
48 
system . In the simplest terms, it was argued that 'what was planned could be 
unplanned.' Implicitly the other purpose of these familiar tracts is to show that 
South Africa 's dysfunctional urban environments did not evolve naturally, shaped 
by lamentable but irresistible forces within society itself, but were in fact a planned 
and manufactured 'reality.' However, far from provoking a caution or wariness in 
relation to the power of 'planning' and its potential to serve a concocted social and 
political vision , Planact and other NGOs embraced planning as a powerful 'vehicle 
for transformation.' 
We bel ieve that integrated development planning (lOP) is a crucial mechanism 
to achieve developmental local government, and to overcome the apartheid 
legacy of out cities and towns.'83 
Having condemned the apartheid local government system as irrational and 
structurally unjust, Planact expresses the optimism of many NGOs at the time , 
for the newly democratised municipalities to act as agents for broad societal 
transformation: 
Despite the huge problems facing South African cities , they have one major 
element in their favour: the democratic, newly empowered local government. 
Municipalities could playa powerful role in transforming the urban landscape, 
especially if combined with community efforts and commitment. '84 
Some might argue that in retrospect this optimism proved to be tragically 
misplaced. It was however generated in part by the assumption that local 
government's enhanced constitutional status and the resulting increase in its legal 
powers and administrative functions would progress beyond a paper commitment 
and take the form of effective, powerful institutions, democratically directed to 
the most pressing issues of poverty and under-development i.e. genuine and 
constructive decentralisation was at hand. Gideon Pimstone refers to this as the 
"promise" within the Constitution, both demanding of, but also imbuing the state 
with a multitude of principles related to justice, human rights and democracy: 
In terms of these constitutional values, democratic local government is, firstly, 
answerable to the people it serves, and is required to justify its decisions in 
a rational , cogent manner. Secondly, local government is also responsive 
government, a value coupled with effectiveness, and signaling the requirement 
that local government be sensitive to popular needs and be capable of acting 
to fu lfill those needs. Third , there is the transparency norm , a call for local 
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government to be open to scrutiny and criticism, accessible and informative. 
Local government is required to be a participatory system which facilitates on-
going dialogue with communities. And lastly, the Constitution speaks to values 
of equity, ethical behavior, procedural and broader administrative justice and 
formal, substantive equality.185 
It might be argued that these imperatives endorsed by government policy-makers 
and legislators and by civil society role-players like NGOs, simply 'set the bar too 
high'. That local government's crisis of credibility in 2003/2004 relates in part 
the yawning gap between the reality of municipal practice and the impossible 
benchmarks created by post apartheid municipal policy frameworks. Furthermore 
local government's constitutional status, portrayed as being on the same footing 
with provincial and national government, is probably illusionary. It may well be 
that local government's license to shape its own future is based upon 'hollow 
powers' that promise much but in fact leave municipalities at the mercy of 
national legislative and policy frameworks and any of the faults contained therein. 
Nonetheless the myth has been sown that local government will, as an autonomous 
and equal sphere of government, determine its own fate. These presumptions may 
be overblown as Pimstone warned in 1998: 
Ours is a unitary democracy with many features of the centralisation of power. 
Primary legislative and executive power resides in national organs with 
Parliament, the President and Cabinet. Legislative initiative is taken by national 
government where matters are to be dealt with uniformly in accordance with 
national standards, norms, policies and frameworks. This is made clear by 
the detailed mechanisms of legislative override presently in the Constitution. 
Provincial governments are afforded generally narrower, matter-specific 
legislative and executive powers, including the power to legislate over all 
local government matters. There is, therefore, a distinct power gradient in the 
Constitution which has significant consequences for local government .... There 
is a marked degree of legislative subordination: municipal government cannot 
legislate in conflict with national and provincial legislation. Local government 
has the right to govern on its own initiative the local government affairs of the 
community, but subject to national and provincial legislation.,a6 
Parts B of Schedule 4 & 5 of the Constitution, conventionally regarded as framing 
the powers of local government, can be misleading because section 156 of the 
Constitution limits municipal authority in respect of these functions to "executive 
authority in respect of, and the right to administer ... and to make and administer by-
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laws" as Pimstone notes.187 According to Pimstone this definition of powers renders 
local govemment subservient to other spheres of government: 
This evokes an overtly administrative function for local government and raises 
the specter of a resuscitation of the municipal role as administrative handmaiden 
to more powerful government spheres. Although greater administrative powers 
can be assigned or delegated, this really leaves municipalities at the mercy of 
other spheres in terms of policy-making. Such a definition of municipal power 
renders the notion of local government as a sphere of government equal in 
status to other spheres quite ludicrous.188 
This argument has already been outlined in previous sections but requires 
clarification; the argument is not that local government has not undergone a 
considerable enhancement of its powers and functions but that it exercises these 
powers within a fairly restrictive framework. One effective of this increasingly 
comprehensive framework of obligations is the duty to assume vast social and 
developmental responsibilities and to do so by participating within expansive 
national-scale programmes like the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure 
Programme (CMIP). It is important to distinguish this argument from the more 
simplistic rendering of a local government systems starved of financial resources 
necessary for the performance of its functions - often referred to as the 'unfunded 
mandate.' The burden he is in fact one of performance and complexity and not 
simply of having insufficient finance to meet responsibilities. "The burden is heavy, 
and at present many municipal structures are simply incapable of shouldering it. 
The discrepancy between need and capacity is one of the more telling features ."189 
Policy-makers and allied sections of civil society like NGOs initiated and conducted 
a discourse about local government's potential role largely free of these sobering 
reflections . Planning and in particular municipal lOP was given an impossibly 
sweeping mandate. The handbook by Planact for example, talks of the more 
general function of planning in bringing about change, "Planning is a tool that may 
be used to bring about desired change. In effect, it sets up each step towards 
bringing about the change."1 9o 
Couched in many of the NGO resource documents on planning is the idea that 
the planning process can be recaptured and controlled by ordinary councillors, 
community leaders and municipal staff, if they acquire an understanding not only 
of the broad political and social objectives of planning but more concretely the 
methods and techniques it uses. Thus in Chapter One of its handbook Planact 
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attempts to overview the procedures and phases of the planning process, trying 
to reinterpret the specialised methods and jargon of planning into simple concepts 
and language. The concept of indicators as measures of development is explained , 
as are forecasting and appraisal techniques .191 Cost benefit analysis is explained 
as "a tool used to analyse the economic advantages and disadvantages of a plan 
or project" with a cautionary note that some benefits are difficult to quantify or value 
in monetary terms.192 Characterising conventional planning as primarily concerned 
with economic issues, NGOs like Planact sought to emphasize both the social and 
economic: 
It is important that social impact assessments and environmental impact 
assessments are used to supplement appraisal tools which focus on the 
economic aspects of a project proposal and generally ignore the social and 
environmental costs and benefits of each alternative course of action '93 
The handbook goes on to discuss a range of assessment and management 
tools like social or environmental impact assessments , the use of bar charts to 
represent project progress and management / logical framework matrices as 
a means of monitoring and representing overviews of projects and managing 
results towards well-defined objectives.194 The new municipal role-players were 
also encouraged to become familiar with technically powerful data management 
systems like Geographic Information Systems (GIS)195 As many NGOs had only 
recently begun to adopt these techniques themselves, (often as a result of funder 
pressure or as an attempt to compete with private sector consultants) the attempt 
to pass these skills onto community organisations and councillors may have been 
imbued with more fervor than realistic assessment of the prospects for successful 
implementation by the cl ient groups. 
How were NGO values and principles inserted into lOP? Chapter 1 of the Planact 
handbook opens with a set of terms and concepts that the authors seek to define. 
These "concepts" also provide an insight into some of the NGO aims and values 
that were inculcated to the planning process: 
• Accessibility: the term is used in its spatial sense and relates to the ease with 
which citizens access facilities and move between work and home. The concept 
of the "integrated" city caries with it the promise of easier, cheaper and reduced 
travel for working people.196 
• Bottom-up and Top-down: Clearly the NGOs preference is for the former i.e. "A 
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bottom-up approach to planning is one where the proposals are made at the 
very local level, the lowest level being the community.197 
• Budget: Ostensibly not a value laden term but the NGO emphasis on budgets 
emphasized the critical link between plans and the allocation of funds - in other 
words planning needed to link projects to specific sources of funds to have any 
credibility.19B 
• Centralisation : NGOs were concerned by the extent to which decision-making 
was centralised . Decentralisation meant, "the power to make decisions is 
dispersed to people, groups, or organisations at lower levels of the hierarchy." 
Planact does not explicitly endorse this but generally NGO literature of the time 
favored considerable decentralisation of decision-making to local government 
for example , rather than provincial of national government. 199 
• Compact city: this is posed as the alternative to the apartheid city that is 
characterised as separated, segregated and sprawling. The concept of urban 
sprawl embodies a number of negative features including inappropriate usage 
of land better suited to agriculture, destruction of the natural environment by 
built environments and the uneconomic use of land for residence purposes.200 
A feature of the apartheid city is dormitory townships or suburbs so named 
because they function purely as residential areas and lack facilities for 
employment, shopping or business activity. In the compact city the objective is 
proximity of services and facilities and concentration of infrastructure. One of 
the ways to overcome this is to engage in infill projects that target vacant or 
poorly used land for residential or other purposes. The sought after result is a 
denser more compact urban area. A related concept is containment i.e. the 
containment of urban development to protect land better suited to agriculture or 
environmental preservation .201 
• Development: Planact offered a fairly comprehensive definition of development. 
" ... the process of improving people's quality of life . Development is successful 
when people have greater choice and opportunities. It can refer to physical 
improvements like housing, access to water, community facilities and so on. 
Development should result in , in among other things , improved health, 
education, employment, equality and freedom. Development is not the same as 
economic growth. ''202 
• Urban nodes: embody the idea of select points where there is a concentration 
of urban activities like business, residences, shops and community facilities. 
Ideally nodes are linked via transport routes and function as the centre of new 
growth and development. 
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A potential dilemma for NGOs embracing the rationale of planning, was the 
necessary corollaries of state imposed control , regulation and restriction that had 
to accompany any form of planning, even the relatively laissez-faire approach of 
integrated development planning. Under apartheid these mechanisms had served 
the purpose of protecting racial privilege and enforced inequality. For many 
township dwellers, all experiences of local public administration and systems for 
controlling urban development were tainted by these racial and economic motives. 
NGOs like Planact had to overcome these negative perceptions in order to create 
understanding and respect for the 'non-political' imperatives of planning. The irony 
of course was that these same NGOs were supporting a planning programme that 
was deeply political. 
Zoning regulations determine the way land is used. For example, these laws 
may state that businesses cannot be opened in residential areas. Under the 
previous government there were many zoning regulations which were strictly 
adhered to and helped shape the apartheid city. Now these laws are much more 
flexible (and) try to promote the integration of urban areas.203 
NGOs saw the opportunity to use processes like land-use planning to bring about 
their vision of a transformed urban environment. Problems of unequal distribution 
of services and facilities were to be tackled through urban integration. Planning 
would become a tool to force the privileged and middle class suburbs to share their 
superior facilities and services with low-income areas, while poor townships would 
receive preferential consideration for upgrading and infrastructure expenditure.204 
Increased rural-urban integration would occur, as rural-urban economic linkages 
were better-recognised and promoted through trading facilities and improved 
connecting infrastructure.205 land use planning, according to Planact, had the 
potential to prevent or curtail irrational uses of land brought about through the 
operation of an unrestrained urban land markel.206 
Training in lOP 
Between 1999 and 2003 government, donors and the NGO sector expended 
vast resources on training for councillors, municipal officials and community 
organisations in lOP. One example of this programme was the contract awarded to 
the Urban Sector Network, a national network of NGOs, in 2001. Four members of 
the network, Planact, the Centre for Community and labour studies (CClS), the 
Foundation for Contemporary Research (FeR) and Afesis-corplan were appointed 
by the Department of Provincial and local Government to run the program which 
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ran from July to August 2001.207 The handbook used by the USN for this training 
was similar to that produced by Planact some four years previously. Its contents 
included the history of planning in South Africa , the legal context for planning, 
key concepts and assumptions that underpinned IDP and how these should be 
applied, the role of councillors , the rationale for cooperative governance and public 
participation.20B The emphasis on integration of municipal activities and moving 
planning out of its purely spatial concerns was carried over into the new handbook 
however new elements like the distinction between district and local municipalities, 
the importance of public participation and the imperative to manage municipal 
performance, were now included . The handbook (more concise and geared 
more directly to training than the Planact document) emphasized that Integrated 
Development Planning now enjoyed legal status as a municipal function, being a 
requirement of the 2000 Municipal Systems Ac\.209 It explained how the executive 
committee and other decision-making bodies of council would, in terms of the 
Municipal Structures Act, be required to identify and prioritise the needs of the 
community and formulate strategies for dealing with those needs. 
Thus NGOs were now in a position to use the power of the law to train and 
orientate elected government representatives and civil servants in the new planning 
process and the values and norms they regarded as having maximum potential to 
deliver democracy and development. In some respects the NGO sector seemed 
even more convinced than the state of the efficacy of the new policy framework. 
The handbook claimed for example that the Municipal Demarcation Act: 
Initiated a new demarcation process that has resulted in a dramatically reduced 
number of municipalities, which are larger and in a better position to become 
viable local government units.210 
The USN affiliated NGOs became the promoters and even the cheerleaders of the 
new local government system and rightly claimed their joint authorship of it: 
We have developed a broad understanding that local government is no longer 
just a service provider but goes beyond that as stipulated in the Constitution. 
South Africa has been breaking new ground in creating participatory, 
democratic, accountable structures of local governance. Developmental local 
governance implies a change from the old way of planning to a new style of 
local government planning that focuses on the developmental needs of citizens. 
It is this new system of planning that is called Integrated Development Planning 
(IDP) .211 
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The handbook reminds municipalities that planning is no longer a discretionary 
matter and the new IDPs with a 'lifespan' of five years are to take precedence over 
all other plans: 
The Integrated Development Plan has a legal status superseding all other 
plans that guide development at local government level. It is clearly stated 
in the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 that all municipalities, i.e., Category A 
municipalities, Category B municipalities and category C municipalities I!ll.!§1 
undertake an integrated development planning process.212 
It is remarkable how NGOs through their joint ownership of the new planning 
paradigm, are drawn into a role whereby they act as partners of the state in gaining 
local municipal compliance with the new policy. Some of the points that the USN 
handbook attempted to drum into municipal stakeholders included: 
• Every newly elected municipal council would be required to prepare an IDP for 
its term of office and the IDP should be reviewed annually 
• The completion of the IDP should take 6-9 months and be linked to the 
municipal budgeting cycle213 
• The IDP process was to be "interactive and participatory": the role-players 
identified are municipal officials, councillors, provincial and national line 
departments and 'municipal stakeholders' (community as a whole , 
disadvantaged groups "e.g. women, the disabled etc" and non-organised 
sectors of the community assisted by NGOs.)2'4 
• The elements of the IDP should include: 
o The vision of the municipality; 
o An assessment of the existing level of development and remaining needs 
in the municipality including basic services, unemployment and the needs 
of the 'marginalized.' 
• The elected council's development priorities and strategies including local 
economic development objectives and internal transformation challenges plus 
the operational strategies to achieve the above; 
• A spatial development framework setting out basic guidelines on managing land 
use; 
• Disaster management plans; 
• Key performance indicators and performance targets - these would be 
differentiated according to "gender and economic principles." 21s 
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It is important to note the power of terminology in these tracts. The USN handbook 
advocated what it termed an "event centred" approach to planning. In describing 
the steps in the planning process, the USN struggled to specify the technical and 
bureaucratic steps of planning and to imbue these with a developmental mission 
and its own concerns with matters of gender, equality and the need to curb the 
spread of HIV/Aids. Terms like "harmonization" begin to appear and are used 
in a technical context but are infused with a value-laden meaning that suggests 
rationality, coordination and consensus between different government plans and 
programs. This term is destined to be picked up by government bureaucrats and 
used in increasingly obscure ways, often dressing-up more political imperatives. 
Another noteworthy element is the assumption that planning will primarily result 
in "proposals" suggesting that even the NGO sector was increasingly resigned 
to a form of local government dependent on the central state for its project and 
operational revenue - a far cry from the autonomy principle. Also evident in the 
following tables is the numerous planning products expected i.e. the one certain 
outcome of the planning process was that it would produce many plans - all to 
be integrated at some level. This would ultimately make the process easier to 
monitor and measure by provincial government and other oversight authorities. 
Municipal planning performance could simply be measured through the production 
of particular planning documents, a simple tick-box exercise. Another remarkable 
aspect of the process is the constant reminders (based on core NGO concerns) 
that issues of poverty, gender equity and the need to tackle HIV I Aids, should 
be included in each phase of the process. The constant repetition of these topics 
suggests a strong advocacy function by the NGO sector but the terminology 
attached viz. to "receive consideration", "be addressed", "not to be marginalized", 
suggests more concern with the rhetoric than careful strategic consideration . 
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3.5 Phases of the lOP Process 
Table 1: Phases of lOP - Urban Sector Network 
The USN 5 key phases to lOP may be represented, in para-phrased form, as: 
Phase 1 Purpose Process Outputs 
Analysis Factor in needs Data-based analysis of Existing levels 
through participation service standards and of development 
and assemble gaps. assessed Frame 
information on Prioritise issues of priority issues 
available resources. participation and causal factorsldentify 
Assemble In-depth analysis of available 
information priority issues resou rces incl. 
and develop Include socio-economic finance 
understanding of and gender concerns in Economic and 
local 'dynamics' for analysis gender specific 
sound decision- Identify the poor & other issues integrated 
making special needs in the into problem 
analysis statements 
Phase 2 Purpose Process Outputs 
Strategies 'Inter-sectoral' Inter-sectoral workshops Vision for 
discussion on 
- open forum concept for municipality 
strategy options dealing with priority issues Objectives set for 
for tackling priority Inter-government & sector all priority issues 
issues with 
consideration of cooperation via district Strategic 
multiple alternatives. level workshops options outlined 
Policy guides to Refer to or develop and choices 
be considered . municipal policies on HIV/ made'tentative' 
Emphasis on Aids, gender and ensure financial 
choices that unlock consideration thereof in frameworkprojects 
best solutions strategies identified 
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Phase 3 Purpose Process Outputs 
Projects Ensure a smooth Project task team to 'work Indicators for 
link between out' project proposals objectives 
planning and in consultation with Specified project 
delivery through specialists, departmental outputs with 
detailed project staff and 'domain targets and 
planning by specialists. location. 
joint teams of Activities specified 
professionals, with time-lines. 
'sector specialists ' Responsible 
and stakeholders. agencies and 
These teams are to actors identified. 
draw up proposals 
with tentative target 
figures, technical 
standards, locations 
time horizons and 
cost estimates. 
Project proposals 
must factor in issues 
of poverty, HIV/Aids . 
• Phase 4 Purpose Process Outputs 
Integration The results of Project proposals Revised project 
project planning discussed at lOP proposals. 
are checked Representative A 5-year financial plan 
against the Forum and capital investment 
original vision (a public forum). programme 
and objectives. Matching and A 5-year municipal action 
Strategies and alignment plan 
resources are occurs within the An integrated spatial 
"harmonised". This municipality. development framework. Integrated programmes harmonization Revision of for local economic 
"will result in a proposals by project development, 
consolidated teams also includes environmental matters, 
spatial, financial review of gender poverty alleviation, 
and institutional and HIV/Aids gender equity and 
framework as concerns HIV I Aids 
a sound basis A management plan 
for smooth Monitoring I performance 
implementation. management systems 
Cross references to 
sector plans 
Disaster management 
plans 
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Phase 5 
Approval 
Purpose 
Creating legitimacy 
and support for the 
lOP by allowing 
all stakeholders to 
comment on the 
draft plan. 
Process 
Municipal council 
and public to discuss 
draft plan 
Check to see that 
'special needs 
groups' have 
opportunity to 
comment 
Amendments 
according to 
comments 
Approval by council 
Alignment with 
district, provincial 
and national plans 
Check for legal 
compliance 
Further sector 
alignment 
Feasibility check 
I professional 
feedback 
Final amendments 
and adoption by 
council 
Outputs 
An amended and adopted 
Integrated Development 
Plan 
HIV/Aids strategies area 
proved by council & 
communitylssues related 
to poverty and genders 
are incorporated. 
[Source: Department of Provincial and local Government & Urban Sector Network 
(undated) IDP Training Handbook Urban Sector Network, Johannesburg South 
Africa, p26-30] 
Did municipalities follow this planning process? The select municipalities 
considered in the case study section of this paper seemed to follow a set of 
procedures that were at least similar. In subsequent discussion of Ngqushwa 
municipal staffing matters it will be shown that this consideration of competing 
concerns and especially affordabil ity issues was entirely lacking. In fact for every 
real or imagined function to be performed by the municipality, the approach was to 
simply create a staff post. This suggests that the planners made little effort to follow 
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their own prescripts or conduct what might be termed a reality check during the 
'strategies phase'. 
Envisaged Benefit 
Like the Planact handbook the USN lOP Training Handbook envisaged that 
the lOP process would have a significant impact on the manner in which local 
communities were governed. Municipalities would gain understanding, in social 
and technical terms, of the problems that beset the area and would be able to 
match up the resources and strategies required to address these problems. 216 
The USN's intriguing formulation of the issue was that under the new Constitution, 
municipalities had been "awarded major development responsibilit ies .. . " These 
encompassed the provision of basic services, the creation of jobs, promoting 
democracy and accountability and eradicating poverty. The lOP constituted a 
strategic management instrument whereby all of this could be achieved.217 Echoing 
throughout all of this is what Arturo Escobar termed "salvation" or more precisely 
that 'development' was about breaking the link with " natural forces, which had not 
produced the most happy results ."218 
To achieve these benefits planning would have to be accompanied by a shift 
towards more professional management practices and adoption of scientific 
management principles or what Escobar terms planning as "rational social action". 
Public sector planning would therefore be accompanied by refurbished concepts 
from the corporate sector like performance management. The USN provided the 
following rationale for adopting performance management. 
Performance management is a strategic approach to management, which 
equips leaders and managers at different levels with a set of tools and 
techniques to regularly plan , continuously monitor, periodically measure and 
to review performance of the organisation in terms of indicators and targets for 
efficiency, effectiveness and impact within their own organisations.219 
But performance management would not confine itself to those comoditiies typically 
traded by the corporate sector i.e. that which was easily measured and quantified, 
for instance; targets related to the number of water connections installed or 
maintained, the average time it took to rectify a service breakdown or the extent to 
which municipal expenditure conformed to budget. Instead in the USN handbook on 
planning, performance management would draw upon the much acclaimed Batho 
Pele (people first) principles.220 This charter of values and principles was framed 
in the 1997 Batho Pele White Paper and included a number of less tangible social 
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values. These values were extended to local government in the 1998 White Paper 
on Local GovernmenP21: 
Batho Pele : 
• Consultation : citizens would be consulted on service levels and quality 
• Service standards: There would prior agreement about the service 
standards that could be expected. 
• Access: citizens would have equal access to the services they were 
entitled to 
• Courtesy: civil servant (including local government officials) would be 
required to show courtesy and consideration in their dealing with citizens. 
• Information: the municipality would be required to provide full and 
accurate information about the manner in which it provided services 
• Openness and Transparency: information on operations, budgets and 
management practices would be open to scrutiny by citizens. 
• Redress: where services were lacking or inadequate, citizens would be 
entitled to remedial action or at least and explanation and apology. 
• Value for money: citizens could expect that services would be provided 
economically and efficiently. 222 
3.6 A New Start 
These principles were hardly new and might reasonably have expected to form 
the basic approach of any well-functioning local government i.e . the basic good 
sense that would shape the norms and tradition of any democratically elected 
council and its administration. The existence of these norms would be taken for 
granted in the regular interaction between the local municipality and local citizens . 
If the municipality strayed from these norms it would be reminded from time to 
time through the voting patterns, petitions, delegations, letters, phone calls and 
complaints of local citizens. 
The Batho Pele White Paper and the Local Government White Paper effectively 
removed these values from the realm of common practice and convention and 
created from them a set of 'scientifically derived' performance benchmarks i.e. it 
moved common sense into the realm of expertise .223 What might have reasonably 
emerged from traditions of understanding and convention were now placed under 
the control of systems and experts. Chapter 6 of the Municipal Systems Act now 
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required that municipalities develop key performance indicators related to the 
above norms and the objectives set out in it's lOP. Municipalities would also be 
required to undertake annual monitoring and internal auditing of these indicators 
that would result in both internal and external reports.224 
Thus while the Integrated Development Planning paradigm promised economies of 
scale, rationality and greater efficiency, it also entailed more management, systerns 
and procedures and thus entrenched the need for expertise. At the same time the 
complex new local government policy framework became the focus of protracted 
bureaucratic discussion and rumination . Breaking with the past especially a 
past tarnished by apartheid required that the municipality constantly reaffirm its 
commitment to the new order and its post-modern vision of professional and 
developmental local government. 
3.7 NGOs, Planning and Modernity 
Participation was seen as a safeguard not just against the dominance of middle 
class and business interests but a way of avoiding the more extreme shortfalls 
whereby planning became simply a matter of technical rationality - yet another ill-
advised pursuit of modernity. To avoid this , the lOP programme readily embraced 
methods of participatory workshops, rapid rural appraisal and other community-
driven information gathering techniques that acted as a check on the techno-
science approach of conventional town and regional planning. To understand 
the broader dialectical context for this concern it is necessary to briefly return to 
the theoretical. Underlying these reservations was the concern of analysts who 
had become skeptical about the technical and social benefits of Western-led 
modernisation and the extent to which these provided relief to the problems of the 
developing world. Arturo Escobar, for example, argued that: 
Generally speaking, the concept of planning embodies the belief that social 
change can be engineered and directed, produced at will. Thus the idea 
that poor countries could move more or less smoothly along the path of 
progress through planning has always been held as an indubitable truth, an 
axiomatic belief in need of no demonstration, by development experts of most 
persuasions. 225 
Escobar suggests that planning conventions introduced into the developing world 
during the post-World War II period have been unable to escape their cultural and 
historical origins: 
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When deployed in the Third World , planning not only carried with it th is historical 
baggage, but also contributed greatly to the production of the social-economic 
and cultural configuration that we describe today as underdevelopment.226 
The South African IDP programme tried to reverse this by explicitly using planning 
as a means of reducing social and economic inequality. Planning now came with it's 
own, frank pol itical agenda. 
They (Integrated Development Plans) require municipalities to weigh up their 
obl igations and systematically prioritise programmes and resource allocations. 
In a context of great inequalities, IDPs serve as a framework for municipalities to 
prioritise their actions around meeting urgent needs .... 227 
Indeed South African planning policy was anxious to demonstrate that it was alert 
to the link between poverty, underdevelopment and marginalisation and those 
commodities and services that formed the focus of planning. 
They (IDPs) help municipalities to develop a holistic strategy for poverty 
alleviation. Poverty is not just about low household income. It includes other 
aspects of deprivation such as a lack of assets to help households cope with 
shocks and stresses, a lack of the resources or contacts necessary to secure 
pol itical advantage, a lack of access to education, health care and emergency 
services, and the lack of safe , secure and adequately sized housing with basic 
services.228 
Although integrated development plans were supposed to provide a vehicle for 
framing the local governing manifesto of a municipality, the challenges confronting 
all municipalities were already defined in considerable detail in an all-embracing 
national policy framework, principally the White Paper. Any concept of embedded 
autonomy would therefore have to be understood against the backdrop of the White 
Paper which prescribed a number of challenges facing South African municipalities, 
some of which directed municipal action directly towards particular manifestations 
of inequality and underdevelopment, "Extreme concentrations of taxable economic 
resources in formerly white areas, demanding redistribution between and with in 
local areas ."229 
Huge backlogs in service infrastructure in historically underdeveloped areas, 
requiring municipal expenditure far in excess of the revenue currently available 
with in the local government system .230 
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Great spatial separations and disparities between towns and townships and 
urban sprawl, which increase service provision and transport costs enormously. 
Most urban areas are racially fragmented, with discontinuous land use and 
settlement patterns. Municipalities in urban areas will need to develop strategies 
for spatial integration, while managing the continuing consequence of rapid 
urbanisation and service backlogs .231 
While the impetus for decentralisation and increased local autonomy existed 
and could theoretically be served by both the process and product of municipal 
integrated development planning, the central state nonetheless retained the 
primary responsibility for defining the objectives of planning and prescribed how 
these should be tackled by local municipalities. Accordingly, the 1998 Local 
Government White Paper, held out the integrated development planning system as 
a neutral , technically superior vehicle for more efficient local planning. 
Integrated development planning, budgeting and performance management are 
powerful tools that can assist municipalities to develop an integrated perspective 
on development in their area. It will enable them to focus on priorities within an 
increasingly complex and diverse set of demands. It will enable them to direct 
resou rce allocations and institutional systems to a new set of development 
objectives. 232 
What is omitted is the fact that these development objectives and the means 
of reaching them were already largely prescribed by the central state through 
comprehensive and over-arching policy as outlined above. Some of th is pol icy 
addressed itself to the mechanics and procedures of planning. Integrated 
Development Planning 's actual planning products i.e. what had to be produced 
on paper, for instance was regulated nationally through the Municipal Systems 
Act, the Development Facilitation Act and the Local Government Transition Act 
(2nd Amendment). In addition there was a host of provincial level regulations, 
the Eastern Cape's provincial gazette number 274 of 24 October 1997 Land 
Development Objectives in Terms of the Development Facilitation Act for example, 
which prescribed procedural aspects within the province. 
In 1999 the Foundation for Contemporary Research tentatively pointed out this 
problem in a rare criticism of the over-arching national framework for planning: 
This centralisation is evident in the policy framework, not only in the directive 
for municipalities to "be developmental ", but also in the different avenues 
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through which national and provincial governments have trespassed on 
municipal planning autonomy. While national policy specifies planning outputs, 
the provincial policy regulates planning processes, albeit less formally. With 
both inputs and outputs pre-specified municipalities have little discretion to 
behave "strategically" in responding to need. Indeed, it is the more powerful 
or independent municipalities (who can afford to challenge or ignore the policy 
framework) that have behaved more strategically in the planning process.233 
More importantly a broad and interlocking national policy framework had virtually 
pre-determined a comprehensive set of social and economic objectives for 
planning, neatly and somewhat glibly bound up in the notion of 'developmental local 
government' . National planning policy and guidelines prescribed at least three 
social/economic objectives of planning which it clearly felt needed to be 'drummed 
home'to municipalities. These became the focus of extensive training and briefing 
sessions directed to municipalities with the assistance of NGOs, the private sector, 
para-statals like the CSIR and foreign donors, principally the German Agency for 
Technical Cooperation (GTZ) 
Spatial restructuring: undoing the spatial manifestation of apartheid was a national 
government priority that called for local implementation via municipal integrated 
development plans. Laudable as this objective was, it sought to replace one form of 
social theory with another: 
Integrated development planning is a mechanism to restructure our cities, towns 
and rural areas. 
Apartheid planning entrenched the ideology of separate development in spatial 
development patterns. Integrated development planning will redress these 
spatial imbalances and promote integrated human settlement through: 
• Ensuring a shared understanding do spatial development opportunities, 
patterns and trends; 
• The localisation of spatial development principles that promote integrated 
and sustainable development; 
• The formulation of specific strategies aimed at the spatial restructuring of 
cities and towns; and 
• The formulation of a spatial development framework that provides a 
spatial overview of planned public and private sector investmenP34 
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Social justice: given the history of the state in South Africa and the new 
government's determination to be seen to overcome this legacy of inequality and 
racial privilege, planning was obliged to become a vehicle for social transformation : 
Integrated development planning is a mechanism to promote social equality. 
The planning process is participatory in nature and allows for local processes 
of democratisation, empowerment and social transformation . The integrated 
development planning process is designed in such a way that all role-players 
and stakeholders have a voice in the issues affecting their lives.235 
While these promises of social equality may seem necessary and authentic, it 
would also be prudent to recall the warnings of Escobar who likened the activities 
of planners in the developing world to their 19th century counterparts serving 
a bourgeoisie who were struggling to cope with the pressures of a new urban 
modernity. Escobar noted the state's efforts via science, technology and planning 
to cope with social problems like health, education and unregulated economic 
activity. 
In sum, the rise of the social made possible the increasing socialisation and 
subjection of people to dominant norms, as well as their insertion into the 
machinery of capitalist production. 
And; 
... those very operations and forms of social planning have produced governable 
subjects. They have shaped not only social structures and institutions, but also 
the way in which people experience life and construct themselves as subjects.236 
Economic equality: A further social function which lOP policy claimed to perform 
was to tackle South Africa 's vast problem of economic imbalance. The basic 
premise being that municipalities and indeed the state in general , had hitherto 
favored a range of commercial and middle-class interests over the interests of the 
poor. 
Integrated development planning is a weapon in the fight against poverty. 
Integrated development planning should address severe social and economic 
imbalances such as the urban Irural divide as well as adverse conditions 
affecting marginalised groups on the grounds of race, gender, age or disability. 
The Constitution requires that: a municipality must structure and manage its 
administration and budgeting processes to give priority to the basic needs of the 
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community and to promote the social and economic development of the 
community. The strategies, projects and programmes that are generated 
through the integrated development planning process must be assessed in 
terms of the extent to which they assist in empowering and improving the living 
conditions of the disadvantaged. 
The holistic, integrated and participatory nature of integrated development 
planning allows poverty alleviation to be addressed in a multi-faceted way. The 
lOP can do this through: 
Focusing on areas of greatest need; 
Prioritising projects that focus on the plight of the poor and the marginalised ; 
Addressing landlessness through implementing appropriate land reform 
initiatives; 
Promoting local economic development; and 
Preparing spatial frameworks that mainstream the poor into the economy.237 
These are just some of the vast social impacts that government promised of its 
lOP programme - the implication being that the plans would deliver miracles 
if municipalities would only properly implement them. Other social benefits 
anticipated from lOPs included: creating wealth by attracting new investment 
partners for government, ensuring more sustainable and effective development 
strategies, building the community by creating a shared vision and ownership of the 
municipality, creating a public "arena" for mediating different interests and getting 
consensus on priorities , improving municipal governance, providing a framework 
and guide for decision-making, aligning financial and human resources with the 
municipalities aspirations and ambitions, transforming the municipal institution itself 
and enhancing political accountability and improving cooperative governance.238 
Indeed it seemed that every imaginable quality in the realm of governance and 
public administration was theoretically achievable through the lOP. 
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CHAPTER 4: DEBATING INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT 
PLANNING THEORY 
4.1 Background 
The lOP policy framework aimed to bring about a new configuration of 
municipal procedures and institutional forms loosely termed 'developmental 
local government'. This concept has been explored through the literature of by 
Chipkin , Parnell and Pieterse. The link between GEAR and 'developmental local 
government' has been extensively explored by other writers but it is worth revisiting 
the official explanation in the Local Government White Paper: 
A central principle of the Reconstruction and Development programme (RDP) 
is the empowerment of poor and marginalized communities. This is repeated in 
the Growth Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) which calls for "a 
distribution of income and opportunities in favour of the poor. "239 
The White Paper goes on to discuss 'equitable share subsidies' to poor households 
and although these come from national government, it warns that they should also 
be affordable within the overall municipal budget. The White Paper also urges 
municipalities to link economic growth and investment in the municipal area to 
"redistribution and community development."24o In reality, the lOP programme and 
the developmental local government ideal it served faced a near impossible task of 
bringing vast neglected and under-seNiced settlements with in the realm of a newly 
established , seNice orientated , pro-poor municipal dispensation that faced , not 
unjustifiably, pressures for rationalisation . 
However, the policy framework itself contains a number of important contradictions 
that, it appears, must be resolved by local actors before proceeding with their lOP. 
Firstly its appears to respond to at least two different pressures for reform. 
On the one hand macro-economic pressures and fiscal stress on the public 
sector (and , more pertinently within the local government sector) encourage 
the scaling back of municipal operations, the search for greater productive and 
allocative efficiencies and other elements of New Public Management (NPM) 
-style reforms. On the other hand, massive seNice backlogs, extensive under-
seNicing and broader democratic transformation create pressures for a dramatic 
expansion of seNice delivery, with associated budgetary expansion.241 
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In preceding chapters it has been argued that the influence of the market and the 
general impact of neoliberalism offer a neat but simplistic critique of new municipal 
policy. Professional and disciplinary tendencies that impacted on Integrated 
Development Plans came from a range of sources and ideological bases. In its 
analysis of IDP case study phenomena, the FCR suggested that the challenges 
confronting municipal government were being seen through three distinct analytical 
lenses, all of which posed the fundamental problem in slightly different terms. 242 
Firstly, the exponents of 'governance' as the key value for assessing local 
government, tended to see the challenge as one of strengthening democratic 
accountability and winning a broad based trust and legitimacy for municipal 
councils and the administration. Council's primary role would be to reconcile and 
mediate between local interests and ensure strong links with civil society. For 
their part, administrators had to be responsive to public needs and will, whilst 
ensuring that there was a clear connection between council 's policy decisions and 
the actions of municipal line departments. Municipal institutions would become 
less hierarchical and more cooperative in their work. Service delivery would 
include partnerships and networks with civil society and strategic planning and 
management would increasingly see programmes and services based on clear 
targets defined through participative processes with communities. The institution 
would function according to good corporate governance principles that would 
eliminate patronage, corruption or any undue influences outside council's pol icy 
framework.243 
Secondly, a more functionalist bureaucratic approach to local government survived 
but not within the new policy realm, indeed new policy regarded 'rule bound' 
bureaucracies as part of the problem rather than the solution. In fact many of 
the 'old guard' administrators and managers who had survived the purging of 
the municipal bureaucracy became the scape-goats for frustrated Ministers and 
politicians. Politicians became very adept at championing the new policy framework 
in the face of what they portrayed as racist bureaucrats fighting a rearguard action. 
However the bureaucratic approach was well-entrenched in the civil service, 
not just at municipal level and not just under the peculiar racial circumstances 
of immediate post-apartheid South Africa. Some of its core tenets have been 
described by Turner and Hulme whose observations are purportedly global. In the 
discourse of change in South African municipalities, these bureaucrats seldom 
offered a theoretical explanation for their behaviour - any attempt to raise their 
beliefs to the level of principle or theory would have been tantamount to career 
suicide. The traditional bureaucrats distrusted the influence of the politician 
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and the boundless faith in electoral and representative democracy to deliver 
leadership of integrity and technical competence . They were deeply troubled by 
rule-bend ing and tampering with what they regarded as immutable principles of 
local public administration. Caste (often unjustifiably) as faithful servants of an 
increasingly politically impotent white middle class, the municipal bureaucrats 
found justification for their suspicions in the many cases of corruption , patronage 
and gross incompetence at senior level which often made the ambitious new policy 
framework seem like tokenism and fraught with comic hypocrisy. Often regarded as 
a reactionary approach lacking in any substantive theory, the "traditional approach" 
was in fact underpinned by principles encompassed within the Weberian view of 
an ideal bureaucracy.244 The Foundation for Contemporary Research describes this 
approach as valuing: 
... uniformity in service delivery across jurisdictions, and the clear definition and 
allocation of powers and responsibilit ies both within administrations and with 
political leadership. The primary role of municipalities is to monopolistically 
deliver local public services on the scale and scope of identified by political 
leaders on the basis of their electoral mandates. The IDP process would 
thus attempt to improve the operation and management of existing municipal 
activities , through building 'better' rule-sets to guide bureaucratic decision-
making.245 
Within the NGO and 'progressive'5 academic sector and indeed amongst many 
emerging politicians there was little empathy with th is approach despite the fact that 
a large degree of institutional failing clearly arose from weak administration and 
disregard for rules and procedures. As a policy discourse this perspective lacked 
ideological appeal and bordered on the politically incorrect. 
Thirdly, a contextual backdrop to planning is incomplete without some mention 
of the pressures for institutional reform that were at work during the IDP era. The 
New Public Management or market-based approach has already been indirectly 
outlined through discussion of Bond's critique of municipal change. Turner and 
Hulme's discussion of Public Choice Theory is also relevant as it draws upon 
the idea that government crises may be attributable to the bureaucratic turf-wars 
where senior managers engage in narrow budget maximisation and departmentally 
competitive behavior. Institutional manipulation and control of communication is 
used to advance and protect narrow departmental interests. The supply of public 
goods becomes irrational because information is monopolised by the bureaucracy 
and presented to elected councillors in a way that justifies maximum resources 
5 A term widely used to describe those who had associated themselves with the liberation movement 
and the new government 
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and power to the bureaucracy. Resource allocation becomes de-linked from 
public need.246 In the 1998 FCR discussion of lOP models, one of the remedies 
to institutional failure was to increase output efficiency by adopting private sector 
management culture and techniques. More efficient allocation of resources and 
a more productive administration is needed to ensure a broader spread of better 
quality municipal services directed and shaped by market imperatives, or so 
the reasoning went. This opinion also called for performance management via 
measurable indicators and benchmarks to ensure greater management autonomy 
along client-supplier lines whilst political interference must be minimised. 
For municipalities this implied a ruthless rationalisation of the bureaucracy and a 
far more economic approach to the provision of public services. Traditional career 
paths and work cultures had to be overhauled and a competitive contracting 
approach would fill the minimum number of municipal posts . In other words, 
science, in this case of the managerial variety, would produce the sought after lean 
and mean municipal administration. 
In the departmental literature and policy documents, commitment to this approach 
is tempered by consideration for the reaction of powerfully organised municipal 
labour. In general the Ministry was able to reconcile this approach with the 
governance approach by arguing that the urgent need for effective service delivery 
would not be subjugated to the interests of labour. Government however was also 
careful to use the somewhat coy rhetoric of 'partnership' to defuse and co-opt 
labour interests. The services of the South African Local Government Bargaining 
Council were key to this corporatist approach:247 
Approaches to improving service delivery efficiency and quality which build 
on existing capacity are most likely to succeed if they are structured as a 
partnership between Council, management and labour. Other partnership 
approaches have implications for the for the position of workers in the 
administration , and no amount of capacity to plan, effect and administer them 
will bring success unless the real concerns of labour are recognised and 
addressed. 
While the successful transformation of municipal administrations depends on 
recognising the particular interests of labour, labour's interests cannot stand in 
the way of transformation or delivery to communities. The South African local 
Government bargaining Council (SALGBC) will become a critical forum for 
shaping the partnership between labour, management and Councils around new 
service delivery and development objectives.248 
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The incorporation of labour into the local government 'transformation exercise' 
was largely successful and did not come under serious strain until 2002 when the 
South African economy experienced a steep surge in inflation after the plunge of 
the Rand in 2001 . The South African Municipal Worker 's Union demanded a 10% 
increase in municipal wages and called a strike in July when the South African 
Local Government Association (the employer body) refused to negotiate on its final 
offer of 8% across the board.249 SAMWU media officer Anna Weeks noted that a 
previous increase in 2001 had been 7% and therefore below the average increase 
in the cost of living and that by the 2002 the minimum wage for a full-time worker 
was only R1 900 per month.250 
Many might argue that the unaffordable wage bill for local government had other 
contributing factors, one being the failure of the 1999 I 2000 re-demarcation 
process to achieve one of its key objectives, namely to significantly rationalise 
municipal work forces when amalgamating municipalities. Secondly, the fact that 
the wage bill was inflated through that portion assigned to senior management 
salaries rather than ordinary workers. The Congress of South African Trade Union's 
(COSATU) Tony Ehreneich remarked on the settlement reached in the wake of the 
2002 SAMWU strike: 
It also deals with the exorbitant salaries of management, which were part of the 
problem. They are milking the system while the workers do most of the work, yet 
do not earn proper salaries .250 
The lOP process thus could count on little pre-arranged consensus regarding the 
matter of personnel costs and where exactly the proposed rationalisation would 
be most painfully felt. In planning terms , FCR suggests that the market-based 
approach to lOP would emphasize an overhaul of administrative systems and 
practices in order to improve the management and delivery of services. Planning 
would be led by senior officials and councillors and would be "cascaded down 
through the administration in a top-down fashion."252 Citizens would participate 
in this exercise mainly as clients of municipal service provision - communicating 
what they wanted and how much they were prepared to pay. FCR suggests that the 
role of the citizen could be taken one step further - they would be the force of the 
market, choosing between municipalities that provided the best and most affordable 
services and thus fuelling competition between municipalities to outdo each other in 
terms of 'lean and mean' service provision.253 
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Conceiving of municipal plans as a form of short-term contract between supplier 
and consumer had its own weaknesses according to FCR. The lOP policy 
imperative of comprehensive plann ing and integration could be lost due to the 
autonomy afforded to service providers and fragmented delivery and performance 
management systems could obstruct strategic control. 254 
Returning briefly to planning theory, a common critique is that which refers to 'top-
down' methods. The criticism is rooted in the perception that professional planners 
assemble the available data on a particular community and make the necessary 
formulations that will meet their needs and ensure that their future is carefully 
predicted and set out. Control of the means for change and even the direction 
of that change passes from society to the planner or the relevant bureaucrat. In 
the South African lOP exercise , the identified need for structural and operational 
change was vast. 'Ordinary' changes , driven from forces within society were 
regarded as antithetical to the purposes of transition because society itself was 
flawed, shaped and riddled by the legacy of apartheid. Escobar's observations 
on planning in the Thi rd World sponsored by the World Bank in the 1940s are 
surprisingly relevant to turn of the century 'integrated development planning ' in 
South Africa: 
In the face of the imperative of the 'modern society', planning involved the 
overcoming or eradication of 'traditions ', 'obstacles' and 'irrationalities', that is' , 
the wholesale modification of existing human and social structures and their 
replacement with rational new ones.255 
While the lOP programme was in no way geared towards the destruction of 
trad itional rural livelihoods or peasant life , along with associated services 
policy, it did elevate 'modern' municipal services to a new level in the collective 
South African consciousness. Through its broad range of social , economic and 
environmental ambitious, the lOP programme attempted to 'wipe the slate clean .' 
Anyone who was subject to the 'developmental local government' and 'integrated 
development planning' rhetoric in South Africa will recognise the resonance in 
Escobar's quote from a 1949 World Bank mission to Colombia : 
Only through a generalised attack throughout the whole economy on education, 
health, housing , food and productivity can the vicious circle of poverty, 
ignorance, ill health and low productivity be decisively broken .'256 
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4.2 Community Appropriation of Planning? 
In South Africa the conceptual tools of calculability and planning were offered up 
for 'community ownership' and control' . This served not only to accommodate 
South Africa 's particularly mobilised neighborhood-level organisations, widely 
referred to as community-based organisations, it also pre-empted criticism from 
a fairly powerful and well resourced NGO sector that might other wise have been 
skeptical of the powers and broad mandate being handed to 'planners'. In 1997 
Afesis-corplan, an Eastern Cape NGO that had long advocated increasingly levels 
of local community control over all aspects of state-led development programmes, 
embraced the lOP framework as a practical expression of these principles. Writing 
in the Local Government Transformer (an Afesis-corplan newsletter directed at 
local government) researchers Lu Heideman and Dave Savage observed : 
The new framework for municipal planning being introduced in the province 
calls for a very different approach. Councillors must lead the planning process 
themselves, the community must be involved in formulating plans, and the 
process must be supported and implemented by the administration at the 
most senior level. To play these leading roles councillors and senior staff must 
understand fully the purpose, approach and content of municipal planning 
exercises. This implies that the method to be followed in the planning process 
must be designed at local level to meet local needs.257 
This statement gives credence to Alan Mabin's observation that in times of social 
upheaval and reconstruction , planning systems tend to be re-worked to serve new 
political and development objectives. More importantly, planning is caste as the 
panacea to a very large range of societal problems. The ambitions for the lOP 
programme in South Africa outlined above, illustrate the allure of planning very 
clearly. As the Department of Provincial and Local Government and its foreign 
donors rolled out their expansive lOP road shows and SALGA supported training 
programmes, planning became the new municipal 'de rigueur'. The modern benefits 
of planning tended to outshine any concern that plans might also bring a level of 
regulation and dependency to the lives of citizens and tied them and their fortunes 
more tightly to the control of the state . The caution of Escobar was entirely absent 
from the headlong rush into a massive lOP programme: 
But development experts have been blind to these insidious aspects of 
planning ... . One cannot look on the bright side of planning, its modern 
achievements (if one were to accept them), without looking at the same time 
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on its dark side of domination. The management of the social has produced 
modern subjects who are not only dependent on professionals for their 
needs, but also ordered into realities (cities, health and educational systems, 
economies etc.) that can be governed by the state through planning. Planning 
inevitably requires the normalisation and standardisation of reality, which in turn 
entails injustice and the erasure of difference and diversity.258 
Planners and other lOP functionaries seldom acknowledged the way that the lOP 
programme would extend and consolidate the state's control. This did not mean 
that they were unaware of the potential for extending control or what had become 
the 'radical' critique of planning. Andre Olivier, a planner and at the time, a senior 
manager in Strategic Support Services for the South Peninsula Municipality made 
the following remarks at a Local Government Conference in March 1999. 
Plans in themselves are a very important form of communication. If you read 
the radical literature, planning is seen as a tool of control. And its not just zoning 
control but actually to keep the masses at bay, because you fob them off with a 
plan. Plans also say what we will be doing and have a quasi-legitimacy attached 
to them that seems to work.259 
This may ultimately be the real achievement of integrated development plans. 
While they may not transform society and reduce inequality in real terms, they bring 
the assurance that the state is sensitive to these problems and doing something 
about them. As public consciousness became saturated with the 'policy-speak' 
of lOP, so the ability to critically differentiate between what is promised and what 
actually happens, is reduced. Statistics like the number of housing units delivered, 
the kilometres of tarred road rolled out, the number of standpipes installed are 
important reinforcements. Assuming these targets are met, and often they are 
not, they 'prove' that the citizen's faith in calculability and planning is well placed, 
that the strategy is working and the vision and mission set out in the plan is being 
realised. These assurances cloud the reality that for most, there may have been 
very little change in their prospects of a secure or improving livelihood. Indeed it 
is worth reflecting on Foglesong's view, that the political agenda of planning i.e. 
urban renewal, education, health, transport, crime etc are seldom realized and that 
planning has returned to its true function, namely a managerial/administrative 
vehicle for tactical decisions dedicated to preserving the capitalist order. 260 
These reservations were entirely lacking from professional and consultant 
critiques of lOP which tended to suggest the need for tweaking the process to 
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better generate and understand data. In this sense the fundamental assumptions 
of planning are not challenged and it is simply a case of improving the approach. 
However sometimes it is also acknowledged that certain human I social conditions 
defy 'capture' in planning. Analysts like Sue Parnell of the University of Cape 
Town 's Urban Research Unit have tended to argue that these shortfalls in lOP and 
other municipal policy, result from an imperfect understanding of the specificities of 
poverty in South Africa. Parnell argues that poverty in South Africa embodies three 
main elements: 261 
The legacy of apartheid: spatial segregation persists and is not tackled in lOP 
documents; static financial base - while municipal boundaries have expanded the 
principle commercial revenue base of municipalities has remained static i.e. we look 
to the same business districts to generate revenue for much larger areas; municipal 
systems for administration zoning and planning are mostly inherited from apartheid 
or our colonial pasl.262 
Expanding Urban Areas: Parnell predicts urbanisation levels rising from the current 
50 percent to 75 percent. This makes the management of urban areas critical, 
particularly large urban areas. Increased urbanisation results from: in-migration 
- people are moving to towns and cities; natural urban growth - urban populations 
are growing, immigrants tend to gravitate towards the large cities. 263 
Urban Diversity: people will have increasingly uneven access to technology; the 
effects of globalisation are unevenly felt - our economy will be increasingly shaped 
by global forces that allow some to prosper while others flounder; a growing and 
diverse informal sector that forms a key part of the overall economy, particularly in 
Africa. Parnell argues that the informal sector is poorly understood in terms of how 
to succeed how to survive and those who barely survive. Cultural diversity and a 
diverse and vibrant civil society must be successfully incorporated.264 
Parnell suggests that many failures in South African municipal policy result from 
a basic lack of understanding of the urban environment and a lack of reliable 
information on its key features. Policy-makers are also not adept at translating 
this information into policy and financial mechanisms.265 While these elements no 
doubt form part of the policy-making challenge, Parnell's argument that they are 
not dealt with in policy is hard to sustain when considering the broad scope of lOP 
for example, already outlined in this paper. Any analysis that begins by assuming 
that the primary function of policy is solely to 'make life better' is necessarily 
limited in explaining and evaluating policy outcomes. As this paper has already 
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demonstrated, policy has a much more diverse and sometime invidious purpose. 
In many respects lOP served as a clever conjuring trick, imparting the illusion of 
control and predictability. In 1998 the Foundation for Contemporary Research 
reviewed a number of lOP processes underway across the country and noted: 
The focus on visions , missions, strategies, goals, programmes and projects 
tends to overcomplicate the objectives of the exercise. The focus thus shifts to 
planning outputs (such as the planning documents) rather than its impacts (or 
outcomes). Experience suggests that formalised strategic processes seldom 
deliver new strategies but rather reassure key role-players that they remain 
"in control". Evidence from the surveys suggests that where strategic planning 
capacity exists , planning processes are likely to have useful exercises, not in 
developing a strategic orientation but in reflecting it. Many "nice thoughts" and 
"nice sounding" principles may emerge but these tend to have limited meaning 
for organisational practice .266 
4.3 Planning and Techno-Science 
The imperative for control is linked to the ascendancy of the 'economic' as the 
primary point of reference for local government actions, including planning. 
Escobar suggests that the rise of technical professions like planning coincided 
with what he refers to as "the invention of the 'economy'. Whereas 'the economy' 
was an unknown paradigm for understanding human society prior to the end of 
the 18th century, the expanded influence of the market in Europe accompanied 
by new philosophies of human behaviour like utilitarianism and individualism gave 
rise to the classical concept of political economy.267 The 'economy' now existed 
as a largely autonomous domain "separated from morality, politics and culture."268 
According to Escobar, the centrality of the logic of the economy, displaced 
concerns for reciprocity and redistribution. Subsistence activity was scorned as the 
world economy began to establish itself not just as a theory but a new all pervasive 
framework of rules and instrumentalist logic.269 Planning, a tool of modernity, 
embodied this faith in the use of science and technology to manage human 
behavior - the rise of the calculable and measurable against convention , tradition , 
culture and belief. Timothy Mitchell refers extensively to this pre-occupation with 
the calculable and the measurable in his study of Egypt. 
During the second half of the twentieth century, economic established its claim 
to be the true political science. The idea of "the economy" provided a mode 
of seeing and a way of organising the world that could diagnose a country's 
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fundamental condition , frame the terms of its public debate, picture its collective 
growth or decl ine and propose remedies for its improvement, all in terms of 
what seemed a legible series of measurements, goals and comparisons. 27o 
Mitchell shows how 'the economy' having become the "true political science", 
began to impose its own fiscal and monetary criteria for measuring successful 
nations. Neo-liberalism and structural adjustment were reinforced by representing 
nations with low inflation figures, reduced budget deficits and impressive rates of 
economic growth as 'successful '. This despite the fact that in Egypt for example, 
powerful economic forces were at work which were of dubious value to the country 
as a whole .271 South Africa obviously did not experience these trends for the first 
time in the late 1990s to early 2000 when lOP attained its maximum momentum 
as a policy framework. However it is noteworthy that lOP roll-out coincided with 
governments adoption of a new macro -economic programme, GEAR (Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution) and widely regarded as the most clear indication 
of the ANC's a shift to neoliberalism. While the South African government's 
ideological shifts, left or right , on the spectrum of economic policy is the subject of 
extensive study, less attention has been focused on how the notion of economy per 
se, has dominated policy thinking. 
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CHAPTER 5: INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN THE 
EASTERN CAPE 
5.1 The Eastern Cape in Profi le & Literature 
The Eastern Cape is one of South Africa 's nine provinces and is bounded by a long 
coastline with the Indian Ocean to the south-east. 272 At 169580 square kilometres, 
the province is the second largest in South Africa and constitutes 13,9 percent 
of the countries total land mass.273 The population of the province is 6,3 million 
people (2002}274 This constitutes 15,5 percent of the total population of the country 
and was expected to grow by 22 % by 2006 (a 2% higher growth rate than the 
national average.}275 The Eastern Cape's share of the country's Gross Domestic 
Product is just 7.2 percen(276 and government literature frequently portrays the 
province as one of the poorest in the country with an unemployment figure (2002) 
of 48,5 percent compared to the national average of 33,9% (2002} .277 In 2002 the 
province had the highest assessment of household food insecurity, 49,7 percent 
of households interviewed indicated that children (under the age of 17 years) 
went hungry because of insufficient food .27B The Bisho / King William's Town area 
functions as the seat of the provincial government. There are 5 significant cities 
in the province namely Port Elizabeth, East London , Queenstown, Mthatha and 
Grahamstown. 
The Eastern Cape has long been characterised as one of the regions to suffer the 
worst effects of apartheid: 
... hundreds of years of colonial and apartheid pol icies left the Eastern Cape 
deeply scarred, with enduring structural problems, underdevelopment and 
enormous socio-economic development challenges. These include very high 
levels of poverty and inequality, huge disparities in access to basic services 
and infrastructure, soaring unemployment, economic decline and sub-optimal 
performance in key sectors.279 
Historically, the Eastern Cape is widely regarded to be a region whose livelihoods 
and social attitudes have been shaped by 19th century violence, principally that 
of colonial conquesPBO Clifton Crais notes for example " the frontier wars seem 
to have become part of the genetic make-up of many South Africans. "2B1 There 
is almost a sense that the region perpetuates its own peculiar brand of hardship, 
"Grinding poverty, premature deaths, stunted lives have been constant features 
of the Eastern Cape for well over a century."2B2 Such ci rcumstances of systemic 
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vulnerability beg explanation and consideration of models that focus on human 
capability and the manner in which people are able to respond to periodic political, 
social or natural calamities . Thus argues Crais; scholars of the region may have 
to look to climate , change, violence and the spread of the market economy to 
properly understand why the Eastern Cape seems to face chronic and systemic 
insecurity. The Eastern Cape is renowned for its cyclical droughts; 
Historical climatologists have suggested that the severe drought at the end of 
the eighteenth century, felt from the Eastern Cape to the Zambesi Valley and 
clear across the Indian Ocean to New South Wales, represented one of the first 
modern ENSO (EI Nino / Southern Oscillation) events. Beginning around 1791, 
droughts and hunger continued in the general Mozambique region up to 1796 ... 
the Eastern Cape in the nineteenth century experienced pronounced variability 
in terms of rainfall. 283 
Reflecting a link widely endorsed by historians, Crais notes how extreme climatic 
conditions lead to changes in agricultural practices , most disastrously the spread 
of a mono-crop (maize) economy. It also created the conditions that sparked the 
migration of entire populations accompanied by political instability.284 
Most conflicts between Africans and Europeans took place during a drought or 
shortly after one. Droughts invariably create insecurity, particularly when they 
are accompanied by crop failure, malnutrition and, in the worst cases , outright 
famine. The environment then , was one engine of historical change, particularly 
when tied to other developments.285 
There is a sense that current Eastern Cape political and social circumstances are 
linked in some way to historical circumstances of insecurity and the vulnerability 
of certain groups to risk and misfortune. Imprecise as this observation may be it 
is nonetheless important; "That earlier history indeed may lead to or exacerbate 
political conflict, creating a vicious circle in which economic and political crisis 
feed off each other."286 Crais goes onto cite instances where colonial military 
conquest began to incorporate 'total war' i.e. not just military subjugation but 
complete economic devastation, including cattle theft, crop burning and destruction 
of shelters, for the Xhosa.287 Crais estimates that in the frontier war of 1851-
1853 " ... ten percent of the African population engulfed by the war - that is one in 
every ten people - died in one of the most vicious and costly colonial wars of the 
nineteenth century."2BB Whereas drought brought insecurity, combined with war it 
plunged the region into total and repeated crisis . Not all conflicts emanated from 
81 
colonial expansion however and parts of the Transkei, and specifically Pondoland 
for example, saw the effects of the migration of Griqua people also resulting in 
violence and instability.2B9 Insecurity also arose from what Crais refers to as 
a sociology of dispute over land in particular. Land and its usage, including its 
central role in African economic production became subject to disputed laws and 
authorities that arose from conquest and the imposition of indirect rule, that drew in 
and simultaneously undermined customary law.290 
The current towns and settlements of the Eastern Cape were established as 
colonial initiatives in the mid to late eighteen hundreds, frequently as military-settler 
ventures. 291 Grants of land were made to settlers , mostly of British or German 
descent and in some very isolated instances such as Keiskamma, to African people 
such as the Mfengu who has demonstrated some form of loyalty to the colonial 
administration .292 African settlements thus established were generally under 
the communal tenure system, freehold title or quitrenl.293 Communal tenure did 
not provide an individual title deed to the land that remained under government 
ownership.294 Settler land was generally that won by conquest or 'vacated' during 
war. The frontier wars and the cattle-killings of 1856-57 had driven much of the 
African population out of the areas settled by colonists but early in the 20th century, 
African refugees had begun to drift back into these areas.295 By the middle of the 
next century rural villages were commonly under a Native Commissioner for the 
district who exercised both executive and judicial functions .296 These 'locations' as 
they were known and were administered locally as separate units by a headman 
who was also the judicial officer for the village as well as undertaking a policing 
role. These officials were also empowered to allocate land but their position in local 
village society was tenuous being both a civil servant to the village and the face of 
colonial authority.297 An important function of the headman was the administration 
of the commonage: 
The commonage was open to all members of the community, for grazing 
livestock, cutting thatching grass, and collecting firewood and manure .. . arable 
and residential rights were individually held, and the final authority over the 
allocation and use of land lay with the Native Commissioner. 29B 
It is difficult to outline a uniquely Eastern Cape record of apartheid local 
government but some broad national patterns are applicable to the region. At the 
time of the Union in 1910 there were limited exceptions to rule of white controlled 
local governmenl.299 The four provinces had slightly different qualifications for the 
municipal franchise for example. In the Eastern Cape, as part of what was then the 
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Cape, coloured and Indian citizens had the municipal franchise until 1970 when 
it was removed by the National Party to create separate quasi-local government 
institutions for these two groups aoo Similar concessions were made to Indians 
in Natal until 1925. White local authorities nevertheless continued to administer 
urban areas in which coloured , Indian and African people resided .301 Some white 
local authorities attempted to incorporate representatives of black townships onto 
advisory or management boards to give advice on the administration of township 
areas. The running of townships was generally funded by a separate municipal 
account that received revenue from rents , service charges and the sale of beer and 
liquor from township-based beer halls.302 
White municipal control of black townships ended in the early 1970s as a stricter 
form of apartheid policy began to be rolled out to urban areas. Bantu Affairs 
Administration Boards were created to enforce an urban policy that attempted to 
relocate black residents to homeland areas and to limit the number of Africans who 
returned according to the labour needs of 'white South Africa .'303 Two of the largest 
and most sustained homeland 'projects ' were in the Eastern Cape, namely the 
Transkei and the Ciskei. To reinforce the notion that the 'real homes' of black South 
Africans were in the homelands, the Bantu administration boards even diverted 
some township revenue to infrastructure development in the homelands.304 As 
"temporary sojourners" in white South Africa , township residents were provided 
with minimal services and infrastructure and township government was largely 
about imposed and coercive administrative boards rather than representation . 
The deteriorating conditions of most black townships by the mid 1970s is widely 
credited with having fuelled black anger and resistance that characterised the 
period from 1976 into the 1980s.305 
In 1977 the Community Councils Act provided for elected councils in townships 
however the administration boards continued to exercise authority over these 
councils. The Riekert and Cillie Commissions looked into the 1976 uprising and 
found a need to improve township living conditions through more credible local 
government structures for blacks.306 The 1982 Black Local Authorities Act therefore 
made provision for township local authorities still attached to the administration 
boards but gradually taking over their functions. 307 The BLAs as they were known 
came into being during a period of broader constitutional change designed to 
co-opt Indian and coloured communities into a reformed apartheid dispensation. 
Contrary to its political intentions, this "tri-cameral" system backfired and fuelled 
an expanded and heightened form of resistance to apartheid and apartheid local 
government in particular. 
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Elected during 1983 and 1984 on rather low polls in the face of vociferous 
opposition led by the newly formed United Democratic Front (UDF) and its allied 
civic organisations, the powers of these authorities remained limited and their 
role confined largely to the provision of basic services.30B 
The BLAs in fact now provided a focal point for local resistance and the councillors 
who were drawn into these structures became a ready and accessible target for 
popular anger and renewed urban resistance. 
Ever since their establishment the BLAs have been extremely controversial 
institutions in township politics. Councillors were categorised by important 
actors, including the civic associations, as effectively being government stooges 
implementing government policies. At the height of the conflicts of 1985-1987, 
many councillors resigned in the face of pressure ... 309 
Not only were the BLAs politically untenable, the design of urban apartheid and its 
limitations on black urban life made the new institutions financially unviable: 
Limitations on property rights, business and industrial development in the 
townships severely restricted the income-generating capacity of the BLAs. 
Massive bridging finance had to be provided by the provincial authorities to 
enable the BLAs to provide even limited essential services.31o 
Humphries and Stack describe other reforms recommended by the Browne 
Committee, including transfer payments by white local authorities to prop up BLA 
administration and the refinement of this into the Regional Services Council model. 
These developments were highly significant to the Eastern Cape with its mixture 
of homeland governments and urban areas administrated by white municipalities, 
and its long-demonstrated propensity for state violence and an insurrectionary 
response. 
Indeed, once the decision was made to include blacks, virtually the entire 
justification for RSCs began to hinge on the need to improve municipal 
infrastructure in the townships as an integral part of the government's counter 
revolutionary strategy. (Humphries 1991 )311 
Government then began to look into a range of options for re-generating economic 
activity in BLA areas and providing support from better-established white councils. 
It was quickly recognised that the principal issue was that of revenue 'leaking' 
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out of these areas due to an imbalance in tax generating potential between 'white 
areas' and black townships.312 In 1990 the general move towards a constitutionally 
negotiated future saw different options for local government being outlined by 
the Thornhill Report (based on the work of the Co-ordinating Council for Local 
Government.)313 The report included important principles for a future systems 
including: local government as an autonomous sphere of government, directly 
elected local councils as a constitutional right, maximum devolution of functions to 
local government with matching fiscal powers, non-discriminatory and non-racial 
local government and the opportunity for local citizens and role-players to negotiate 
their own way to a new municipal order.314 The similarity between these principles 
and those carried through into the Constitution and the Local Government White 
Paper are obvious (the latter documents having been already described and 
discussed.) Although the ANC embarked upon a different policy formulation process 
for local government, it ultimately adopted many of the core principles of the 
Thornhill Reporl.3 '5 
The features of the negotiating forums (1993-1995) and the transition phase (1995-
2000) are outlined in a number of different sections of this paper and need not be 
repeated . We return therefore to the circumstances in the province at the end of 
the century. 
In 2000 the province received 17,5 percent of national revenue in terms of a 
formula that allocates an "equitable share" of national revenue according to 
need.316 The province has generally lagged behind other provinces in the provision 
of infrastructural services. For example in 1994, the year of the first democratic 
elections, the Eastern Cape had the second lowest percentage (59,7%) of urban 
and lowest (3,1 %) of rural households with electricity.317 By 1995 the percentage 
of urban households that accessed electricity had increased significantly to 67,2% 
(but still the second lowest compared to other provinces) while the rural household 
access to electricity had only increased to 5,8% compared to a national average of 
20,6% for other rural households around the country.31B Consultant to the Eastern 
Cape Socio-economic Coordinating Council (ECSECC) Chris Edwards notes a 
worsening of public access (to basic services) between 1995 and 2001 in both 
the Eastern Cape and South Africa.319 
This lag in service provision has persisted despite consistently preferential 
Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme (CMIP) allocations to the 
province. For example, the Eastern Cape has the highest allocation of CMIP 
funding for the 2002/03 financial year according to the Department of Provincial 
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and Local Government (DPLG) November 2002 Report. The Eastern Cape was 
allocated R444.1 million which is equivalent to 24% of all national allocations. 
These allocations are also directed to the areas of greatest need i.e. the eastern 
part of the province. The largest share of the Eastern Cape 2002/2003 provincial 
infrastructure allocation was directed to the OR Tambo District (27.95%), with 
a total of R124.00m. The Chris Hani District has the second largest allocation 
of R71.66m (16.15%). Alfred Nzo and Amatole districts are allocated R48.22m 
(10.87%) and R46.57m (10.50%), respectively. The fifth and sixth largest share of 
the infrastructure grant is directed to the Nelson Mandela Metropole, at R39.75m 
(8.96%) and Ukhahlamba District, at R38.92m (8.77%). Buffalo City is allocated 
R30.62m (6.90%), and the remaining infrastructure grant funding is allocated to the 
Cacadu District, at R16.93m (3.82%).320 
A number of special interventions have been focused on Eastern Cape local 
government and sought to understand and remedy the breakdown in local 
administration. The Presidential Project Team (PPT) launched in 1996 focused 
on the former Transkei and reported at its inception that water, sanitation, roads, 
telecommunications , health facilities and urban infrastructure were all facing 
imminent collapse .32' Municipalities had "rotted and decayed" and were bankrupt, 
surviving only on grants from provincial governmen(.322 The PPT attempted to 
remedy these problems by installing service meters, introducing computerised 
billing systems, upgrading electricity services and other infrastructure, unblocking 
stalled housing projects, renovating municipal facilities, drawing up rates registers 
and introducing management plans and other human resource systems.323 The 
PPT exercise resulted in a number of short-term improvements but by 1999 most of 
these had reversed and fresh interventions like the Municipal Support Programme 
and the Municipal Mentoring Programme confronted much the same problems that 
the PPT had in 1996.6 
The Eastern Cape is one of three provinces that retains a fairly intact system of 
traditional authority. Lungisile Ntsebeza, using Mamdani's analogy, argues that 
this has led to a 'bifurcated' state i.e. one where state authority functions in a dual 
way where the modern state serves urban citizens in a democratic order and the 
traditional or rural state rules rural subjects in a despotic mode. The South African 
government's strategy to 'democratise' traditional rule , in particular the legal 
and policy attempts to find an accommodation between chiefs and elected local 
government, are a failure according to Ntsebeza.324 Drawing on an article by Leslie 
Bank and Roger Southall (Traditional leaders in South Africa's new democracy)325 
Ntsebeza supports the view that the values of South Africa's constitutional 
6 Based on my own experiences of having interacted with all of these programmes 
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democracy are undermined by the on-going existence of traditional authority. In 
particular he draws attention to the exercise of traditional power in the allocation 
and administration of land and the view that this practise has and continues to 
be corrupted .326 Ntsebeza shows that government's concessions to the role of 
traditional authorities had resulted in irrational forms of rural local governance 
and have irreparably set back basic principles of gender equality for example .327 
Ntsebeza ascribes these concessions to a resurgence of conservative sentiment 
within the ANC, mirroring other neoliberal influences that resulted in the adoption 
of GEAR.328 He also allows however that there might also be a concern for the 
possible alienation of chiefs and their support base with the risk that this brings for 
serious civil and ethnic conflicP29 Ntsebeza also notes that there is a significant, 
but misguided argument that traditional authority may be no less legitimate or more 
corrupt than elected local representatives. 
5.2 Negotiated Local Democracy and the Integrated Development Plan 
Integrated development planning was the first planning campaign of the newly 
democratised local government system. To understand how this programme played 
out in the Eastern Cape it is necessary to briefly revisit the circumstances of the 
local government democratisation process in the province. The broad context 
of locally negotiated municipal change has already been outlined and its impact 
on subsequent local government systems discussed . In the Eastern Cape , local 
negotiating forums were often a response to untenable levels of conflict and 
violence with concomitant effects on small town economies. 
The negotiation of a local 'ceasefire' frequently moved rapidly to the beginnings 
of longer term endeavors to find a lasting solution to local government and 
administration. These forums operated for many months as a form of local 
response to crisis before they were formally recognised in the 1993 Local 
Government Transition Act (LGTA) as a procedural mechanism for change. 
A well-known example is Stutterheim, a rural town, fairly typical of small-medium 
sized towns in the Eastern Cape. Stutterheim has followed an evolutionary route 
in political and social reconciliation with a greater degree of success than many 
other towns. In so doing, Stutterheim has become one of the most researched and 
documented examples of development that has arguably combined both economic 
and governmental progress.330 
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The roots of the Stutterhe im initiative would appear to lie in multiple causal 
factors. The most immediate and pressing one being the endemic pol itical 
violence and tension which characterised the town in the 1980s (Magwangqana, 
pers . Com. , 1996) Clashes between the black communities and the police , riots, 
strike action, a consumer boycott and business closures marked the last years 
of the 1980s and the first months of 1990 (Grahamstown Rural Committee, 
1990; July, pers. Com., 1994). It was out of this negative environment that 
the Stutterheim Forum developed from what for all intents and purposes was 
the figurative ruin of the town. It would seem that the suffering and economic 
hardship had become so intense in all communities, both black and white , that 
both sides realised that the situation had to be defused or the town's entire 
future was in jeopardy (Tandy, 1993; Nel , 1994a).331 
Given the political experience with disingenuous 'political compromise' and various 
reforms that sought to perpetuate apartheid local government in different forms, 
the recently unbanned ANC was initially wary of allowing these forums to become 
a joint negotiated locus of government and administration and sanctioned their 
operations in terms of negotiating improved services and infrastructure only. Thus 
the UDF and the ANC aligned civic movements in the Eastern Cape were prepared 
to endure government by apartheid structures for a few months longer, rather than 
allow locally negotiated power-sharing options to emerge, where the relevant power 
balances may have favored the existing state . 
Nel suggests that the local leadersh ip in Stutterheim were sufficiently mature 
and far-sighted enough to pursue cooperation towards an " improved urban 
environment" while other towns got bogged down in the question of party-political 
sanction for participation in the negotiating forums.332 In retrospect, some might 
argue that this hesitancy in endorsing local leadership's efforts to find workable , 
albeit temporary solutions to local government, was a warning of the dominant 
parties tendency exercise power and control from the centre. Suspicion of the 
negotiating forums stemmed in part from a rather complex strategy by ANC aligned 
organisations which allowed participation by allegedly non-political structures like 
the South African National Civics Association (SANCO) whilst withholding party 
members from such forums. Th is despite the fact that the SAN CO strategy was 
clearly determined by the ANC. 
The South African National Civic Organisation's (SANCO) General Secretary 
has confirmed that his organisation would not be contesting the local 
government elections. He indicated that SANCO would be supporting the African 
National Congress, as they did in the April 1994 national elections.333 
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Having participated in the negotiating forums with the blessing of the ANC some 
SANCO leaders were by-passed when it came to formal nomination as an ANC 
councillor. This caused tension between the ANC and SANCO in many Eastern 
Cape towns. Splits occurred within SANCO itself as some individuals questioned 
the link between SANCO and the ANC and opted to stand as independents despite 
the ANC's warning against this strategy. Stadler describes the longer-term effects 
of these events : 
It (SANCO) had backed the ANC in the local elections in 1994(sic) and 
after .. . However its relationship with the ANC is problematic, the national 
leadership having lost any identity separate from the ANC, and the grass roots 
organisations pursuing diverse objectives.334 
Similar problems of internal conflict were also experienced in other provinces. 
Stadler goes on to describe how in Mpumalanga for example, the ANC was divided 
after the 1995 elections by SANCO who used 'populist' strategies like resistance to 
service payments to mobilise opinion against ANC councillors. 335 In other instances 
like Leandra , the SANCO Mayor and the ANC chairperson of the Executive 
Committee allowed their personal and organisational animosities to disrupt the 
functioning of council. 336 There were also instances where ANC councillors have 
come under pressure from municipal labour for seeking material benefits over 
the interests of workers. These accusations from the labour movement were 
accompanied by " ... references to fat cats and gravy trains". 337 On the other hand 
SAN CO had also come to the assistance of the ANC. Stadler cites instances where 
SANCO, through overlapping membership and joint intervention with higher level 
ANC leadership, seems to have succeeded in marshalling 'disruptive elements' 
back to conformity. These events may be well documented but they are rarely 
analysed in any depth within a theoretical framework of pluralism and relations 
between civil society and state.338 
What becomes clear in retrospect is that this reversion to factionalism and games 
of power, in the Eastern Cape (and to a lesser extent in other provinces), often with 
the sole objective of personal advancement, do little to lend credence to the new 
policy frameworks with their notions of healthy democratic competition and a civil 
society untainted by political intrigue. As already suggested in past chapters this 
was in part a response to strategies by the National Party, the officialdom of the 
Provincial Administrations and the white municipalities who all played an equally 
complex game of trying to create multiple 'establishment' groupings, each with its 
own power-base to confront and limit the non-statutory (ANC) grouping. Thus Black 
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Local Authorities , the white municipal councils with their 'puppet' coloured and 
Indian partners , the CPA and even the municipal administration often all claimed 
equal and separate representation on the negotiating forums in their efforts to 
match the mass support of the civics. Stadler notes that conservative and militant 
right-wing groupings went as far as forming alliances with black township res idents 
associations in an effort to curb the power of the ANC .339 The emergence of anti-
ANC vigilante groups or militant opposition groups (frequently manipulated by the 
apartheid security forces or Bantustan governments) was particularly pronounced 
in the Eastern Cape.340 
These forays into cynical forms of Machiavellian politics were seen as anomalies 
in the political culture of the time , which stressed the building of a politic based on 
consensus and universality. Graham Gotz's detailed observations on the build-
up to the 1995/ 1996 election on the other hand, suggest an emerging state that 
rapidly calculated how 'sufficient' consensus would have to be in order to govern 
effectively. Gotz compared the behavior of different politicians from various 
parties and concluded that the new generation of local politicians were prone to 
putting the interests of their party over that of the citizenry as a whole.341 These 
observations proved to be prophetic in the emerging Eastern Cape municipal 
system. In contrast to growing cynicism, Nel suggests that Stutterheim's unusual 
progress resulted from local leadership figures who were " ... prepared to get on with 
other business while waiting for facilitating mechanisms to be introduced at national 
level to permit the institution of one-municipality initiatives."342 
By way of example, in the case of the Joint Negotiating Forum set up in 
Grahamstown in 1991, the non-statutory civic movement was assisted by the local 
office of the Black Sash and negotiated only with the white Grahamstown City 
Council and the Cape Provincial Administration (CPA) thereby depriving the puppet 
BLA , the Rini Town Council of real status and credibility as a political opponent. 
In many cases the 'shadow council ' role of the forum reflected not so much the 
inadequate will to take power and run the municipality but a strategic decision by 
the non-statutory grouping not to give credence to reformist models that fell short of 
a democratically elected local council. 343 
In most Eastern Cape towns and cities, white councillors and their bureaucrats , 
confronted with the prospect of being removed from power through non-racial, 
democratic elections, used their political experience and municipal knowledge 
as well as the nationally agreed concessions in the Local Government Transition 
Act, to win privileges from what was widely referred to as the "mass democratic 
movement". There was little indication however that this effected the credibility of 
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the process. In a 1995 public opinion survey Idasa found that in the Eastern Cape 
94% of respondents said they were registered to vote while only 80% reported as 
such in the North West province. The Eastern Cape had the lowest expressions of 
the intention to abstain (4%). Nearly 70% agreed to some degree that there was 
'great value' in voting in the 1995 local elections and only supporters of the Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP) had a significant portion (27%) who felt that voting would be 
a waste of time. This, in broad terms is not a picture of a populace too disillusioned 
and apathetic to take the first municipal election seriously.344 
5.3 Expectations 
In a brief October 1995 review of party election media in East London by Afesis-
corplan researchers, in it was observed that parties had opted for " a barrage of 
candidate and party statements and associated mudslinging" while key issues 
about the cities future were largely being ignored and were not being formulated 
into strategic programmes.345 All parties regarded the following as important issues: 
• Fighting crime: more policing, stronger punishment, community 
involvernent 
• Restructuring local government: improving administration and 
management and redressing racial imbalances in staffing whilst retaining 
merit-based advancement 
• Service levels and rates and service charges: improving service, keeping 
tax and service charges affordable, subsidies for poor areas 
• Representation and participation in local government - endorsement for 
the idea of advisory or elected neighborhood structures (within the 
municipal area) 
• Local economic development: ranging from assisting small business to tax 
and rates incentives to formal business. 
Party manifestos were generalised and" not articulated through a clear local 
political programme" according to the researchers .346 The researchers attributed 
this to the previous apartheid fragmentation of the city into five separate 
municipalities and the failure of the political parties to come to terms with a new 
citywide strategy that would address all issues. They also suggested that the 
negotiation process towards the formation of the Transitional Local Council had 
been fraught and that the business of council had continued to be shaped by past 
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routines and conventions. The LGTA determination of wards with its bias towards 
white and coloured areas was seen to entrench race-based politics and few parties 
had confronted the "uneven spatial distribution of wealth and resources across 
greater East London ."347 
The conclusion reached by the researchers in 1995 may have seemed somewhat 
harsh at the time however it became increasingly symptomatic of local politics over 
the next seven years: 
A new breed of South African populism appears to have emerged, with parties 
prioritising short-term tactical issues couched in the rhetoric of the Rainbow 
Nation and seemingly oblivious to their strategic context. The underlying political 
agendas remain disguised.346 
It is sometimes suggested that the problems of Eastern Cape have to be seen 
in the context of a naYve and overly hopeful populace. This was not borne out 
by the Idasa survey which found that only 15 % of the respondents felt that local 
government could solve the problems mentioned in the party literature and 54% felt 
that local government could "do something about these problems" . 349 Only 35% of 
Eastern Cape respondents thought that local government would solve their most 
important problems compared to 70% in the free State and 66% in the North West. 
Policy-makers would have done well to heed the moderation in these views and 
framed post 1995 policy and legislation accordingly. 
In the Eastern Cape the long-recognised logistical problems of arranging and 
holding elections in the deep rural areas of the former Transkei came to a 
predictable head. The Bisho based provincial government lived up to its reputation 
for inefficiency by failing to establish the necessary provincial coordinating office 
until the 18 April "owing to the non-availability of telephone lines."35o The rural local 
government model was particularly important to the Eastern Cape however halfway 
into the year the model was still not finalised and the Coordinating Committee 
reported that this was inhibiting registration in rural areas. Suggestions of 
inadequate registration procedures in the province were also generated by the fact 
that, despite a high officially reported registration rate, many unregistered voters 
presented themselves at the polls .' 
7 Graham Gotz, a member of the EIRC suggests that the most likely explanation for low registration 
rates in urban areas of the Eastem Cape relate to conservative white disinterest in the process 
unwittingly abetted by provincial officialdom who failed to anticipate such a reaction (or, and this is 
my view rather than Gotz's, were unconcerned by a white stayaway.) 
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As of April a modest rural registration of 28.5% of estimated voters was reported 
however this concealed the fact that in the Wild Coast district, by far the most 
populous district with an estimated 838 524 potential voters, less than 10% were 
registered while urban areas were reporting an average registration of 44.6%. How 
these figures came to be reversed in the final months before the election (80% in 
rural areas and 70% in urban areas) is a mystery and is cause for suspicion .351 
The demarcation of municipal boundaries was a hasty exercise, nearing completion 
by mid 1995 whilst the demarcation of wards had not yet started by midyear. Noting 
the challenge of training election officials for deployment in the rural areas of former 
Transkei, the Provincial Coordinating Committee estimated that full coverage would 
have required 1100 voting stations staffed by 15 000 officials.352 The robust efforts 
of the South African National Defense Force could not solve the problem and 
polling was further hampered by adverse weather conditions even in East London. 
Many elections stations did not receive ballot papers at the voting stations on time 
and many voting stations opened late.353 
The point of the preceding section is simply to demonstrate that lOP was introduced 
into a municipal situation where recent political transition had been a harsh and 
often faithless project. Community expectations of the new democratic local order 
nonetheless remained high, firstly because of the "learning period" afforded by the 
experimental phase of transitional councils and secondly because a very effective 
'transformation machine' comprised of both state and civil society players, had 
mobilised communities behind the democratic and developmental promise of the 
new municipal system. 
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CHAPTER 6: BUFFALO CITY MUNICIPALITY INTEGRATED 
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING FROM 2002 -2006 
Buffalo City is a local municipality with its base in East London; a secondary city 
on the coast of the Eastern Cape.354 In 2002 the municipality had a total budget of 
approximately R1, 4 billion .355 The municipality is governed by a mayoral executive 
system combined with a ward participatory system. According to the 1996 census 
figures and municipal estimates, the population at the time was between 680434 
and 888000 (municipal estimate) The inhabitants are spread over the settled urban 
conurbations of East London, King Williams Town and Bisho and the intersecting 
rural areas.356 The municipal area is represented in the lOP as a grouping of urban 
areas within a metropolitan corridor that stretches from the port city of East London 
in the east to the failed industrial township of Dimbaza in the west. The area is 
frequently characterized as an 'aspirant metro' in other words the municipality 
seeks to achieve Metropolitan status sometime in the future. Ward committees 
from 45 wards were elected during the period 19 November 2001 to 4 December 
2001.'57 
The municipal vision of Buffalo City is a "a people-centered place of opportunity 
where the basic needs of all are met in a safe, healthy and sustainable 
environment".35B The municipality produced its first lOP in 2002. The Buffalo City 
Integrated Development Plan 2002 begins with a critique of past apartheid planning 
initiatives suggesting that these were "technically driven" and lacking in community 
participation .359 It also suggests that apartheid planning was overly concerned with 
land-use regulation, geared towards preserving 'white privilege' and neglectful of 
concern like the environment, poverty and the need for economic growth. The lOP 
then devotes 6 pages to more recent trends in local planning and the merits of 
the lOP process itself.36o The 'new principles' of planning are lauded and include 
democratisation, participation, municipal governance as an 'enabler' principally 
of local economic development, more integration between sectoral matters and 
sustainable development. The latter relates mainly to the values and benchmarks 
set out in the Agenda 21 plan framed at the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development.J61 Finally the introductory chapter of the lOP 
offers an interpretation of the purpose of lOP which relates mainly to overcoming 
apartheid inequalities and adopting a system of governance that better aligns the 
municipality's financial and human resources and achieves greater efficiency and 
effectiveness.362 This 'new model of governance' is intended to improve legitimacy 
for the municipality's programme by using consultation with communities to "fast-
track" decision-making and subject the municipality to a "barometer for political 
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accountability and a measuring tool for municipal performance."363 It is worth 
noting that, while criticising previous planning approaches as over-regulated and 
dominated by national government prescript, the lOP goes on to list twelve new 
pieces of legislation with which it must comply. 364 
6.1 Institutional Approach 
In terms of procedure the lOP programme was overseen by an lOP Steering 
Committee. This was an 'ad hoc' political committee of six councillors i.e. not an 
existing standing committee of council and was convened by the Executive Mayor. 
Logically and in the interests of integration it might have been expected that the 
responsibility would fall to the Development Planning Sub-committee however this 
was not the case and the lOP document provides no explanation for this apparent 
anomaly6 Furthermore the lOP programme created a separate series of Thematic 
Task Teams in order to integrate various thematic concerns like social , cultural 
and ecological and economic aspects rather than relying on the core structures of 
council i.e. the standing committees. 365 In terms of political decision-making and 
oversight therefore the lOP entailed an increased level of complexity with a greater 
number of structures and more complex lines of accountability. For reasons that 
are not clear, the administrative component responsible for lOP was also complex 
with an lOP Technical Committee, coordinated by the lOP manager and chaired 
by the City Manager, responsible for directing the various planning activities, 
commissioning research, considering inputs from internal structures of council 
and outside agencies, processing planning outputs and commenting on contenl.366 
However there was also an lOP Unit also headed by the lOP manager and "under 
the direct oversight of the City Manager" and also consisting of senior managers. 
This unit was responsible for framing the process plan, coordinating day to day 
planning, preparing documents for meetings , chairing the technical committee and 
functioning as its secretariat, managing consultants and ensuring that follow-up 
tasks were completed viz. lOP reviews and amendments.367 On the basis of this 
breakdown of responsibilities it is apparent that there was scope for the overlap 
of tasks and responsibilities between the technical committee and the unit and, 
although implied, it was not clear that the unit reported to the committee. 
8 Queries by the author into this revealed only rumors of dissension regarding senior managers and 
portfolio allocations i.e. a suggestion that certain structures were created to provide senior posts and 
that the final structure had been subject to departmental HoD negotiations - none of this could be 
reliably verified . 
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6.2 Process 
Table 2: The Planning Process in Buffalo City 
The 2002 Buffalo City lOP entailed the following steps:368 
Process Description 
Public Consultation Representative Forum: local civil society 
were invited to send nominees to this forum 
through press adverts. BCM and claims that 
50 organisations responded. BCM claims that 
the forum met five times during which different 
aspects of the lOP process were discussed 
including emerging priorities and strategies. 
Community Needs Assessment: The 
lOP unit met with ward councillors in their 
neighborhoods to ascertain local needs and 
balance this against needs in adjoining wards. 
Unclear that local public was involved in these 
meetings. 
Mayor's Listening Campaign: Executive 
Mayor Sindisile Maclean held meetings from 
September - October 2001 in various areas 
to hear "first hand" the needs and frustrations 
of local citizens - the outcome of such 
meetings is not reported but BCM assures 
that "All of the recorded frustrations, needs 
and aspirations of the people articulated in 
these meetings were also generally consistent 
with the information gathered from other 
consultative processes." 
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Process Description 
Public Consultation Quality of Life Study: A survey was conducted 
on 2500 households by Rhodes University. The 
results were 'synthesized' into the IDP data and 
was also used to establish baseline information 
on how SCM residents of various profiles 
perceived their quality of life in the municipality. 
Community Workshops: SCM claims that 
local workshops were held in all 45 of its 
wards facilitated by consultants. The aim 
was to explain the lOP process and review 
the emerging priority issues and have views 
and concerns recorded 
Analysis Phase Little information is available on this phase but 
it appears to have involved the balancing of 
inputs from the Public Consultation process 
with more technical assessments. The 
intended output was a vision and an outline 
of development objectives. (Curiously all the 
actions and outputs are reported as "intended" 
suggesting that not all the activities or 
objectives were realised.) 
Strategies Phase Again little information is provided on what was 
actually undertaken and it is simply indicated 
that this looked at how the municipality would 
achieve its objectives. 
Formulation of Operational This phase was geared to producing an 
Programmes and operational strategy covering a five-year 
Strategies financial plan and capital investment plan, a 
spatial development framework, integrated 
sectoral programmes, disaster management 
plans, institutional development plans and 
an institutional monitoring / performance 
management system. SCM notes that actual 
projects began to be designed during this phase. 
Integration Phase This involved the alignment of various sector 
plans and checking on legal compliance and 
was "seen as an opportunity for the municipality 
to harmonise the projects in terms of contents, 
location and timing."369 
Approval by Council This simply notes that council must approve the 
IDP and does not report when or how this was 
done. 
Provincial Assessment Again this simply states the legal requirement 
to have the IDP assessed by the MEC of the 
province for its compliance with legislation and 
to ensure "that is its not in conflict with IDPs and 
strategies of other municipalities and organs of 
state."370 
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The 2002 lOP document begins by describing what actually happened in the 
lOP process but then quickly reverts to a 'handbook' type description of what 
should have happened in terms of planning method. In its own assessment the 
municipality identified three key factors that impacted the quality of its planning 
namely:371 
1. unrealistic time-frames given the planning tasks required 
2. the fact that the municipality had only recently been through a merger 
process involving the previous King William's town and East London 
councils and that roles and responsibilities had therefore not been 
finalised 
3. uncertainty regarding the allocation of powers and functions related to 
potable water, domestic waste water and sewage, bulk electricity supply 
and municipal health. 
6.3 Priority Issues 
The lOP identifies poverty as the critical issue for Buffalo City with 71 % of the 
municipal population earning less than the household SUbsistence rate of R 1500.00 
per month.372 The 2005/2006 Buffalo City lOP Review uses the 2001 Census to 
present the following breakdown of access to services. 
Table 3: Access to Services in Buffalo City 
Water (access Sanitation Electricity Refuse 
to piped water in (flush toilet, (supply that is removal 
dwelling! yard or septic tank, adequate at least (at least once a 
within 200m) chemical toilet for lighting) week) 
or ventilated pit 
latrine) 
No. of households 148894 135672 122872 136316 
% of households 78% 71% 63% 71% 
[Source: Census 2001 as represented in the 200512006 Buffalo City toP Review] 
For the sake of practicality this paper looks mainly at health and housing issues, 
these obviously being key concerns for any municipality and inter-related . 
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Health 
In the Quality of Life survey, 25% of respondents said that health services 
were most important to them.373 Whereas health functions were spread across 
provincial, district and municipal government and all three government spheres 
were active in BCM and the municipality reports the operation of 44 fixed clinics, 13 
mobile clinics, a community health centre, a day hospital and an Aids training and 
information centre - without specifying which sphere of government is responsible 
for which facility. Using World Health Organisation prescribed ratios of nurses to 
patients (1 :25), BCM argues that it has a critical shortage of staff i.e . one nurse 
apparently sees 60 patients per day and that access to health facilities in rural 
areas was particularly difficultY4 
The municipality set itself two main objectives in this regard, firstly more accessible 
primary health care facilities "for all communities"375 and secondly, institutional 
integration of primary health care services by December 2003. The strategy that 
flowed from these objectives however was simply to institute two 'programmes', 
one to support and integrate health care and the other to "promote" and "build 
capacity" around community health.376 Given the effort and resources expended 
on the research and planning process, the framing of these strategies could be 
seen as lacking in detail and analysis - being little more than a reformulation of the 
objective. 
Other environmental health issues included, poor rural infrastructure leading to high 
levels of water-borne diseases, rapid urbanisation placing pressure on informal 
settlements and unhealthy living conditions, generally unsafe settlement conditions 
both in residences and public facilities and equally unsafe work environments. 
The major water sources, namely the Buffalo and Nahoon Rivers are polluted by 
run-off from rural and urban settlements and industrial I agricultural pollutants. In 
relation to these issues, the municipality pledged to promote community awareness 
and participation in health issues, monitor the environment and the health 
status of communities with a view to making rapid intervention when required, 
prioritise integrated service delivery to high risk communities and enforce health 
legislation.377 The strategies invoked to this end were also fairly 'generic' i.e. 
implement an environmental health management programme with appropriate 
policies and by-laws, inform and build the capacity of communities and develop 
and coordinate networks and partnerships.378 The basic problem of expanding and 
improperly serviced settlements leading to the pollution of the main water sources 
is not the primary concern of the lOP at this point. These apparent priorities are 
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however not reflected as budget priorities. For example in the operating budget 
for July 2002 to June 2007, the budget provision for repairs and maintenance 
increases by R32m or about 35,6% however salaries increase by R129m (nearly 
36%) over the same period.379 In terms of the Capital Investment Programme over 
the same period , the municipality's own investment in infrastructure and spatial 
projects actually decreases by R22m while anticipated infrastructure allocations 
from national government increases by only R4m i.e. there is a net decrease 
of planned expenditure on infrastructure of R18m from 2003 to 2007.380 Thus 
while the BCM lOP recognises the need to "maximise its investment in municipal 
infrastructure" it does not in reality do this and its aspiration to "encourage the 
maximum degree of private sector investment" is therefore unfounded. 381 The BCM 
was also not in a position to effect short-term adjustments to its spending priorities. 
While committing itself to responsible revenue and credit control the cash liquidity 
position of the municipality was precarious with a current ratio of assets to liabilities 
of 1.23:1 whereas the generally accepted 'healthy' ratio was in excess of 2:1.382 
Housing 
The 2002 lOP indicates that Buffalo City had a housing shortage of 85 000 units 
at the time of drafting383 and had 47 000 units planned as projects mainly within 
Mdantsane I Potsdam, Reeston, Newlands and King William's Town.384 Smaller 
projects were also planned at Gonubie, Beacon Bay, West bank, needs Cap, 
Mount Coke, Ndevana and Yellowlands.385 By 2005 this estimated backlog had 
dropped to 75 000 units suggesting that the municipality had made some progress 
in accelerating its housing provision.386 The lOP suggests that 80% of households 
fell within the income bracket of RO-R3500 per month and were therefore unable 
to independently provide for their own housing needs nor were they viable clients 
for the bond markel,387 Apart from providing state subsidised housing , Buffalo 
City also planned to ""build partnerships with communities and developers aimed 
at mobilizing state, private or donor resources and exploring creative alternative 
models of housing delivery ... "388 However land for new housing was not easily 
available due to slow and complex processes for its identification and release 
and a situation where bulk services infrastructure like roads, water, sewerage and 
storm-water were already over-extended and unable to cope with new settlement 
development. The municipality also noted that standards and regulations for 
housing and infrastructure were not appropriate for the low-income market and that 
there was inconsistency between national and provincial norms in this regard. 389 
The lOP cites the Quality of Life Survey in describing the main settlement types of 
the BCM population.9 
9 There is no explanation of why the figures do not total 100% - presumably there was another form 
of housing that did not fit the identified categories . 
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Table 4: Settlement Types in Buffalo City 
Type of Housing % of the Buffalo City Population 
Informal 20% 
Formal housing - bonded or paid up 35% 
Tribal tenure 20% 
Government housing subsidy 14% 
[Source: Buffalo City lOP 2002 p 60J 
The servicing of these households varied greatly.Water for example was reticulated 
directly to the house or piped from a roof tank, obtained from communal or site-
specific standpipes, drawn from boreholes or dams or collected from natural 
sources like rivers and springs.390 Issues with regard to urban settlement included 
over-crowding, both in informal areas and formal townships (Duncan Village, 
Buffalo Flats, Mdantsane and Cambridge) where 'backyard shacks' had been built 
on to existing formal dwellings.391 'Overspili' settlements from existing townships 
were impacting land required for community facilities in the same areas and West 
Bank. Areas peripheral to existing townships were also identified as a problem 
without specifying why but presumably because of unplanned settlement 'sprawl'. 
Apart from uneven levels of services in urban areas and the urban periphery, there 
were also a number of inadequately serviced rural settlements which BCM could 
not quantify or locate at this poinP92 The lOP acknowledges vast differences in the 
state of public infrastructure and facilities10 between urban and rural areas however 
the 'situation analysis' component of the lOP does not quantify these differences, 
suggesting that the purpose of the analysis itself is political rather than technical 
i.e. to signal where the BCM's primary social concerns lay. Certain key strategic 
challenges are repeated, for example: 
The lack of bulk infrastructure in Buffalo City is a constraint to the planning and 
delivery of housing. The demand for housing exceeds the supply and there is 
also an information gap concerning the rural housing issues. Buffalo city does 
not have a defined housing delivery programme for the next 5-10 years. 393 
While this is clearly fundamental to any future provision of housing, it does not 
seem to register as the overriding concern nor does the municipality at this point 
indicate what its likely approach I constraints will be in dealing the problem. In 
the next paragraph however, the municipality hints that housing provision may be 
a political issue i.e. something more than simply a 'public need - state delivery' 
conundrum. 
10 See pages 59-63 
101 
Furthermore the demands of housing delivery from the government and the 
community are unrealistic with regards to available funding and the lack of 
accessible land. The rapid in-migration, the politicisation of the housing process 
and the unclear rural tenure reform process pose potential threats.394 
The lOP analysis of obstacles to housing provision includes issues that were within 
the municipality's control I responsibility (lack of data on existing housing stock and 
needs, slow inefficient release of land) and factors like HIV/Aids which had caused 
changing demographic profiles and shifts in household economies, for example the 
possibility of households headed by children and elderly people. 395 Taking the issue 
of land identification and the related function of spatial planning as an example it is 
worth noting how the lOP provides the rationale for a veritable deluge of other plans 
including:396 
• A Detailed Buffalo City Spatial Development Framework: this would extend 
the current spatial development framework and serve as the basis for a land 
use management system. 
• A Buffalo City Integrated Land use Management System: proposed legislation 
made this mandatory. 
• An Integrated Rural Development Plan: "intended to provide a coherent 
framework for development initiatives and support to the rural and peri-urban 
areas ... "397 
• Coastal Development Plan: for spatial development and environmental 
purposes this was considered necessary for the management of resources and 
natural assets along the coast. 
• Buffalo City Densification Policy: it appears that this was a policy rather than a 
plan and was to guide the development of higher density and mixed land use 
areas in key parts of the municipality for greater efficiency and equity in land 
development. 
• Mdantsane Urban Renewal: this project fwas derived from the National Urban 
Renewable Strategy and was intended to upgrade infrastructure and facilities in 
Mdantsane. 
• Ginsberg Planning Implementation: this aimed to develop well-located land 
parcels close to the King William's Town central business district. 
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• West Bank to Needs Camp Development Plan: this was intended to correct 
historically distorted spatial development patterns along the route from the West 
Bank through Mount Coke and King William's Town. The aim was to create 
socio-economic linkages between Mdantsane and the West Bank industrial 
area. 
Claims that housing was held up by slow or inadequate release of capital funding 
for infrastructure delivery need to be treated with some caution given that municipal 
infrastructure grant (MIG) programmes were being significantly overhauled and had 
increased their overall share of nationally generated revenue. Buffalo City cited the 
fact that such funding 'vested' with provincial government and was inadequate and 
resolved to become an 'accred ited municipal ity' in order to allow it to receive funds 
directly from national governmenl.398 The lOP makes little mention of the specific 
type of bulk infrastructure it would have attempted to develop, with additional grant 
funding , to prevent further pressure on the natural environment and its main water 
sources. 
The municipality committed itself to three strategies in relation to housing: 399 
1. Developing a municipal housing policy; 
2. Implementing a housing programme and; 
3. Developing a housing financing system; 
In the summary of the programmes and projects these strategies remain broad 
statements of intent with further planning exercises e.g . "establishment of 
benchmarks and performance indicators" simply mentioned rather than actually 
performed.40o Bulk sewerage infrastructure, arguably a critical priority is simply 
listed along with "sidewalk rehabilitation", "replacement of aged and domestic water 
meters". 401 A more careful scanning of the envisaged programme of bulk sewerage 
upgrade or rehabilitation suggests a task of huge proportions includ ing upgrades of 
the Potsdam, Mdantsane West, Reeston and the central works and all related bulk 
transfer infrastructure402 Replacement of sewers in zone 7, 8 and 14 in Mdantsane. 
New or upgraded plant would be required to treat VIP generated sewerage, plant 
operated by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry would have to be taken 
over and upgraded.403 Sewers in Berlin, the East Bank and along Eastern Beach 
would have to be refurbished or replaced . In fact virtually all of the municipal ity's 
sewerage infrastructure needed to be upgraded or replaced 404 
Taking Buffalo City as an example of how lOP was implemented, it emerges that by 
2004, priorities had shifted further. Salary expenditure for 2005 projected as R419 
million in the 2002 lOP had now risen to over R472m and would rise further to over 
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R 525m by 2007 as against the 2002 lOP projection of R489m i.e. an increase of 
R36m.405 Repairs and maintenance, clearly crucial to optimum functioning of over-
extended infrastructure were projected in the 2002 lOP at R105m rising to R122m 
in 2007 however in the 2004/2005 lOP review this figure has dropped to R56,4m 
rising to only R59,5 million in 2007.406 This represents a massive variance of R65.6 
million i.e. the projected expenditure had dropped by nearly 53.8%. The planned 
Capital Investment Programme however had increased significantly in terms of both 
the municipality's own investment and national government infrastructure grant 
investment. 
Table 5: Buffalo City Capital Investment Programme (Rmillions) 
2005 2006 2007 
SCM lOP Own funds 43 10 10 
2002 
Grant funds 33 35 37 
Subtotal 76 45 47 
SCM lOP Review Own funds 90 73 82 
2004/2005 
Grant funds 69 81 94 
Subtotal 159 154 176 
Revision : 2002 lOP - 2004/2005 lOP Review +83 +109 +129 
[Source: Buffalo City lOP 2002J 407 
Sy 2004/2005 therefore the municipality had begun to reflect the backlog in 
infrastructure as a capital investment priority but had not made full provision for the 
maintenance and repair of such infrastructure. This despite the fact that the lOP 
review recognised that, "Current underexpenditure on maintenance budgets, as 
well as under provision (4%) for maintenance results in asset stripping that has a 
negative effect on service delivery."4oB The 2004/2005 - 2005/2006 lOP reviews 
had in fact begun to estimate the size of the under spend that had resulted from 
deferred maintenance expenditure: 
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Table 6: Value of Buffalo City Service Backlogs 2004-2006 
Type of backlog 2004/2005 Value 2005/2006 Value 
Water: pipeline replacement, 
bulk equipment, treatment works R216m R190m 
Electricity R195m R195m 
Sewerage: pump stations, reticulation , 
treatment works , vacuum tanker R329m R230m 
Roads: entire network R230m R373m 
Buildings: offices, depots and City Hall R40m I R40m I 
Vehicles: replacement R25m 
Total R1 ,035bn R1,028 
[Source: Buffalo City Municipality Review 200412005 Integrated Development Plan 
& Buffalo City Municipality Review 200512006 Integrated Development Plan1 
The above figures suggest that the overall value of backlogs remained unchanged 
between 2004 and 2006 although the backlog in water services is reduced by 
R26m and sewerage by R99m and the value of the road network backlog increases 
by R143m. The last point seems incongruous given that the R143m increase in the 
value of the backlog occurred over just three years - suggesting that the original 
estimate may have been too low. The R40m backlog for buildings and vehicles 
reported in 2005/2006 must also be treated with some caution in that it combines 
two line items that were reported separately in 2004/2005 but remains fixed at the 
R40m value that was originally for vehicles alone. By 2005/2006 the lOP review 
process was delivering an increasingly blunt assessment of the consequences on 
on-going failure to maintain infrastructure. 
The issue of maintenance is of particular concern. BCM now faces a critical 
situation with much of its infrastructure past its functional life and operating 
beyond its design capacity. This results in more frequent power outages, poor 
quality of electricity supply, increasing risk of environmental pollution because 
of sewer overflows and deteriorating sewage conveyance systems, increasing 
water losses because of bursts and leaks and increasing threats of water 
shortages because of conveyance bottienecks409 
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The municipality was also forced to concede that it had serious problems in terms 
of staff expenditure, disinvestments from trading services, expend iture on non-
core functions, persistent pressure to make provision for bad debt and as already 
illustrated, severe under investment in infrastructure.41o However if the lOP process 
had failed to resolve these issues, the municipality and its planning consultants 
were unshaken in their belief that planning held the solution. The problems set out 
above would therefore be resolved through a Revitalisation Plan. This plan had 
been adopted in 2003 and pledged to make the municipality more efficient and 
effective in management terms, to improve customer care , to ensure that services 
were more affordable and sustainable, to improve the accuracy of information that 
informed financial decisions, to better ensure the health of residents, to better 
manage the spatial and natural environment and finally "to faci litate and attract 
development-enhancing investment and local economic growth ."411 Obviously 
these pledges were nothing more than a set of aspirational statements. Each would 
require that the municipality significantly improve its performance across a range 
of functions but performance management was itself a key component of planning 
logic. 
6.4 Managing Performance 
Nearly four years after the enactment of the Municipal Systems Act (2000) and 3 
years after the gazetting of the Municipal Planning and Performance Management 
Regulations, this municipality, the largest of the Category B (local) municipalities in 
the province, is still planning the implementation of its performance management 
system. Section H of the Buffalo City Integrated Development Plan Review 
2004/2005 is largely devoted to restating the policy intentions of municipal 
performance management and lauding the anticipated benefits of the yet to be 
implemented system. Comment on actual municipal performance is contained 
within a 24-page table titled the Institutional Scorecard412 that will be described in 
more detail later. Section H entitled Framework for the Performance management 
System restates the objectives of municipal performance management. In 
the local government context, a comprehensive and elaborate system of 
monitoring performance of municipalities has been legislated. The system is 
intended to continuously monitor the performance of municipalities in fulfilling 
their developmental mandate. Central to this system is the development of key 
performance indicators as instruments to assess performance. The indicators help 
to translate complex socio-economic development challenges into quantifiable and 
measurable outputs. They are therefore crucial if a proper assessment is to be 
done of the impact of government in improving the qual ity of life of all .413 
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In describing the components of its Performance Management Framework, Buffalo 
City outlines the legislative provisions for performance management citing the 
South African Constitution of 1996, the Batho Pele White Paper (1998) the White 
Paper on Local Government (1998), the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 and the 
Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations (2001 ). 414 Quoting 
verbatim from some of the above legal and policy instruments, the lOP review is 
clearly concerned with legal and policy compliance. The actual description of what 
will be measured as an indication of performance is contained within a lengthy 
table titled the Institutional Scorecard 415 Much of the chapter describes institutional 
systems, mechanisms and procedures and the roles of internal stakeholders 
(Executive Mayor, Mayoral Committee, City manager, staff etc) as well as external 
agencies (National Government, Auditor general, Provincial Government as well as 
private sector bodies, the media, organised labour, service providers etc) . There is 
much reference to models and objectives. Buffalo City opted for something called 
the Hybrid Systems Model Approach "and applicable scorecards .. . incorporated 
with the South African Excellence Model (SAEM)." According to Buffalo City 
municipality, "The model is a non-prescriptive framework based on eleven criteria 
reflecting validating, leading edge management practices. "416 Key to this system 
was the use of institutional scorecards. Scorecards dominated the bureaucratic 
discourse on performance management but were in essence a re-worked system 
of logical planning and reporting - similar in many respects to the familiar log frame 
method much favored by donor agencies active in South Africa. The Buffalo City 
description of scorecards stipulated their alignment with the lOP process and 
the municipality's strategic plans. 417 Scorecards would allow performance to be 
represented in accurate and visual form by describing inputs, outputs, outcomes 
and required process. These would be applied at two levels, firstly at an institutional 
level where the performance of the institution as a whole would be described , and 
secondly at a directorate level where the performance of particular directorates or 
line functions would be set out. 
The example of housing gives an indication of how the scorecard was applied: 
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Table 7: Buffalo City Housing Scorecard 2002 
Priority Area I Objective Strategy Indicator Measurement Base- Target Target Date Target Target Responsible 
Issue Source & line % Date Date Directorate 
Frequency 04/05 05/06+ 
Insufficient and All citizens Development of a S9.7 Policy will be 0 Report to - Dec. 2004 - Development 
inappropriate especially the Municipal A council policy document with reviewed annually CM planning 
housing poor, women, Housing Policy clearly defined strategies to be 
provision the aged the implemented in addressing the 
!especially for disabled and housing backlog, by providing shelter 
he poor, people with and services to the poor, women, 
t-vomen, and Aids shall have aged, disabled and people with aids. 
people with Aid access to 
appropriate on 
a renewal basis 
S 9.15 Policy will be 0 20.00% - - July 2005 Development 
Decrease in homelessness in reviewed annually planning 
informal dwellings. 
S9.16 Policy will be 0 20.00% - - July 2005 Development 
Eliminating the housing backlog reviewed annually planning 
S 9.17 Policy will be 0 100.00% - July 2005 Development 
% of people having access to shelter, rev iewed annually planning 
clean water, sanitation and other 
social services 
S9.23 Policy will be 0 70.00% - July 2004 - Development 
% tenants converted to proud reviewed annually planning 
home-owners with title deed 
S9.31 Policy will be 0 Improved - July 2005 Development 
Lead time on housing delivery reviewed annually by30% planning 
[Source: Buffalo City Municipality 2004, Review 200412005 Integrated Development Plan Buffalo City Municipality East London (unpublished) Annexure A pg 114J 
The above section of the BCM scorecard illustrates the more measurable targets 
that lOPs were able to frame , for example the 20% decrease in homelessness 
by July 2005; 100% of people having access to shelter, clean water, sanitation 
and other social services by July 2005, the intention to convert 70% of tenants 
into 'proud' homeowners by July 2004 and the reduction of the lead time (start-up 
period) on housing delivery.418 
Batho Pele imperatives however required that a range of far less quantifiable 
targets be captured within the system, reducing what might simply have been 
conceived as reasonable practice to the realm of objectives, indicators, targets and 
results: For example - Environmental Health: "The participation of communities in 
the control (of) environmental health risks and conditions" and "Greater community 
and internal and external stakeholder participation."419 
Solid Waste management: "Identify, initiate and evaluate partnerships." The 
envisaged indicator to measure this was however disconnected and unclear 
i.e . " No (number) of public meetings to share information on levels of waste 
management service policy"420 
Local Economic Development: BCM's objective was "Reduced poverty through the 
redistribution of economic resources and opportunities for the benefit of all citizens." 
The strategies included a programme to develop commerce and industry, a small 
business development network I programme, the Duncan Village manufacturing 
complex and to "develop partnerships: joint implementation". All of the above would 
be measured against a target of creating 600 small medium and micro enterprises 
by March 2005.421 
However public scrutiny or oversight related indicators are entirely lacking from the 
BCM finance scorecard422 where the issue of public oversight and engagement 
might be considered crucial and where the Batho Pele principles required "value 
for money" i. e. that "Public service should be provided economically and efficiently 
in order to give citizens the best possible value-for-money."423 In addition, Batho 
Pele required that "Citizens should know how departments are run, how resources 
are spent, and who is in charge of particular services."424 Thus the municipality's 
performance scorecard system does not include the most basic requirement that 
the Auditor General 's report on the municipality's financial situation is presented for 
public scrutiny or comment. 
The working group within BCM known as the Finance and Institutional Cluster 
framed two objectives related to Batho Pele principles: 
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1. Improve Communication and access to information to both internal and 
external customers of buffalo City Municipality 
2. Establishment of a Customer Care oriented organisation (sic) 
However the strategy adopted for ach ieving these objectives is "Adoption and 
Implementation of IT strategies" and "Development and Implementation of an 
integrated Customer Care strategy" respectively. It is hardly surprising therefore 
that the performance measures set out in the scorecard are not relevant to the 
objectives . Throughout all of these systems lies the worrying suggestion that 
the existence of 'the system' or 'the procedure' is more important than its actual 
function . 
If planning is about "breaking with the past" as Escobar has noted then the lOP 
experience was also about re-inventing the planning challenge to justify what had 
and had not been achieved in terms of previous plans. In Buffalo City's 2002 lOP 
the emphasis had been on massive roll-outs of services and infrastructure guided 
by the vision of Buffalo City as a: "People-centred place of opportunity where the 
basic needs of all are met in a safe, healthy and sustainable environment."425 This 
led to the formulation of vast lists of infrastructure projects and service programmes 
which a few years later were found to be unaffordable: 
Billions of rands worth of capital projects were identified as potential priorities. 
This huge challenge was beyond the conventional resources available to the 
Buffalo City Municipality and highlighted the need to formulate a more strategic 
approach to the way the Municipality approaches its core activities.426 
However instead of looking to its likely revenue sources for the next three years 
and adjusting its 2002 lOP to fit the funds available BCM senior management 
decided instead to " ... transform the municipality into a developmental organisation , 
as opposed to merely a one-dimensional 'deliverer of services'."427 Instead of 
having to admit that the 2002 lOP was overly ambitious and misguided, senior 
politicians and management could now proclaim the adoption of a new plan. Thus 
the municipality's planning failure or weakness never had to be conceded . Instead a 
fresh start is proclaimed and once again the planners and politicians offer the public 
an opportunity to "break with the past". Conveniently, the process conceals the fact 
that the cou ncil and its managers were responsible for that past. 
The new plan, known as the Revitalisation Plan, has already been referred to and 
was adopted in April 2003. It focused the municipalities activities and resources on 
seven strategic programmes namely: 
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1. Effective Organisational management 
2. Customer Care 
3. Service Improvement 
4. Financial management 
5. Improving Health 
6. A Sustainable City 
7. Growth and Incomes428 
Buffalo City also followed the example of Amatole District Municipality in producing 
a set of sector plans related to water services development, public transport, spatial 
development, housing , waste management, integrated environmental management, 
local economic development and the Mdantsane Urban Renewal programme. 
These plans, according to Buffalo City: 
.. . focused on meeting the requirements of sectoral legislation , as it applies to 
the assigned powers and functions of the Municipality.429 
In other words, the solution to problems within the 2002 Integrated development 
Plan was to produce more plans, namely the 2003 Revitalisation Plan and a set 
of nationally prescribed sector plans. Thus much of the structure and process 
of the 2004/2005 lOP review was dictated by the obl igation to meet planning 
requ irements set out in policy developed by national government and passed on 
via the district municipality as a planning framework. The other major component 
of the lOP review, the seven programmes, do not appear to address the main 
conclusion of the previous lOP review, namely that its projects and programmes 
of 2002 were "beyond the conventional resources available ." Whereas municipal 
overheads were clearly increasing, particularly in terms of staffing, as will be 
demonstrated later, the seven programmes addressed this only obliquely or not at 
all. Effective organisational management for example spoke of greater efficiency 
and effectiveness in very general terms. However in a series of workshops held 
at resorts within and outside of Buffalo City, the question of affordability is raised 
repeatedly by some managers and presumably, some of the planning consultants. 
For example at Mpongo park in November 2003 it was noted that: 
It is clear that the current financial situation does not support much of the 
Municipality's broader developmental ambitions. A bad debt provision of 
some R62million, for example, had to be addressed against the expenditure 
requirements of service delivery units and lOP related initiatives.43o 
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Buffalo City's budgeting approach however led the municipality to look to 
maintenance costs rather than other overheads, for savings: 
In addition the proposed approach to drafting the budget placed pressure on 
services and departments to cut maintenance expenditure, already suffering the 
effects of endemic asset stripping.431 
In capital expenditure terms , Buffalo City acknowledged that it had "relatively 
limited discretionary capital budget resources available for re-prioritisation " in fact 
about R127.3 million.432 The weighting exercise that was subsequently undertaken 
to prioritise projects, did not deal with actual projects as such but with the "lOP 
themes" or clusters . In other words the lOP approach allowed reprioritisation to 
deal with broad and abstract concepts like "Social" , "Environmental", "Economic", 
"Spatial and Infrastructure" and "Finance & Institutional". What was implied in 
assigning "Spatial and Infrastructure"433 a top rating of 50% and "Finance & 
Institutional" the lowest rating of 5%? Could staffing cuts be expected based on the 
low priority attached to institutional matters? 
Buffalo City had the potential for a greater degree of financial independence due 
to its significant revenue base in the East London and King Wiilam's Town urban 
centres. However far from framing this as an objective, the lOP review process took 
the municipality further down the road to dependence on national grant funding 
(transfers) and other forms of external funding. In response to the problem that 
it had only R127.3 million for discretionary deployment to capital projects, the 
municipality decided to embark on a range of measures to "relieve the pressure on 
the discretionary amount available." One of these measures was "assessing the 
use of grants rather than internal funding."434 In the period 2001/2002 to 2003/2004 
BCM budgeted R1130 million for capital expenditure however only R329 m (about 
29%) was from its own funds and the major portion of R801 m (about 71 %) would 
come from external funds.435 Between 2002/2003 and 2003/2004 grant income 
would increase by 5.47% whereas own income from assessment rates, water, 
refuse and sewerage would remain stable (with a small increase in 'other income' of 
0.38%.)436 
In a section titled "Securing partnerships with recognised stakeholders" , Buffalo 
City notes its subscription to the South African Excellence Foundation and its 
intention to draw support from Daimler Chrysler South Africa, the City of Tshwane, 
the Planning Implementation and Management Support Services (based at Amatole 
District Municipality) and the Department of Provincial and Local Government. 437 
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This support plus that of a number of consultants438 is apparently needed despite 
the fact that the Buffalo City employees 21 people at executive and senior 
management level and a further 106 persons at middle or junior management 
level. 439 Executive mayor and his mayoral Committee would receive over R3 ,5 m 
in salaries, allowances and benefits in the 2004/2005 financial year while senior 
management would receive nearly R4.4 m.440 The institutional backdrop for this 
included the fact that in 2002/2003 salaries would constitute 35.3% of operating 
expenditure.441 In a 2003 budget revision council resolved to cut-back salaries, 
wages and allowances by R12,96 million however repairs and maintenance were 
also cut by R 12,5m and general expenses by R 19, 7m thus the cuts to salaries, 
wages and allowances constituted a fairly minor component of overall cut-backs. It 
must also be recalled that staff budgets had been 'inflated ' by the 7.85% increase 
agreed to by the South African Local Government Association during 2003.442 Thus 
the cut-backs were nothing more than an attempt to bring the overall percentage 
increase in staffing costs back to the 5.5% inflation figure of the time. 
What these figures do not reveal is the cost to the municipality of senior 
management and full-time senior councillors . The rationale for employing highly 
paid professional staff was clear ; " leading edge management practices" and the 
dictates of scientific management demanded these skills. However, having filled 
these posts, Buffalo City remained substantially dependent on consultant and 
partner support (see footnote 2.) The City Manager for example, was assisted by 
no less than three international special advisors. 443 While international advisors 
were invariably donor funded, BCM's much proclaimed partnerships with agencies 
like the Swedish International development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and its 
twinning arrangement with Gavle in Sweden and Lieden (Netherlands) came 
at a price . "A Development Cooperation office has been established to support 
the City Manager with all international and inter-governmental activities of the 
municipality."444 
The achievements of this office as set out in the 200412005-200612007 Operating 
and Capital Budget are mostly related to securing donor support for further plans , 
policies and systems design including a coastal management plan , an integrated 
environmental management plan, the design of a land-use management system 
and a water and roads management system and the development of sanitation 
policy.445 In addition th is office claimed as its successes, the hosting of the 
2004 annual conference of the Institute for Local Government Management of 
South Africa and its on-going interaction with the Cities Network and "friendly 
and outcomes-based bilateral relations and working arrangements with other 
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municipalities throughout the country." These activities were overseen by a 
dedicated Manager for Development Co-operation who worked alongside three 
other General Managers and an Office Manager. 
The other five line Directorates (Corporate Services , Development Planning, 
Engineering Services, Social Services and Financial Services) were similarly 
structured , each employing 3 general managers and an office manager.446 The 
exception was Corporate Services which also employed a Chief of Staff and 
Development Planning which employed only two general managers under the 
Director. In total the various directorates plus the City Manager thus employed 18 
general managers and one Chief of Staff. Under the respective general managers 
a total of 49 managers and one Senior Legal Advisor were responsible for line 
functions or specialised tasks.447 
Despite this extensive management structure, Buffalo City still required the 
assistance of at least 3 other institutions each of which came with its own 
overheads and staff payroll. 
• Buffalo City Tourism: described as a "Section 21 Company, which is 
funded extensively by the Municipality and functions as a tourism-
marketing agency for the area." 448 
• East London Industrial Development Zone: BCM was one of six bodies 
represented on the board of the ELiDZ. This proprietary limited company 
was responsible for the developing and securing investors for an industrial 
area within East London.449 
• Buffalo City Development Agency: this organisation was developed during 
2004 and was based on the belief that under-utilised (and decaying) public 
land and infrastructure within the extended water front area and CBD of 
East London could be the 'asset base' that would attract partner 
investment from public and private institutions. Supported by the 
Industrial Development Corporation, the BCDA appears to have been 
launched on an exploratory basis i.e. without a finalised 
business plan or clearly stipulated mandate from Buffalo City except to 
trade and develop key pieces on land within the CBD and the extended 
esplanade. It is also not clear what strategic decisions regarding the core 
functions of the municipality and its competence to perform these, led to 
the formation of the BCDA. However BCM assured its public that "South 
Africa has adapted the concept of development agencies from examples 
found worldwide as efficient mechanism (sic) of integrated area-based 
development."45o 
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In summary then, Buffalo City drafted its first full-fledged lOP in 2002. In the period 
thereafter it operated an increasingly top-heavy management structure, drew more 
support from partnerships and consultants and set up additional institutions for 
core municipal functions like tourism marketing, industrial development and urban 
regeneration . Rather than streamlining the bureaucracy, personnel costs were to 
remain at 34-36 % of operational expenditure for the period 2000-2007451 despite 
the additional outside support. Rather than seeking new efficiencies or economies 
of scale the lOP process itself became the generator of additional planning systems 
with new technocratic requirements and of course well-paid jobs for managers 
and bureaucrats. In the 2003/2004 financial year the salary of the BCM Municipal 
Manager was the highest in the province at R819 081 452 despite the fact that 
its budget was just over 42% of that of the most resourced municipality in the 
province, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 453 Buffalo City also employed the highest 
number of senior managers (15) compared to Nelson Mandela Metropolitan's 
11 despite the fact that its total budgeted revenue in 2004/2005 was R1,335bn 11 
i.e. less than half of NMM's R3,134bn.454 Buffalo City's budgeted expenditure for 
salaries, wages and allowances in 2004/2005 was over R472m or nearly 35.4% of 
its operating budget455 
Sophisticated policy and scientific management practises therefore came at a 
price that could not be ignored. In his 2004/2005 budget speech Executive Mayor 
Sindisile Maclean seems to have belatedly recognised the political implications 
of escalating salary bills and took the unusual step of noting concerns about staff 
expenditure: 
However our wages and salary bill remains too high . At the end of last year, 
we had 3 831 permanent and 814 non-permanent Employment Equity Act 
-compliant staff consuming some one third of budget in salaries and wages. 
The accepted norm is below 30% and the 284 municipalities in South Africa 
spent R19,8 billion in the 2002/2003 financial year on wages and salaries. It 
represents 32% OF BUDGET. Our spend (sic) is put at 36%.456 
Complex and sophisticated management systems thus held the promise of better 
performance i.e. greater efficiency and effectiveness by the institution and its 
personnel. But the operation of these systems and compliance with a policy 
framework that demanded measurable outputs and rationality in all public service 
functions required more managers and increasingly sophisticated management 
systems. Operational costs were ratcheted up and real efficiency became ever 
11These figures are rounded 
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more difficult to achieve. In fact by 2005/2006 salaries constituted just over 35% of 
the operating budget while repairs and maintenance were just 5, 7%457 
As a result of planning, interaction between municipalities and local citizens would 
move beyond the ambit of natural forces and well understood convention that 
were deemed to be unscientific and unreliable. Planners and systems consultants 
would now ensure that these high level values and principles were properly served 
because as Escobar notes, "Science and planning, on the other hand, are seen as 
neutral, desirable and universally applicable .. ,,"458 
What broad social objective was served by this renewed enthusiasm for planning 
and its technological accompaniments? South African society impacted by the lOP 
roll-out of the mid to late 1990s was already significantly urbanised, had several 
years experience of emerging governance and democracy and was already well 
down the road to modernity. But South Africa had other traditions that could easily 
be construed as obstacles to 'development.' The legacy of apartheid government 
and administration was the most popular explanation cited for underdevelopment 
and within this it was easy to identify traditions, obstacles and irrationalities 459 
The imperative was not so much the modern society alluded to by Escobar but a 
'democratic and developmental' society - a construct of both the new state and 
its allies within civil society. Thus although the setting was not the developing 
Third World of the late 1940s referred to by Escobar460, the imperative remained 
much the same i.e. planning involved the overcoming or eradication of 'traditions', 
'obstacles' and 'irrationalities', that is, the wholesale modification of existing human 
and social structures and their replacement with rational new ones.461 
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CHAPTER 7: lOP PLANNING IN NGQUSHWA 
If planning held the risk of unintended consequences in a large urban context like 
Buffalo City, its outcome were even more unpredictable in a predominantly rural 
context. 
The document that is referred to extensively in th is section was drafted by the NGO 
Afesis-corplan and is entitled Situation Analysis: Peddie & Hamburg - Integrated 
Development Plans / Land Development Objectives September 1999. The title 
itself, reflects a number of important factors that effected the planning process. 
Firstly the document mentions two adjacent but at this stage (1999) separate 
municipalities namely Peddie and Hamburg (destined to be amalgamated into the 
Ngqushwa municipality). The reason for this was that while the planning process 
was underway, the Municipal Demarcation Board had simultaneously begun a 
process of re-demarcating municipal boundaries with the purpose of reducing the 
486 municipalities to about 283. 
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In the Eastern Cape the following change came into effect on 5 December 2000: 
Table 8: Adjustment of Municipal Forms and Number of Municipalities 2000 
Type of Municipality No. in terms of the LG. (After Dec. 2000) No. Comment 
Transition Act in terms of the LG 
(Act No . 209 of 1993) Municipal Structures 
Act (Act 117 of 1998) 
Transitional Local 94 0 TLCs were merged 
Councils (TLCs) into Category B 
(local Municipalities) 
Local Municipalities 0 38 
(Category B) 
Other non-urban 102 0 These were 
local authorities mainly Transitional 
Representative 
Councils (TrepC) 
with no or minimal 
administrative 
components and 
without dedicated 
budgets. Their 
function was 
primarily to 
represent rural & 
small settlement 
needs to the DCs.462 
District Councils / 6 6 There was minimal 
Municipalities adjustment of the 
actual model. (New 
district municipalities 
are category C)463 
Metropolitan 0 1 The Metropolitan 
Councils model was a 
creation of the 
Municipal Structures 
Act 
Total 202 45 
[Source: Auditor General 2003, Special Report of the Auditor-General to the Eastern Cape 
Provincial Legislature on Local Authorities in the Eastern Cape Province for the Period 1 July 2001 
to 30 June 2002 (Pr 7112003 ISBN 0-621 -34405-2) page 3J 
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The restructuring of municipal types and categories and the re-delineation 
of municipal boundaries caused considerable disruption to the Integrated 
Development Planning process underway from 1998 -2000. The municipal re-
demarcation process initially won much support from the NGO sector because it 
promised to create the spatial pre-conditions for a more equitable distribution of 
public resources between rich and poor or what Whelan refers to as 'vertical equity.' 
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7.1 Municipal Demarcation 1998-2000 
Before examining further the impact of lOPs in the Peddie / Hamburg area, it is 
necessary to briefly overview the intended and actual effect of re-demarcating 
municipal boundaries in the period 1998-1999. The aim is not simply to show how 
the re-demarcation process impacted the drafting of lOPs (which is already well 
accepted) but also to demonstrate that municipalities like Ngqushwa were caught 
up in interplay of powerful and often non-rational policy machinations that sent 
out mixed signals to weak municipalities. On the one hand municipalities were 
encouraged to increase their stature and institutional importance, on the other hand 
they could also anticipate a future of limited responsibility for municipal duties with 
considerable dependence on district government to 'do the job' and on national 
government to pay for it. 
The possibility of merged urban-rural municipalities was posed in the Local 
Government White Paper as one of 3 possibilities for local (Category B 
municipalities) in areas covered by district municipalities (Category C).465 In 
addition to the possibility of separate urban and rural councils , the White Paper 
suggested that amalgamated urban and rural municipalities . 
. .. are appropriate for small and medium-size towns which have clear social and 
economic linkages between urban and rural settlements. Many countries have 
pursued this option as a way both to cut the costs of multiple Councils operating 
in the same area and to enhance service delivery in rural areas." 466 
These constitute some of the basic benefits anticipated from the work of the MOB 
and South Africa's policy for developmental local government. The merger of 
racially separated municipalities and economically segregated areas during the 
pre-interim phase of transition had gone some way to improving vertical equity. 
However rural and urban imbalances persisted and this became a critical issue for 
municipal demarcation: 
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The impact of the demarcation process in rural areas has been that the 
boundaries of existing small towns have been expanded to include adjacent 
rural areas. The objective of this approach, in line with the recommendations 
of the White Paper, has been to achieve a degree of redistribution between the 
(relatively) rich urban areas and the poor rural areas and to reduce the total 
number of municipalities by having fewer, larger councils. It will also capture the 
functional and economic relationship that exists between small towns and their 
rural hinterlands within a single administrative and political structure.467 
This policy imperative, combining a seductive mix of science and political vision, 
was to dominate the discourse on municipal boundaries and local government 
transformation. A contrasting reality unfolding in new municipalities like Ngqushwa, 
was conveniently ignored in the representation of the new municipal scenario by 
politicians and technocrats alike. 
The Municipal Demarcation Board developed a powerful rationale for its ambitious, 
and some might argue, belated foray into local government restructuring . At district 
level and between predominantly rural and predominantly urban areas there 
was still much imbalance in the overall location of tax bases and municipalities 
were not regarded as having achieved the necessary economies of scale in their 
operations.468 
The redistribution argument in respect of the re-demarcation process is 
somewhat more muted and relates mainly to pockets of dense peri-urban 
development that were not included in the first urban amalgamation process. 
The amalgamation of urban and rural areas was framed in terms of efficiency 
rather than equity.469 
The types of efficiency that Whelan refers to, were set out as a number of key 
principles for rationalisation by the Municipal Demarcation Board (MOB). The work 
of the MOB is often regarded as a task of hard science involving the irrefutable 
logic of economics, geography and ergonomics. 
The Demarcation Board was responsible for redrawing municipal boundaries 
to achieve a balance between financial viability (through capturing sufficient 
income-generating capacity within each municipal boundary) and representation 
(be ensuring that each municipality is small enough to enable a sense of 
community to develop and to facilitate local participation in municipal decision-
making processes.)470 
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A closer examination of the Board 's guiding principles reveals much latitude for 
interpretation and in the final analysis, often having to make decisions on the basis 
of contradictory criteria. 
The idea of geographical contiguity or 'nearest neighbor' - simply put, this meant 
that those municipalities that were already in close proximity should be considered 
for amalgamation provided that they were bound by some sense of shared identity, 
elected municipal representatives would still be accessible to local populations, 
service delivery improvements were feasible and a sense of civic purpose would 
not be undermined.471 
It was immediately evident that some of the MDB working criteria would be very 
difficult to reconcile. Geographical contiguity for example, invariably implied that 
municipalities existed under much the same socio-economic circumstances by 
virtue of their location in the same region . Peddie and Hamburg fitted this criteria 
in that they were adjacent with only about 40kms separating the two towns. A 
further principle of the MDB however was to "develop a minimum 'critical mass' of 
municipal capacity (staff, assets, finances), especially where vulnerable and under-
capacitated TLCs and TRCs currently exist." 472 This section of the report will show 
that both Hamburg and Peddie shared a common and severe problem relating 
to staff capacity, assets and sources of income. In fact both towns were a virtual 
illustration of the MDB's characterisation of vulnerable small municipalities whose 
viability was in doubt: 
Very small municipalities lack the potential to develop the specialised and 
dedicated capacity that is necessary to effect good town planning, engineering 
and development management and general service delivery, in a country which 
is undergoing significant modernisation. 473 
Despite its own warnings on viability, the MDB went ahead and amalgamated 
Peddie and Hamburg with the result that the Ngqushwa municipality shared all 
the problems of its formerly separate municipalities. The notable difference was 
that Ngqushwa's incapacity now affected a much larger rural area. The rural 
area served by the Peddie Transitional Representative Council had previously 
enjoyed administrative support from Amatola District Council. (Amatola DC with 
an own income of about R540m in 1999474 was the second wealthiest district 
in the province and therefore the main source of services and facilities for rural 
settlements within its jurisdiction.475) The MDB elaborated on the principle of 
combining weak and strong areas thus: 
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Wherever possible , current TLCs, TRCs and lor other areas should be 
combined with a view to realising fiscally sustainable units, with 'weaker' areas 
being paired with 'stronger' areas so as to achieve a sharing of existing or 
potential resources. Unless this is done there is every possibility that many 
of the smaller or weaker authorities will collapse or 'islands ' of exclusive 
development may emerge ... 476 
Therefore , if considered in isolation, the capacity principle should probably 
have resulted in both Peddie and Hamburg being absorbed into their stronger 
neighbors i.e. Port Alfred in the west (which became Ndlambe), Grahamstown in 
the north-west (which became Makana) or East London in the east (which became 
Buffalo City.) However such a step would have almost certainly been at odds with 
other demarcation criteria . One of those criteria was the notion of functionality 
i.e. that within the municipality there should be "significant internal functional 
Iinkages."477 These linkages, explained the MOB, related to " ... shopping and work 
travel patterns, patterns of social integration, economic interdependencies, and 
shared transportation networks among other considerations."478 In terms of these 
criteria there were certainly strong linkages between Peddie, Hamburg and the 
surrounding rural settlements. 
Peddie contains a large proportion of the region's services and facilities and 
fulfils the role of a regional service function for the entire municipal area. It is the 
administrative seat and performs economic and social functions for the region. 479 
However confronting these ties of functionality there were clear indications of 
financial non-viability, illustrated in the following passages of this paper. It is 
self evident that the most measurable criteria - local government finance and 
the question of economics and affordability, should have held precedence in 
the techno-scientific formulations of the MOB. How then did the MOB arrive at a 
decision to amalgamate two rural municipalities that both clearly lacked a revenue 
base? The Board itself stressed, "The financial viability of municipalities is a key 
criterion in the determination of municipal boundaries ."48o The Board had also 
recognised that many local municipalities that existed prior to amalgamation were 
not viable: 
It is evident that from the number of current municipalities, which are deemed 
unviable and the extent of social and economic disparities in South Africa, that 
the financing of category B municipalities requires close scrutiny.481 
One explanation for the merger of two financially non-viable municipalities is that 
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the MOB did not consider local revenue sources as the key factor in fiscal viability. 
Two assumptions seem to underpin the MOB reasoning. Firstly that the mandate of 
the MOB, or at least the manner in which the MOB interpreted that mandate, could 
be extended to a significant overhaul of the financial and fiscal system for local 
government with significant changes to the national mechanisms for redistributing 
local government finances. While following the general principle that 'finance should 
follow function' i.e. a municipality should have access to the necessary revenue 
sources that were linked to its service delivery obligations, the Board looked 
increasingly to the national fiscus as a revenue source for non-viable municipalities 
(a pattern that had developed under apartheid and contributed greatly to the on-
going political control exercised by central government.) 
The Demarcation Board's accepts however that many municipal powers and 
functions can be funded through intergovernmental transfers, with accountability 
then resting with the municipality that is given responsibility for the funds. 482 
To this end, the MOB prepared a discussion document for the Department 
of Provincial and Local Government and the Department of Finance.483 The 
Department of Finance however responded by reminding the Board that policies 
with regard to the restructuring of municipal finance including critical changes to the 
formula-driven and poverty targeted Equitable Share transfer were already well-
advanced and being adequately dealt with through the assistance of the Finance 
and Fiscal Commission. The Department of Finance thus signaled its reluctance 
to simply accept a second revision of municipal fiscal policy at the behest of the 
MOB. Indeed the MOBs recommendations to the Department of Finance came 
shortly after the most significant shift in municipal financing in many decades. 
This saw operational grant policy to municipalities, shift from arbitrary 'bail-outs' 
by national government, invariably influenced by political considerations, to a 
less discretionary, predictable transfer system that attempted to measure actual 
municipal need through a formula defined allocation. The so-called Equitable Share 
system , introduced in 1998, could thus already claim to already have a significant 
redistributive element in that poorer municipalities received a preferential share of 
nationally generated revenue . 
Nationally raised revenue used to fund government services is vertically 
divided into three sections, one for each sphere , (local, provincial and national 
government.) This vertical division is based largely on historical expenditure 
patterns. The local government share is then horizontally divided, through a 
formula , into individual municipal transfers such that each municipality receives 
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an amount. Horizontal allocations are divided into two sections. Firstly the 
basic services grant (S) is positively linked to population levels below a poverty 
threshold (Department of Constitutional Development 1999). Secondly, the 
institutional grant (I) , aimed at addressing shortfalls in institutional capacity, 
only comes into operation after a population threshold has been reached (2000 
people); it increases gradually with population size and decreases with per 
capita income ... 484 
Secondly the Board assumed that its mandate could also be extended to any 
changes in municipal form, structure, powers and functions that would make the 
boundary changes instrumental in bringing about an improved system of local 
governance.485 Thus the Board signaled its intention to look into: 
• The administrative reorganisation of municipalities 
• Political structures to oversee such reorganisation (termed transformation 
committees) 
• A re-evaluation of the system of allocating powers and functions to local 
and district municipalities based on the MOB's assessment of capacity at 
the respective levels. 
• The incorporation of traditional leaders into the new municipalities 486 
Using its authority to revisit the allocation of powers and functions between district 
and local municipalities (as set out in Chapter 5 of the Municipal Structures Act 
117 of 1998), the Board framed a vision of municipal governance that promised 
to remedy many of the dysfunctionalities in the somewhat chaotic system of 
transitional councils that had evolved. The principle direction of these changes 
in powers and functions was towards more powerful district municipalities. The 
MOB's new vision of redistributive and capable local government thus entailed an 
enhanced status of district government with respect to local municipalities. 
Originally Chapter 5 of the Municipal Structures Act made provision for flexibility 
and pragmatism in the allocation of powers and functions between local and district 
municipalities based on the principle that some services were best provided at a 
local scale and others (bulk services of water for example) were best provided at 
district scale . Variations in the allocation of powers and functions were possible in 
terms of Section 85 of the Act that allowed provincial MECs for local government to 
adjust these powers and functions based on their own views of the relative capacity 
of district and local councils to deliver services. This recognised the important 
fact that the respective capacities of locals and districts varied greatly across the 
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country and could not be usefully served by a single national prescription that 
divided powers and functions rigidly between local and district municipalities. 
Prior to its amendment in October 2000, the Local Government: Municipal 
Structures Act, 1998 divided municipal functional powers between local (Category 
B) and district (Category C ) municipalities. Broadly it did so by allocating district-
wide (bulk) functions to district municipalities under section 83 and 84 of the Act. 
In terms of section 85 of the Act, provincial MECs for local government could 
adjust these powers and functions in accordance with a municipality's ability to 
deliver services.4B7 By 2001 the prevailing wisdom or at least that peddled by 
the Board, was that these legal provisions made for an unclear assignment of 
powers and functions to district and local government respectively. "One of the 
key problems with section 84(1) (and for that matter, Parts B of Schedules 4 
and 5 to the Constitution) is the lack of clear definitions of the functional powers 
assigned to municipalities. "4BB It could also be argued however that the fault lay 
not with the legislation which was deliberately flexible but with the inability of many 
MECs to develop a coherent and politically defensible measure of the capacity of 
district councils and their constituent local municipalities on a case by case basis. 
Nevertheless the alleged 'confusion' in the assignment of powers and functions 
provided the rationale for the MDB and the Department of Provincial and Local 
Government, to shift many basic municipal functions from local to district level. 
In October 2000, Parliament amended section 84(1) of the Act by transferring 
the most significant powers and functions originally vested in local municipalities 
to district municipalities. These included the supply of water, the transmission 
and distribution of electricity, the removal of waste and the provision of municipal 
health services ... 489 
Previous shifts in local government policy had been subject to considerable public 
and stakeholder consultation, including national conferences, workshops and public 
hearings by the relevant portfolio committees in parliament. By contrast there 
was remarkably little public debate about the shifting of basic municipal functions 
from local to district level. The Finance and Fiscal Commission for example, 
submitted that it had not been consulted on the amendments to section 84 of the 
Municipal Structures Act and that such inattention was contrary to section 229 
of the Constitution of South Africa 490 The general attitude of the MDB and the 
Department was that there had been no major shift from the principles outlined in 
the 1998 Local Government White Paper. However the White Paper had directed 
that districts should assist local municipalities in developing their capacity to 
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perform proper municipal functions or temporarily assume responsibility for select 
functions but certainly not to remove such responsibilities . Furthermore districts 
were directed to only assume functions where there was no prospect of an effective 
local municipal presence: 
While the capacity of Category (B) municipalities to deliver municipal services 
should be enhanced to meet local needs, there are some areas which do 
not warrant the building of fully-fledged municipal administrations ... District 
government should supplement the administrative capacity of category (B) 
municipalities in these areas, by providing financial and administrative capacity 
where lacking, or directly providing municipal services where required .491 
This point is further underscored by the White Paper's acknowledgment that 
districts did not all exist in a uniform relationship with local municipalities thus 
making a standard breakdown of powers and functions impossible. 
District Councils are very different entities in various parts of the country. 
Given the numerous different settlement types with in district jurisdictions, this 
is not a bad thing. While a measure of consistency is necessary across all 
district governments, a measure of flexibility needs to be built into the system. 
A variable district government system is envisaged in which districts exercise 
different sets of powers vis-a-vis their areas and the local municipalities that 
comprise them, depending in local circumstances 492 
Above all the White Paper determined that district government was not intended to 
strip local government of its responsibilities; on the contrary it had an obligation to 
increase the capability of local government: 
The ability of district government to provide on-demand assistance, as well as 
systematic capacity building to municipalities will be promoted . The capacity-
building role of district government should be focused on increasing the capacity 
of category (B) municipalities to assume municipal functions 493 
The influence of the MDB in this very significant policy shift to stronger district 
government and weaker local government, in contravention of the White Paper, 
is often overlooked. The Ministerial Advisory Committee on Local Government 
Transformation which reported to Minister Mufamadi in November 2001 , at one 
point in its report, portrays the MDB as only incidentally and cautiously in favor of 
the shift in powers and functions: 
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Broadly speaking , the DPLG and the Municipal Demarcation Board (MDB) 
support the sUbstantial changes made to section 84 of the Act by Act 32 of 2000 
(the Amendment Act) , provided that a process of incremental transformation is 
followed .494 
Whereas the fact of the matter was that the changes had arisen directly from the 
Board's own recommendations ; as Pycroft observes: 
... the Demarcation Board's recommendations do entail a considerable 
reallocation of responsibility from local to district municipalities. This transfer 
is particularly pronounced in areas where local councils are financially or 
administratively weak and vulnerable 495 
This precipitated a crisis for local governance that went curiously unnoticed at the 
time. Not only were local municipalities stripped of the basic functions that allowed 
them to have any meaningful role in the lives of citizens, it also transpired that most 
off the district municipalities that were to assume these functions, were hopelessly 
ill-equipped to do so. The crisis was temporarily resolved by a blanket proclamation 
by the Minster of Provincial and Local Government that temporarily returned these 
basic functions to local municipalities until 1 July 2002 - a date advised by the 
MDB.496 
The fact that the amendment to the Municipal Structures Act was only temporarily 
suspended meant that local municipalities faced a sword of Damacles in figurative 
terms. Implied was a loss of political authority to local municipalities, in that they 
could ultimately relinquish all key municipal functions including the supply of water, 
the transmission and distribution of electricity, sewerage services and the removal 
of waste. Other 'lost' functions like municipal health were less clearly a municipal 
function in constitutional/legal terms. This down-scaling of local government 
competencies was glossed over by many commentators at the time including 
Pycroft who chose to de-link issues of democratic representation from actual 
municipal service functions. The distinction between full political authority, in the 
sense that a local council is able to make final decisions regarding the policies 
relating to local service provision, and a much weaker form of representation based 
on local councils acting as the conduit for articulating local needs, became blurred. 
Theoretically at least, the rendering of services became all important and municipal 
politics was reduced to the "channeling of needs" to the appropriate authorities. 
Local elected municipal government and indirectly elected district level government, 
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were confiated -as the same thing in order to defend any suggestion that local 
government had been subject to a down-scaling of its powers and responsibilities. 
One of the few agencies to openly confront this issue was the Free State Local 
Government Association (FRELOGA). In its submission to the Ministerial Advisory 
Committee; FRELOGA noted: 
Retail water provision, sewerage removal and disposal, health services and 
electricity generation (and) distribution were traditionally local municipal 
services. In many cases, the reason for establishing a municipality for a 
particular settlement had been to provide water ... The "delocalisation" of 
decision-making about these services creates the danger that the public, i.e . the 
consumers and potential consumers of these services may be removed from 
decision-making about the coverage, quality and cost of these services. Most of 
these consumers do not have access to transport or the communications media 
to voice their needs and complaints.497 
The ensuing debate about allocating powers and functions seemed to be framed 
within two significantly different visions of the future of local government in South 
Africa. One, framed by the DPLG and MOB, comprised a limited number of strong 
district councils across the country taking control of all critical local functions and 
using their control over basic municipal services to ensure effective delivery and 
equitable redistribution of fiscal resources within the district boundary. Local council 
would still preside over less essential services and would make their constituencies 
needs known through indirect representation at district level. The other vision, 
framed within the White Paper and recalled partially in the responses of the 
National Treasury and the Finance and Fiscal Commission was of increasingly 
stronger local municipalities with broad powers and functions. Redistribution of 
fiscal resources would be primarily a national responsibility. By virtue of their 
important service functions (if necessary supported by non-discretionary grants 
from national government) local municipalities would have credibility and be 
directly answerable to local constituencies for service delivery and governance 
functions. In achieving this status they would gradually decrease their dependency 
on both district and national (financial) support. 
Most of the other key role-players had reservations about the transfer of service 
authority. These reservations were expressed however in terms that were 
predominantly technical and financial, or related mainly to potential difficulties 
in the transition process. In making submissions to the Ministerial Advisory 
Committee, the Department of Provincial and Local Government and the 
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Demarcation Board focused on procedural and transition related problems relating 
to the issue of district and local powers and functions. Predictably the department 
and the MOB choose to ascribe these problems to the Ministerial authorisations 
rather than their own hasty amendments to section 84 of the Municipal Structures 
Act:498 
• Difficulties in preparing lOPs and municipal budgets due to uncertainty 
regarding how powers and functions will finally be allocated 
• Negative impact on creditworthiness for municipalities seeking loans or 
private investment for capital projects 
• Uncertainty around finalising staffing organograms (in point of fact most 
municipalities choose to draft expanded organograms with little regard to 
the powers and functions they could realistically assume - the example of 
Ngqushwa is discussed later in this chapter.) 
• Uncertainty and low municipal staff morale. This certainly proved a factor 
in many municipalities but its origins arguably had more to do with the 
generally protracted transition process and in particular the amalgamation 
of multiple municipal administrations and the often crude, nepotistic and 
ill-advised implementation of necessary affirmative action policies. 
• Uncertainty related to the scheduled transfer of functions by provincial or 
national departments to municipalities, (DWAF water schemes were 
cited.) 
• Divided geographical responsibility (due to wards being served by more 
than one authority) would complicate the assignment of equitable share 
allocations. 
The Department and MOB also revealed a significant distrust of the motives of local 
municipalities in dealing with the powers and functions dilemma. They argued that 
municipalities might use the two-year period of the authorisations for "new officials 
to entrench the status quo thereby making the allocations of power and functions 
in 2002 based on capacity almost impossible."499 Apparently it did not occur to 
Department and the MDB that their own capacity assessments could be usefully 
supplemented by a two-year re-appraisal period in which those same municipal 
officials demonstrated the real capacity of both local and district municipalities 
thus providing the basis for a more appropriate and flexible division of powers 
and functions on a case by case arrangement, (as section 84 of the Municipal 
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Structures Act had originally provided for.) Instead the Department and the MOB 
speculated in an ungenerous manner that municipalities might "cherry-pick" i.e. 
take on those functions that delivered revenue and shed (by "under-resourcing") 
those functions that were unprofitable.50o 
Other submissions to the Ministerial Advisory Committee focused on the immediate 
impact of the amendment to the Municipal Structures Act and the resulting 
Ministerial proclamations on local government finance rather than the underlying 
and, arguably more serious political policy implications. Organisation Development 
Africa for example was concerned that the principle of finance following function 
had been compromised and that no stabilising mechanism existed to ensure that 
the necessary financial transfers could be affected between district and local 
government to reflect the actual pattern of functions aliocated. 501 Rates accounts at 
local level would come under severe pressure as local municipalities relinquished 
the tariff income from those trading services transferred to district level , argued the 
ODA.502 
In its submission the Msunduzi municipality in Kwa Zulu-Natal echoed this concern 
i. e . finance not following function , but related it more to the existing system which 
already saw significant levy income of R45 - R50 million going to the district council 
which "appears to be spending the majority of its income on administration."503 
Msunduzi noted that, contrary to the MOB's vision of powerful and developmental 
district municipalities, it's own district municipality had made no provision for 
new capital projects in the 2001 and 2002 financial year and "some previously 
committed projects and funding has been withdrawn .. . "504 Thus argued Msunduzi , 
not only did it need to retain its income from tariffs on trading services, it also 
needed to access the income from levies which currently accrued to the district, 
because as a local municipality, it was in fact providing those services."o5 
The National Treasury reaffirmed its principle that fiscal equalisation was a national 
concern and that redistribution of resources should be effected nationally.506 It also 
pointed to immediate short-term problems like municipal services funded by rates 
income which accrues to local municipalities rather than districts. Apart from it's 
concern with fiscal stability, creditworthiness and protecting economies of scale , 
the Treasury also recognised that political accountabi lity issues arose from the 
proposed shift in powers and functions: 
The problem with the Amendment Act was that it would give rise to an ad hoc 
devolution of powers and would lead potentially to weak accountability and little 
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service delivery. In addition to weak accountability of district municipalities, it 
was difficult to see how strengthening district municipalities would strengthen 
local municipalities; in fact the converse was more Iikely.507 
Perhaps not recognising the vastly ambitious plans of the Municipal Demarcation 
Board to completely re-engineer municipal finance, the Banking Council accused 
the MDB of misreading financial viability issues at local municipal level and not 
recognising the critical role of trading services in local municipal income.50s The 
Council noted that the loss of these services would negatively impact "current and 
future viability and the capacity to borrow of category B municipalities. "509 
In its submission to the Ministerial Advisory Committee the FFC recalled the clear 
distinction in the White Paper and the original version of section 84 of the Municipal 
Structures Act between district service obligations related to district-wide matters 
and bulk services and local municipal obligations related to electricity, water and 
waste which should be "located as close as possible to the communities the 
services are meant to serve".510 The FFC touched on the political dimensions of the 
issue by noting that district municipalities did not operate mechanisms for citizens 
participation in decision-making - (ward committees) thus there would be no 
easy access to the decision-making process. The FFC echoed other submissions 
that the nonalignment of service obligations with revenue income would disrupt 
municipal government. More fundamentally the FFC came out strongly in support of 
the National Treasury's position that: 
Issues of redistribution should not influence the division of powers and functions 
between local and district municipalities given the primary role national 
government should play in funding redistribution; 511 
In summing up the arguments presented, the Ministerial Advisory Committee 
indicated its concurrence with virtually all of the reservations expressed about 
the amendments to section 84 of the Municipal Structures Act. 512 In particular it 
was unimpressed with the idea that a legislatively undefined financial mechanism 
between district and local municipalities would constitute the best mechanism for 
fiscal redistribution . It noted that there had been no policy intention that district 
municipalities should provide local services. The MAC also caste doubt on the 
feasibil ity of a two-tier model of local government, noting that this created a 
"bifurcated system."513 The MAC drew parallels between the two -tiered system 
of metropolitan local government experienced by Johannesburg between 1995 
and 2000 during the transition phase of local government. The MAC was of the 
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view that this system had been the cause of Johannesburg's liquidity crisis in 
1996-1997 and warned against extending such a system to non-metropolitan local 
government.S14 
The MAC's recommendations were very simple; restore the status quo i.e. separate 
functions and powers for local and district councils, that existed prior to the 
amendment to the Municipal Structures Act. Alternatively the MAC suggested that 
the 84(3) authorisations for local municipalities to retain the 4 key service functions 
should hold beyond 1 July 2002 and that any transfer of functions should be based 
on a "national capacity audit of all district municipalities. "515 
In general however the powers and functions debate was ultimately was glossed 
over. Government, including the supposedly independent South African Local 
Government Association (SALGA) insisted on treating the granting of basic service 
provision functions to district government as a minor administrative adjustment for 
more rationale service provision: 
The outcome of this process will be that in rural areas where there is limited 
financial and administrative capacity, the local municipality will have fewer 
direct powers and functions . The small rural local councils will provide 
representation for their communities and channel the development demands of 
their constituencies to the district the district municipality, in a similar way to the 
existing TrepCs.516 
Pycroft and other supporters of the MOB's vision of more centralised local 
government through strong districts do not comment on the fact that public 
representatives at district level are not directly elected. District councillors are 
elected by local councils from within their own ranks. Once municipal voters have 
elected a local councillor, either through a party vote or a ward vote , they have 
little control over who is elected by council to district level. Thus passing municipal 
functions from local district level effectively means the removal of these functions 
from the influence of the local electorate. The Ministerial Advisory Committee that 
sat in 2000-2001 was one of the few bodies to acknowledge this impact on the 
political dimensions of local governance: 
Accountability and democracy are not promoted by transferring the most 
significant municipal services to a level of local government in which there are 
no ward councillors and which sits above all local municipalities, and as such 
stand unaccountable to the people.5w 
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To understand the full impact of the proposed shift in powers and functions on 
municipal politics and government it is necessary to envisage the potential shift in 
powers and functions in combination with the results of re-demarcation in spatial 
terms where the principle of geographic contiguity was stretched to breaking 
point. By way of example, prior to demarcation Cradock and Middleburg were 
small-medium sized towns in the Karoo region of the Eastern Cape each with its 
own municipality. Separated by nearly 100kms of uninhabited farmland and arid 
wildemess the towns had distinctly different social and economic identities and 
different political traditions. In December 2000 both towns were amalgamated into 
the Inxuba Yethemba municipality. The seat of the municipality and all its major 
political and administrative facilities are now in Cradock. Any Middleburg resident 
wishing to attend a councilor sub-committee meeting of Inxuba Yethemba must 
travel 100kms. Both municipalities initially challenged the new demarcation of 
boundaries but these challenges were later withdrawn, apparently as a result of 
political pressure from provincial level party structures. 
By combining weak municipalities like Peddie and Hamburg the MOB created 
the pre-conditions for the long-term dependency of the Ngqushwa municipality 
on financial transfers from national government and on the Amatola District 
municipality for operational matters and capital projects. This is clearly illustrated 
in later sections of this chapter that deal with the composition of the Ngqushwa 
budget and the manner in which it performs (or does not perform) its functions. 
Where weak municipalities are combined, and these fall within the jurisdiction of a 
weak district municipality, the conditions for severe municipal failure are created. 
This is well illustrated by the combination of Nqgeleni and Libode into the Nyandeni 
municipality, now under the jurisdiction of the newly created and institutionally 
weak O.R. Tambo District Municipality. In fact after the 2000 establishment of new 
municipalities only one district municipality (Amatole District Municipality) could be 
said to be reasonably capable of performing its assigned functions. 518 
The consequence for local government of the recent demarcation process appears 
not to have been adequately considered. The emphasis on creating very wide 
boundaries to effect redistribution of financial and administrative resources is 
directly linked to the transformation requirements to include functionally linked 
areas into one municipal area, but many municipalities cannot effectively implement 
redistribution. Both the institutions of local government and the personnel have 
been subject to repeated transformation initiatives at the workplace and in the their 
private lives over the last six years. This appears to be having a major impact on 
the morale and quality of services delivered by municipalities.519 
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It is worth noting how policy thinking was influenced by the MOB's vision of a 
municipal finance system increasingly reliant on inter-governmental transfers as 
a mechanism for redistribution -despite the fact that key stakeholders like the 
FFC and the Banking Council had severe reservations about the MOB's basic 
assumptions. What was surprising was the ease with which the Board set aside 
key principles like the importance of accessible local representation and local 
municipalities that could be empowered to eventually take full responsibility for 
governance and administration within their localities. 
Through its powerful brief to re-determine municipal boundaries, the Board thus 
assumed the prerogative to revisit many of the changes in municipal form and 
function only recently finalised in the Municipal Structures Act No. 117 of 1998 
and other draft provisions in the then unpromulgated Municipal Systems Act. 
The Board's hand was greatly strengthened by the Constitutional Court ruling in 
October 1999 on the application of criteria for metropolitan areas. The action was 
bought by the Provinces of the Western Cape and Kwa Zulu-Natal and challenged 
the constitutionality of sections of the Municipal Structures Act relating to boundary 
demarcation, citing the MOB as the respondent. The court ruled in respective of the 
metropolitan boundary issue that the authority for determining criteria lay with the 
Board and not the Minister of Provincial and Local Governments20 
Local experiences of re-demarcation 
In 1998/ 1999 Afesis-corplan, through its contact with the Demarcation Board 
and the provincial government, had prior knowledge that Peddie and Hamburg 
were likely to be amalgamated into a single municipality, Ngqushwa. In order 
not to render its planning services obsolete, Afesis-corplan had undertaken a 
planning process that covered both municipalities. In a further attempt to overcome 
blurred policy, planning documents were drafted which referred to both Integrated 
Development Plans and Land Development Objectives. This reflects the fact that 
municipal planning was governed by two separate pieces of national regulation at 
this stage - an issue that has already been discussed. An amendment to the 1993 
Local Government Transition Act (209 Of 1993) required municipalities to develop 
Integrated Development Plans and was overseen by the then Department of 
Constitutional Development. Land Development Objectives were a requirement of 
the Development Facilitation Act (67 of 1995), overseen by the Department of Land 
Affairs. While the new planning regime spoke to greater coordination , integration 
and inter-governmental cooperation, the fact was that these two departments 
engaged in a low-level battle to become the principal legislating authority with 
respect to municipal planning. In July 1997 Steven Beresford, then Director of 
Development Facilitation in the Department of Land Affairs warned: 
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A wide range of national departments have either passed - or are in the process 
of passing - legislation which requires planning processes from municipalities 
(e .g. housing, transport etc.) While all of these reflect an intention to promote 
integrated development planning their effect is often the exact opposite.521 
Some of the proposed planning laws that municipalities were required to abide by in 
1997 included: 
• The draft Housing Bill : set goals for housing delivery, identify land, 
oversee development, regulate land use and provide bulk infrastructure. 
• National land Transport Bill 1997: designates municipalities as 'transport 
authorities' - required to produce integrated transport plans 
Water Services Bill : potentially designates a municipality as a 'water 
service authority' which must draft a water development plan including 
targets for service access, nature of the service, institutional and financial 
arrangements required to deliver and regulate the service. 
• Proposed regulations in terms of the Environmental Conservation Act 
(Act 73 of 1989).522 
Despite the limited capacity of local municipalities, amply demonstrated since 
1995, the municipal lOP process was supposed to gather these various planning 
provisions into a single coherent process coordinated by the municipality: 
lOPs seek to address this problem (coordination of different planning laws) by 
providing a central co-ordination plan that includes the required sub-plans523 . 
In order to do this the municipality was required to refer to and interpret a broad 
range of national, provincial and district policies and plans which set out the broad 
parameters for development. These included: 
• at the broadest national level, GEAR 
• at provincial level , the Provincial Growth and Development Plan (PGDP) 
and the Provincial Spatial Development Plan 
• sub-regional investment and growth plans like spatial development 
initiatives (SOls). (Ngqushwa municipality for example fell within the Fish 
River SOl) 
• more locally Ngqushwa municipality was also expected to refer to the 
district level DPs being framed simultaneously by the Amatole District 
Municipality. 
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There is little indication of why the planners and policy-makers thought that small 
and even medium sized local municipalities would have the capacity to engage 
in such a complex task of coordination . In fact even understanding the distinction 
between Land Development Objectives (DFA) and Integrated Development Plans 
(LGTA) would have required considerable familiarity with the conventions of 
planning. Contrary to the implied literal meaning LDOs are not simply objectives 
related to the development and use of land. In 1997 Kojo Giyan, then Acting 
Director of town and Regional Planning in the Eastern cape provincial government 
described LDOs as follows, "".LDOs concentrate to a large extent on the spatial 
budgeting and development time-frames" while lOPs "go further to link action 
programs to budgets and human resource capacity."524 Beresford described a 
similar relationship between lOPs and LDOs: 
The lOP is needed to ensure that the physical delivery objectives established 
in the LDOs are tied into an appropriate financial and institutional framework. 
Particularly important is the link between the objectives and the budgetary 
process of the municipality.525 
The bureaucratic competition between the Department of Constitutional 
Development as overseer of the LGTA and the Department of Land Affairs as 
implementer of the DFA was downplayed by skilled planning technocrats like 
Beresford: 
Because of the close relationship between the LGTA's requirement of lOPs 
and the DFA's requirement of LDOs, the Departments of Land Affairs and 
Constitutional Development have agreed to combine the satisfaction of these 
two requirements into one process.526 
Despite these skilled attempts to explain away discord at the level of national 
oversight, by late 1999 it was still unclear whether local municipal plans should 
be drafted as LDOs or IDPs12 thus Afesis-corplan framed the draft Ngqushwa 
municipal plan as both. 13 
12 See for example the Planning handbook for Eastern Cape Local Authorities produced by 
the Eastern Cape Department of Housing and Local Government in 1998. Page 2 purports to 
explain the relationship between LDOs and lOPs but in fact re-states the origins of the planning 
requirements and the elements of the planning process. 
13 Ultimately the lOP terminology was to prevail as the newly formed Department of Provincial and 
Local Government consolidated its policy grip over municipal affairs and introduced a chapter on 
lOP into the new Municipal Systems Act which replaced lOP provisions in the LGTA. (The DFA was 
never repealed however and strictly speaking its requirements for LDOs could still be applied to 
muniCipalities.) 
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7.2 lOP in action: Ngqushwa 
The examples set out below help to describe a typicallDP procedure but 
also show how Integrated Development Plans relied upon an idyllic notion of 
municipal government. The overall IDP approach is to plan as if the newly formed 
municipalities were model institutions with normal levels of operational competence, 
or would shortly achieve such status. The structure of the planning process is rigid, 
as prescribed in various resource documents. 
The Ngqushwa municipality, that forms much of the basis for subsequent comment 
in this chapter, conducted the following planning steps: 
1. An analysis phase to 'scan the environment in order to identify the 
existing problems and opportunities facing the municipality. ' The 
diagrammatic representation of this shows an interaction between the 
technical compilation of data on environmental, economic, social factors 
etc and the community that is represented through an IDP Representative 
Forum that should prioritise needs through an orientation workshop . 
These needs are then reconciled with the data presented by the IDP 
Steering Committee in its technical role. The IDP document observes 
that "The participation of all stakeholders was very important at this stage" 
but does not comment on the actual level of participation.527 The process 
was scheduled to be completed in 3 months and was directed largely by 
the Planning and Implementation Management Support Centre (PIMS) 
based at the Amatole District Municipality although the actual planning 
work was done by consultants.528 
2. A strategies phase during which choices are made on the different 
options for addressing priority issues and contact is established with the 
district municipality to adopt a common approach to solving problems. The 
purpose of this phase was to find the "most appropriate ways and means 
of tackling priority issues."529 Policy guidelines and guiding principles are 
referred to and competing priorities are compared with an agreed vision. 
This 'vision' and its related objectives were to be formulated by the 
Ngqushwa public at Representative Forum meetings. However the vision 
and objectives are then taken to a 'joint strategy workshop at district level' 
for comparison with district objectives. Only after the local municipal level 
objectives are cleared at district municipal level, does the local IDP 
steering committee (officials and experts) get to adjust development 
strategies according to technical data and expert knowledge .530 "The 
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strategy debate helped to avoid the usual short cut from identified needs 
to sectoral projects. It helped to find more appropriate , innovative, cost 
effective solutions ... " 
3. During the Project Phase the Ngqushwa municipality claims to have 
'translated ' objectives and preferred strategies into projects and 
programmes. "This phase was considered as the 'nuts and bolts' phase. It 
was the phase of technical and financial experts - the phase in which 
municipal officers and their service providers were involved in preparing 
project proposals. "531 The experts and officials apparently work in 'cluster 
task teams' to create criteria for project selection. Once these criteria 
are approved by the Representative Forum they are used to select priority 
projects in a 'Projects Co-ordinating Workshop' which ultimately create the 
basis for final project proposals '"32 
4. According to the IDP document the Integration Phase functions as a 
form of "double-check' to ensure that the identified projects are in line with 
the municipalities objectives and strategies , are with in the "resource 
framework" and are legally compliant. This is done by allowing the 
Representative Forum to assign projects "criteria and weights" i.e. to 
reassess relative importance and ranking in terms of priority. Once all 
projects and programmes are compliant with the criteria, the IDP 
document may be compiled and submitted for public comment and 
approva!.533 The actual structuring of that document however is 
determined by national policy and legislation and it must contain certain 
elements like: a five-year financial plan and capital investment 
programme, a monitoring and performance management system, a spatial 
development framework, an integrated poverty reduction / gender 
equity programme, an environmental management programme, a local 
economic development programme, an institutional programme, an HIV/ 
Aids programme and a disaster management plan. 534 
5. The Approval Phase involved the eliciting of public comment on the lOP 
before it is adopted by the council, " ... all relevant stakeholders and 
interested parties, including other spheres of government, have been 
given a chance to comment on the draft lOP. This was to assist in giving 
the approved plan a sound basis of legitimacy , support and relevance."535 
This section of the lOP outlines two slightly different processes that could 
be followed during the approval phase. The second option was specified 
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for those municipalities that could not meet the 31 March 2002 deadline 
for approval. The document does not specify which process was followed 
by Ngqushwa, lending further weight to the suspicion that some 
procedures were carried out as a 'paper exercise' only rather than a 
practical action . 
The entire first chapter (20 pages) of the 2002 Ngqushwa lOP document, is given 
over to vaunting the expanded constitutional role of municipalities , the policy 
imperatives for better use of resources through lOP, accelerated service delivery, 
strengthening democracy and overcoming the apartheid legacy. It describes in 
highly generic terms an ideal planning process as prescribed by the OPLG I GTZ 
Guide Pack. The planning process is described largely in policy terms (what was 
prescribed) or what was intended rather than what actually occurred.536 
In relation to small , medium and micro enterprises and what these can do for local 
economic development: 
Skill development initiatives are aimed at providing unemployment people (sic) 
with skills and competencies that are likely to secure them with employment. 
Human capital is the critical ingredient for sustainable economic growth. 
While the development and maintenance of services and infrastructure is the 
foundation of an enabling environment for LEO, it is also an integral component 
for improving the lives of poor citizens in the area.537 
In relation to water infrastructure: 
Ngqushwa municipality is blessed with dams and water treatment works that 
provide bulk services to the communitiesS38 
In reality Ngqushwa had no control over this infrastructure because, as the very 
next sentence of the official lOP concedes, the water infrastructure was owned by 
the Amatole Water Board and operated by a private company (Amatole Water I 
Amanzi) . 
The lOP process tended to de-contextualise municipal operations by ignoring 
certain 'realities', for example why certain infrastructure operated by the 
municipality was under-utilized. The mechanical sewerage treatment facility in 
Peddie is described in the lOP as "more than adequate for the present inflow". In 
fact it serviced only 288 households (1 .38% of total) .539 The official lOP expresses 
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'surprise' about this situation, offering nothing by way of explanation . Earlier 
surveys by Afesis-corplan had in fact warned that a water-borne sewerage system 
had been introduced to Peddie with no consideration of affordability. While the 
eMIP had funded internal reticulation and the treatment works, the reality was that 
households could not afford the connection costs to the main sewer. Had this been 
overcome, a further problem of operating costs remained. The 1997/1998 budget 
for Pedd ie municipality indicated that only 55 households were provided with a 
sanitation service (water-borne or bucket collection) and even with this minimal 
service level , sanitation was projected to generate a loss of 
R38 000 .540 This is precisely the kind of problem that IDP was supposed to resolve 
but as will be demonstrated in further looking at Ngqushwa, the issue of longer 
term operational costs was often overlooked. This problem was not limited to small 
rural municipalities: 
In many cases the maintenance of the projects is not budgeted for, either by the 
local authority when it applies for fund ing, or by the national departments who 
cannot afford to maintain them. Alternatively, the skills to maintain them are not 
available in the municipality, which effectively means that the local authority is 
saddled with projects that are unsustainable. Without the continued support of 
national and provincial governments, these projects would not be maintained .541 
Similar issues emerge in relation to electricity. Planners typically represented the 
absence of electrical power supply simply as a 'development need' : 
Table 9: Example of the representation of a 'Development Need' - Electricity 
Key Issue Objective 
Inadequate provision of electricity To ensure that at least 90% of the 
population has access to electricity by in some rural settlements 
2005 
[Source Ngqushwa IDP 2002, p52] 
Afesis-corplan adopted a more circumspect approach to the generic rendering 
of 'needs' Noting the general absence of electricity for rural households, Afesis-
corplan questions the common assumption that electricity supply will alleviate 
pressure on natural sources of energy: 
The provision of electricity to rural areas (Eskom planned to electrify all villages 
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by the end of 1997) may not relieve pressure on the environment because few 
people could afford the service M 2 
Whereas planning documents for municipalities tended to process and analyse 
development challenges in terms of the state's capacity to respond, the NGO 
approach was more sensitive to the complexity of these challenges and the 
possibility that the state formed part of the problem: 
Since most people live on state owned land, the obligation for resource 
management falls to the state. The functions of local government, district 
government and national ministries have become blurred in relation to 
environmental management and there are no clear institutional means for rural 
people to participate in this S43 
Despite this more critical approach to the role of the government, the overall 
inference is that ultimately the key function , in this case natural resource 
management, belongs with the state and the obligation rests with the state to 
ensure citizens participation in this function . Planning is shaped by the assumption 
that the state and those responsibilities allocated to particular government line 
functions, will be the primary source of development. 
The expectation that national government would bail-out weak local municipalities 
was something that the new municipal regime (the Department of Constitutional 
Development and the National Treasury in particular) set out to change. However 
a pol icy paradox occurred when, in re-demarcating new municipal boundaries, the 
Municipal Demarcation Board, as demonstrated in previous sections of this paper, 
explicitly acted on the assumption that some municipalities would remain entirely 
dependent on national government for the foreseeable future. This contradicted a 
key principle of municipal policy and in general terms, government tried to retain 
some link between local affordability and municipal expenditure. The Auditor-
General's report of 30 June 1996 for example, warned of services being rendered 
at a loss in Peddie, " ... the council's budget estimates for 95/96 provided for a deficit 
of R592 571 . Budgeting for a deficit is contrary to statutory prescriptions and sound 
financial practise. "544 
The Quest for Data 
The absence of reliable data and local knowledge is well acknowledged in literature 
on South African municipal planning.545 
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We need to understand the environment in which we operate. And that's local. 
What does it mean to live in Durban as opposed to 'Maritzburg? .. We need to 
have some accurate information about the variables. At the moment we don't 
have that in our country. We only disaggregate everything down to provincial 
scale or down to just broad national kinds of comparisons. We simply don't have 
that information.546 
Indeed the constant reference to this 'challenge' provided the rationale for many 
lucrative consulting contracts for planners and other consultants who argued 
that the generation of data would do much to solve the planning impasse. Little 
consideration was given to who would actually use that information in effective 
ways. Influential policy advisors like Sue Parnell noted: 
Getting the information is important but it is not enough. We have got to be 
able to take it to the key decision-makers - the people who produce the IDPs 
and most importantly, the people who run the budget. If we cannot translate 
the information about out environment, about what we want to achieve, and 
why we are not there at the moment, into language that can be adopted and 
incorporated into budgets , we will never change the direction of this ship.547 
Despite this call for the application of data to the municipal decision-making 
process , planners and policy-makers continued to overlook the limited ability 
of municipal staff and political leadership to process the limited data that was 
available and to combine this in useful ways with the very visible evidence of 
problems confronting the municipality. In the absence of this capacity, the actual 
formulation of strategies and appropriate municipal programs fell largely to the 
planning technocrats - greater complexity and volume of data inevitably meant less 
local 'ownership' and greater discretion for the planning professionals. The quote 
below refers to the offices and staff of the then Peddie municipality. 
No records on housing are kept by the municipality except through rate(s) 
registers which show 256 wooden houses, 463 squatter houses(informal), and 
some undeveloped sites. Peddie has a hospital with an old age section, and one 
of the schools has a hostel (in an area called Durban.) The housing backlog for 
Peddie is unknown, although they were able to say that 1073 low-cost housing 
applications had been made, mainly for in-situ upgrading in Peddie extension.548 
Despite these obvious and well-documented problems, the IDP process re-
launched after the December 2000 local elections for the newly elected councils , 
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sought to generate further data with little consideration for what already existed 
and how it had been used. It is not contested that there was an absence of rel iable 
technical data on housing and infrastructure in former homeland towns at this 
stage, however the repetition of situation analysis and data gathering became 
an ends in itself. As a statement of the problems confronting the municipality, 
the mention of inadequate information and information systems was virtually 
obligatory. It reflected a broad consensus of the status quo as reflected by 
professional planners formally in the service of government. The Afesis-corplan 
document (1999) for instance endorses the basic premise that the problem lay 
in the unavailability of the necessary data rather than the inability to process 
the data. In the Peddie experience, the information obtainable through the rates 
register and the register of applications for low-cost housing or in-situ upgrades 
is discounted or considered inadequate, despite the fact that there is considerable 
description of existing housing stock and some quantification of backlog . How 
was existing information being used or processed by the municipality? The 1997 
property valuation in Peddie listed the assessed properties as 39 businesses, 
90 government properties and 93 privately owned houses. As limited as the 
rates assessment may have been, in 1998/ 1999 the value of assessed rateable 
property was R19 031 480 however in 1997/1998 and again in 1998/1999 no rates 
income is factored under "income" in the municipal budget. 
Hamburg TLC, having failed to produce a budget for the previous 3 years , 
produced a detailed budget (with consultant assistance) for 1998/1999 which 
was described in the 1999 Afesis-corplan lOP document as "a serious effort to 
implement proper budgeting in the municipality." Using a 1996 interim valuation 
of property in the town, the total value of land and improvements was calculated 
as R23 315070. The municipality then correctly used the projected deficit in the 
budget (R241 120) to work out that it would need to tax property at 0,1 cent in the 
rand to recover the shortfall. This ind icates how fairly modest systems may have 
had considerable impact on local revenue generation and poses the question as to 
why such small improvements did not feature prominently in subsequent planning, 
in particular the 'official' 2002 lOP. 
The importance of property rates in local government fiscal policy had been 
clearly spelt out. Sections 229 and 230 of the Constitution of South Africa grant 
municipalities taxing powers and property taxes are the major source of tax 
revenue, accounting for about 20% of total revenue in 1998.550 
Neglect of potential income from property rates was not limited to Ngqushwa - the 
143 
Auditor General notes that the second most prevalent shortcoming identified by 
his 2001/2002 audit is the absence of a general valuation of property according 
to the 4 year cycle required by section 8(1) of the Property Valuations Ordinance 
of 1993.551 Despite the importance of this revenue power, the 2002 Ngqushwa 
IDP reflects no discussion or planning related to the matter of property rates or the 
state of the property valuation register. This despite the fact that the IDP repeatedly 
refers to the inadequate revenue base of the municipality. This reinforces the 
impression that the planners were indifferent to matters of local affordability and 
happy to support the expectation that the municipality remain dependent on 
national government financing in the long-term - a policy position the Municipal 
Demarcation Board did much to reinforce. 
The fact that the responsible local officials were making very little use of the 
existing data on the rates base for example, to frame basic strategies for improving 
life in the town, is overlooked in the IDP process. The competence of local officials 
is pertinent. The Afesis-corplan report reflects the anticipation of a more technically 
sound process driven by some as yet unidentified but better qualified service 
provider. While the IDP program captured the imagination of local politicians and 
staff and imbued a sense of participation and ownership,552 the technical and 
professional requirements of Integrated Development Planning were not matched 
by the necessary skills and experience in non-metropolitan local government: 
A review of the interim IDPs (conducted by the IDT and the Sub-committee) 
revealed that the extent to which these interim IDPs were successful in meeting 
their objectives is questionable. While they helped to focus councillors and 
officials to identify key priority projects and to adjust their budgets accordingly 
in a relatively short time span, the extent to which they have been able to do so 
adequately depended largely on capacity within each municipality. Thus, better-
resourced municipalities were able to respond quickly and effectively, while 
others deviated from the templates, focused on those infrastructure projects 
where funding could be accessed and had weak sectoral integration.553 
In fact municipalities at small-town and predominantly rural level were ill-equipped 
to handle the enhanced developmental functions assigned to municipalities as 
Atkinson et al (2003) point out: 
... given the revised conception of municipal functions, developmental 
municipalities need much higher levels of developmental staff than they have 
at present. Such staff should have some qualifications and experience in 
development management, programme management or project management.. . 
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It goes without saying that the appointment of development staff should avoid 
the pitfalls of political patronage.554 
Limited Functionality 
The Peddie municipality, like many predominantly rural municipalities, exercised 
limited control over some of the key infrastructure within its jurisdiction and even 
when it owned basic internal infrastructure, had insufficient knowledge of the 
operation thereof. 
A private water company (Amatole Water) suppl ies bulk water. The main dam, 
which supplies water, is owned by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 
and the TLC owns the reticulation system within the town. The exact number 
of standpipes is unknown, but it was estimated that there are 20 .... .There is no 
storm water drainage in Pedd ie, which causes flooding in rainy season. 555 
Infrastructure which the municipality had control over was frequently poorly 
maintained, even within the then limited municipal boundaries which ended at the 
periphery of the town. 
The roads in Peddie are in a shocking state ; there is one tarred road through 
the CBD that is very bad. The access roads leading off th is were never properly 
gravelled. Many residents refuse to pay their rates and taxes, citing the poor 
roads as reason. 55B 
In 1999 a sewerage spillage occurred from septic tanks I conservancy tanks on 
the hill above the Hamburg municipal offices. The response of the municipality was 
to hire consultants to investigate and write a report on the problem. 55? Integrated 
development planning tended to overlook the fact that rural municipalities were 
'hands-off' institutions when it came to operational matters. They functioned 
essentially as client bodies to other government institutions or the civil engineering 
I consulting industry. The lOP process tended to over-estimate the resources and 
finances over which municipalities were able to exercise discretion. The Peddie 
Transitional Local Council recovered minimal costs from its own functions and 
relied on inter-governmental grants and the newly instituted 'equitable share' 
transfer from national government: 
The TLC has no other significant source on income, and has no reserve fund . 
It is clearly in a state of financial crisis, which is confirmed by the Auditor 
General 's report .55S 
145 
The dilemma of the Peddie municipality was not unusual amongst South African 
rural municipalities. A weak local economy provided limited livelihood opportunities 
with the result that even basic municipal services were unaffordable to most local 
residents. According to data used by the planners for the 2002 lOP, only 4.6% of 
the Ngqushwa population is employed, 16% are unemployed and 36.8% are 'not 
economicallyactive'.55g Nevertheless the 2002 lOP document estimates that 54% 
of the population has access to either on-site taps or communal standpipes and 
70% of settlements access electricity. 56D 
The resulting shortfall in cost recovery on service provision caused a steady 
decline in the standard and coverage of all municipal services. This in turn 
provided the rationale for further non-payments by poor consumers but also by 
middle-class households who were unwilling to maintain payments on generally 
faltering communal services. 
Hamburg municipality followed a similar pattern between 1994 and 1997 i.e . a 
steadily increasing reliance on inter-governmental transfers (IGTs): 
Table 10: Intergovernmental Transfers as a Percentage of Total Income: Hamburg 
Transitional Local Council 1994-1997 
Year IGTs as a percentage of total income 
1994 76,75% 
1995 76,8% 
1996 77% 
1997 82,5% 
[Source: Afesis-corplan 1999, p 28J 
In parallel with this trend was an increasing reliance on the roll-out of national 
infrastructure programs to meet infrastructure needs. This placed local government 
planning in a subservient or client relationship with national government programs. 
The much lamented breakdown in coordination between national-level planning 
and lOPs was explained thus by the Ministerial Advisory Committee: 
A possible explanation could be that these departments have approved budgets 
for projects and that their success of failure will be determined by the extent to 
which they have spent those budgets on the identified projects. This problem is 
especially evident in areas where municipalities are weak and the department 
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has a strong presence. DWAF, DLA and DoT appear to be the most common 
departments mentioned in this regard by local authorities .561 
These problems are clearly long-term and endemic however the 2002 lOP gives 
little hint that solutions may lie outside the control of the municipality. Instead the 
lOP talks of the need for qualified finance personnel and the need to "identify 
other internal sources" of finance . Thus the municipality's financial predicament is 
portrayed as a manageable local problem requiring only the 'tweaking' of systems 
and some financial 'topping-up ' from hitherto untapped revenue sources. 562 Apart 
from these observations, the remaining financial analysis consists of one or two 
sentences on budget systems, policies and strategies like credit control and tariffs, 
financial controls and information technology systems.563 
7.3 Planning and Municipal Finances 
The crisis of escalating municipal overheads and inadequate local revenue 
bases had been recognised in 1996 when local government received enhanced 
Constitutional status. The principle of finance following function was supposed 
to ensure adequate revenue sources for the increased powers and functions and 
service obligations that were passed over to municipal government564• This provided 
the rational for the South African Local Government Association and others to lobby 
for expanded municipal institutions with more staff and full-time or at least well-
paid , public representatives (councillors). 
8y taking on a larger share of the (token) responsibility for meeting national 
poverty reduction objectives , local government became eligible for a much larger 
slice of national revenue. 565 However In small bankrupt municipalities much of the 
'equitably allocated share' of national revenue was treated as 'own revenue' rather 
than being directed to the poor service consumers it was intended to subsidize. For 
the period February 1998 to November 1999 and for the following financial year the 
Auditor General noted of inter-governmental grants: 
These grants are made to local governments for specific purposes. While in 
certain cases the grants received were not accompanied by directives from the 
donor department as to how the funds were to be applied, these and many of 
those received from the subsidisation of indigent consumers were appropriated 
as income. Furthermore many local authorities did not have an indigent policy 
which governs the subsidisation of indigent consumers .566 
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Under the previous municipal finance regime (limited and unreliable transfers 
to local government and representation based on local affordability) the internal 
costs of a small , poor municipal ity were determined by discretionary transfers 
from other spheres of government. Municipalities were therefore reluctant to incur 
recurring costs like wages and allowances where the revenue source could be 
'turned off' or limited by provincial or national government. The institutional costs 
of the municipality therefore increased more slowly as a response to the expanded 
provision of services to poor communities. 
In 1996-1997 the Hamburg Transitional Local Council, illustrated this pattern . It was 
almost entirely reliant on transfers from the provincial government: 
Grants and funding totaling R979 509 received from the Provincial 
Administration represented 82,5% of the total income received by the Council. 
This indicates a disproportionate reliance on Provincial Government funding and 
it appears that the continued operations of the Council are wholly dependent on 
continued support from this source S67 
Nationally, in the same period , (1996 / 1997) a fragmented system of inter-
governmental transfers to local government comprised R 1 ,2billion for agency 
payments, R1 ,2 billion for capital grants (exclud ing any receipts from the housing 
subsidy programme), only 2,2billion went to operating subsidies and with other 
non-cash subsidies the total national transfer to local government was R5,2 
bili ion.56B In 1997/1998 immediately prior to the implementation of the equitable 
share system, the overall transfer amounted to R5,9bn . The advent of significant 
and constitutionally assured financial transfers (the equitable share system) in 1999 
I 2000 was based on Section 227 of the South African Constitution which provided 
that the local sphere of government is entitled to an equitable share of nationally 
ra ised revenue. The key policy principle is explained thus: 
In other words , nationally generated income must be shared fairly between 
national, provincial and local government, based on the functions each has to 
fulfill , and the amount of revenue they are able to generate on their own .569 
The equitable share transfer was supposed to ensure that local government could 
" provide basic services and perform the functions allocated to i\"570. The White 
Paper tried to introduce the notion of revenue adequacy and certainty i.e. both 
their own revenue and transfer revenue should be certain and predictable to allow 
for realistic planning. Municipalities were encouraged to ensure that services 
were provided at affordable levels and that the costs of service delivery should be 
recovered .571 
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No bailout will be provided to a municipality that overspends its budget and / or 
fails to put in place proper financial management controls. It is the responsibility 
of political leaders to ensure that they set realistic budgets.572 
Subsidisation (the equitable share transfer) was intended to ensure that poor 
households, who are unable to pay even a proportion of service costs , have 
access to basic services. Instead the significantly increased and formula defined 
ES opened the door to escalated salary bills and councillor remuneration that was 
de-linked from local affordability. 
Clearly salary increases have exceeded increases in bulk services spending over 
the period 1999-2003: 
Table 11: Comparison of Increases: Bulk Services and Salaries 1999-2003 
R Billions 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 
Salaries 13.8 15.9 17.9 19.8 
Bulk Services 13.8 14.9 13.7 15.3 
Others 16.9 17.3 21.1 29.3 
[Source: Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2003J 
Municipalities like Ngqushwa had battled with inadequate own revenue (even 
during the brief periods when tariff setting, billing and debt collection were taken 
seriously) and undependable and discretionary financial transfers were not. 
The main reasons identified for this crisis were consumers not paying for 
services, and the municipality having poor facilities , like the two tractors and 
one refuse trailer that is in need of repair .. .. The revolving fund and capital 
accounts are in a bad state, with 80% having been spent on salaries .573 
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By April 2002 the analysis of Ngqushwa municipal income, as reflected in the 
official lOP document indicated as follows: 574 
Table 12: Sources of Funding Ngqushwa Municipality 2002 
Source of funding Amount® % 
Department of Local Govt. 
(National Fiscus) 11240052 56.63 
Rates and services 2057999 10.73 
Consolidated Municipal 
Infrastructure Proramme 3424300 17.86 
Amatole District Municipality 2450000 12.78 
Total 19172 351 100.00 
[Source: Ngqushwa Municipality 2002, Integrated Development Plan, p 45] 
Only 10.73% of municipal income was generated locally through service charges 
and property rates and a massive 87.27% coming as transfers from other spheres 
of government. This highly dependent state of the municipality does not seem to 
have worried the planners in any broad sense. While noting that internal generated 
income is very low, the lOP does not appear overly concerned by this, noting only 
and somewhat confusedly that " ... the need to identify other internal sources 
should be identified. "575 
The drafters of the 2002 Ngqushwa lOP chose to ignore ample evidence that in 
addition to spending irresponsibly, municipalities were poor debt collectors. Credit 
control and debt collection were treated as a 'systems' issue, the objective being 
to show that there was a policy in place and not that the policy was necessarily 
workable. In July 1998 the Hamburg TLC adopted a debt collection and indigent 
support policy. The debt collection policy was based on the Municipal Act 17 
of 1987 and applied to rates and taxes, refuse collection, water and rentals on 
municipal owned property.576 The policy relies on the legal systems to deal with 
defaulters with the legal costs of recovering the arrears to be paid by the service 
consumer. 577 Having experienced similar policies at work (or more accurately 
not working) in a number of small Transitional Local Councils at the time, Afesis-
corplan noted: 
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This policy is perhaps a little unrealistic for a town like Hamburg, and may have 
been borrowed from larger towns like East London. Needless to say that the 
implementation of this policy has been difficultya 
Hamburg's indigent policy provided that indigent users of refuse and water services 
(to a value of less than R166) with a household income of less than R2500 per 
month would qualify for a staggered system of subsidies inversely related to the 
level of income: 
Table 13: Services Subsidies: Hamburg Transitional Local Council 1999 
Level of income ® % subsidy 
0-800 70 
801-1200 60 
1201-2500 40 
[Source: Afesis-corplan 1999; p30] 
Indigent households would have to apply for this subsidy and council undertook 
to check a sample of the applications to verify that the households did in fact 
qualify. Remarking on the R166 subsidy targeted at water and refuse services, 
Afesis-corplan noted, "Given that only water and refuse are charged for, this is 
quite high."579 Despite the centrality of these issues to the Ngqushwa municipality's 
financial predicament, indigent policy and credit control are barely mentioned in the 
2002 lOP: 
Concern was expressed regarding the application of the indigent policy and 
assistance. The Council resolution 19 of 2001 stressed the need to amalgamate 
the Hamburg and Peddie indigent policies into one policy. 
Credit Control Policy / Debt Control Policy: Analysis of debtors and creditors has 
not been properly undertaken.5ao 
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7.4 Affordable Staffing 
In the era of transitional local councils preceding the establishment of Ngqushwa 
municipality, the Peddie municipality employed 20 full-time employees while the 
Hamburg municipality employed 14 staff.581 The most senior employee (the town 
clerk) had a national diploma in public administration and limited experience as an 
assistant town clerk in the Flagstaff municipality. 
By 2002 this situation had changed significantly. While no new skills or 
qualifications had entered the top management positions, the Ngqushwa 
municipality, now incorporating Peddie and Hamburg, had 27 councillors and 
employed 46 staff. As this paper has already demonstrated , one of the key policy 
objectives of the 1999/2000 re-demarcation of municipal boundaries was to 
rationalise costs associated with staffing and councillor remuneration. 
In the case of Ngqushwa, the newly amalgamated municipality employed 12 
more staff than the combined staff complement of its previous constituent 
mu nicipalities. 14 
Furthermore the 2002 Ngqushwa lOP notes that many posts were not filled at the 
time of drafting the lOP and the staffing organogram in fact made provision for 87 
postS.582 (The post of Municipal Manager had become an issue of dispute involving 
both town clerks of the former TLCs and the mayor.) Ngqushwa staffing levels 
are unexceptional when compared with the 2003 survey by Atkinson et al where 
the average staff complement of a sample of six "small town" municipalities was 
147.583 Interestingly the ratio of "white collar" staff to "blue collar staff' ranged from 
nearly 1 : 1 to 1 : 2,7 . Although Atkinson et al do not comment on this, it suggests 
that municipalities have nearly as many administrative and managerial staff as 
labourers and artisans. 
Quoting from a 2002 report by Sakhisizwe Consulting Services, the lOP raises 
concerns about the non-delegation of powers, non-enforcement of the councillors 
code of conduct, the review and 'issue' (sic) of by-laws, the absence of resources to 
handle certain functions, the absence of human resources policy and the absence 
of training strategies. No concern is expressed about the affordability of the new 
staff complement, despite the fact that it was scheduled to increase by 255% , 
indeed it is noted that with 5 staff, the finance section of the municipality " ... is 
understaffed ."584 Under Institutional and Finance (section 3.3.2) the lOP finds that 
14 It might be argued that this does not include the previous Peddie transi tional representative 
council (TrepC) however this council had no employees and although Nqushwa is formally 
responsible for the rural area, it performs minimal functions in rural areas. 
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there are, "Inadequate staff in the municipality to effectively provide the required 
services in the municipality."s8s 
And "There is a lack of other important components within the organogram to 
effectively deal with lOP issues." Thus one of the objectives identified is to, " .. . 
restructure the organogram to include other important components by 2003."587 
As a result the lOP Financial Plan (Table 30) projects that the municipality will 
spend more than R4,8m on salaries wages and allowances in 2003 or slightly over 
14% of its nett expenditure (R34,04m). However, if infrastructure expenditure and 
contributions to capital outlay are excluded from expenditure , (as they should be 
in determining operational costs) the salary, wage and allowance component rises 
to just under 44% of expenditure - the Auditor General regards wage!allowance 
expenditure in excess of 30% as unacceptable .s88 
Comparing this expenditure to income is difficult as the financial plan lists only 
"subsidies" (R32m) and "other income" (R34,04m) however since the difference is 
about R2.2m (and this figure constitutes roughly the 'own income' of Ngqushwa) 
it would appear that the R34,04m 'other income' is in fact the total income (and 
balances exactly with expenditure) of which just under 94% is comprised of 
transfers or 'subsidies.' Bearing in mind that municipalities like Ngqushwa play 
very little role in the implementation of infrastructure projects (where most of the 
non-salary! allowance expenditure goes), in financial terms, it would appear that 
the main function of the municipality is to provide income for staff and allowances 
to councillors. This clearly contradicts the policy imperative for increased technical 
efficiency at municipal level ; 
Macroeconomic management measures to keep money creation and the public 
deficit at target levels have also been conceived of as ways of squeezing 
greater efficiencies from municipalities.ss9 
Apart from direct staffing costs, there were other 'institutional' costs associated with 
ensuring that staff became more effective and organised in their jobs. Considerable 
faith is placed in 'capacity-building' and the development of systems and policies 
in order to meet this objective . Indeed at one point the drafters of the Ngqushwa 
2002 lOP suggest that municipalities were created to "empower" municipal staff and 
councillors: 
One of the most important objectives of the municipality is to empower 
councillors and municipal staff through institutional capacity building and 
training .s9o 
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This was more than simply an 'in principle' commitment as the institutional plan and 
assigned budget shows: 
Table 14: Ngqushwa Municipality 5-year Institutional Action Plan 
Activity Cost Over 5 yrs 
Capacity building for staff and 
councillors R750 000 
Instituting a skills development and 
training plan R100 000 
Formulation and implementation of 
Employment Equity and Affirmative 
Action Plans R80 000 
Formulation of HR and 
administrative policies R80 000 
Install computerised 
administrative system R475 000 
Develop and implement 
communication plan R500 000 
Total : R 1985 000 
[Source: Ngqushwa lOP 2002 p88] 
Thus Ngqushwa municipality, with an own income of just R 2057 999 in 2002, 
planned to spend nearly R2m over the next 5 years purely on staff and councillor 
development and associated administrative systems and policies. In addition, 
its expanded staff complement and administrative systems would require new 
office and workshop accommodation at the cost of R3,5m.591 Significantly, the 
need for this expenditure is created through policy - a policy framework that 
places unprecedented reliance on the formulation of plans. Thus the municipality 
is confronted with the legal requirements to have skills development and training 
plans, employment equity plans and communication plans. The only certain 
outcome of which was that planners and conSUltants would continue to gain further 
income from the Ngqushwa municipality for the next five years. 
154 
Thus the planning process itself served to defeat one of its main objectives; that of 
using limited financial resources within the system to maximum public benefit; 
In a 1999 Department of Finance circular, municipalities were directed to 
define and stick to their 'core' activities (Department of Finance 1999). The 
IDP process has been suggested as a means of defining that core, with cost 
benefit analysis playing a key role within the process. The linkage between the 
IDP and the budget, obliged in legislation, is an attempt to facilitate the shift in 
expenditure patterns. 592 
What could explain the planners reckless endorsement of further inflated internal 
costs in a context where the municipality was already expending an unreasonable 
percentage of grant income on staffing overheads? One obvious explanation is 
that planners did not regard the financial sustainability of Ngqushwa municipality as 
pertinent to the planning brief. With the formula driven, non-discretionary equitable 
share transfers in place, the National Treasury was able to exercise little control 
over how municipalities used these transfers. The main instrument available to the 
treasury to curb municipal expenditure was the budget cap. Although these ceilings 
on increases in municipal budgets became tighter between 1997-1999, the 'cap' did 
not effect the internal allocation of expenditure within the budgets93 
It is also evident that the respective national departments did not share the same 
imperatives. In contrast to the abovementioned position of the Treasury, the 
Department of Provincial and Local Government did little to prevent the ratcheting 
up of municipal salary bills during the 1999 I 2000 transitional period when virtually 
all municipalities were disestablished and re-established . Anticipating the need to 
make 'acting' appointments in the case of municipal managers and other senior 
posts, the Special Task Team on the Establishment of municipalities recommended: 
... that employees be compensated on the basis (of) the highest graded 
administration in the newly established municipality.594 
The Task Team favored the appointment of senior managers on performance linked 
contract rather than fixed salaries.595 The Team argued for private sector linked 
salaries and that municipalities were "part of the wider Human Resources market 
and must compete therein for suitably qualified and experienced personnel."596 
Given the lack of staffing capacity already outlined, these comparisons were 
inapt. Another factor may have been the reluctance at provincial level to confront 
problems of municipal staffing arising from the perceived political risks of standing 
in the way of informal 'job creation strategies.' This crude interpretation of job 
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creation was based entirely on the expansion of municipal bureaucracies. On 
the face of it, this could be interpreted as a strategy whereby, local elites were 
'bought off' to retain their loyalty to the party and the 6-year old government. 
This was matched by a reluctance to confront organised labour on the need for 
retrenchments. Whelan interprets escalating salary bills as yet a further indication 
of incapacity in local government: 
The capacity of employer representatives to negotiate affordable salary 
increases is critical, as municipal services are currently labour intensive 
and labour costs make up a large component of the costs of services (Van 
Rhynevled 1998). Salaries are also one of the elements that constitute 
transitions costs. Judging from the inflation increases in personnel costs that 
have occurred since 1996, it would appear that local government has limited 
capacity in negotiating affordable wages. 
However inflated wage scales were only one element of the problem as the 
massive increase in the number of posts for Ngqushwa illustrates - a problem that 
emanates at a fairly high policy-making and political level and which is not simply 
due to poor negotiating skills by the employer body (SALGA). 
Why was planning unable to reveal and reverse these irrationalities? One obvious 
explanation is that the planners themselves were in a client relationship with the 
new municipal elite. A planning consultant who suggested that the municipality was 
overstaffed, was paying salaries not commensurate with skill levels and in addition 
had too many full-time councillors on the pay roll, could not look forward to future 
appointments. Eastern Cape lOPs generally reflect a situation where the planners 
are dictated to by council and thus endorsed populist strategies that avoided 
the hard questions that lie at the root of planning ie rationality and affordability. 
Whatever the motivation, the effect was clear. With all its claims to rationality and 
financial prudence, the lOP served to regularise very doubtful practices in the 
deployment of public finance. The Ngqushwa lOP developed a technical planning 
rationale for short-sighted policies that were mainly in the interests of staff and 
municipal councillors. 
Local and regional political forces and their impact on planning services and 
consultants is an under-researched topic and the comment reflected in this paper 
is based on the experiences of a participant-observer rather than a formal research 
process. It is possible that an investigation into this relationship between planning 
and politics could do much to explain why planners simply omitted to deal with 
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certain fundamental municipal issues. Instead the lOP program continued to focus 
on data and its extrapolation. The implied need is for a more comprehensive and 
scientific assemblage of data which would quantify the municipality's development 
priorities in technical terms thus creating the opportunity for professional/technical 
solutions. In many cases the planner's call for specialist support masked the fact 
that municipal officials were not doing their job either due to incapacity or due to 
weak performance. The Auditor General shared this concern: 
Cognisance is taken of the action taken in employing consultants to assist 
failing municipalities. However, this in itself is seen as a short-term solution that 
could result in fruitless expenditure , especially where existing financial staff are 
already remunerated to do the task. 59? 
The example of the Hamburg town clerk during the time of the Afesis-corplan 
(1999) lOP report gives some indication of how 'incapacity' arises. The Town Clerk 
had been in his post from 17 March 1997 to April 1999 and was suspended at 
the time of the research. He had no professional qualification and no training or 
experience as a town c1erk. 598 
7.5 Public Scrutiny of Municipal Finance 
In policy terms, integrity and efficiency in public spending were to be safeguarded 
by local residents who would provide "the necessary checks and balances"599 
principally by participating in the budgetary process. However the Auditor-
General's report for the years 1994 - 1996 for Hamburg indicate that no budget 
was drawn up for these years.600 According to local government policy, the 
participatory aspects of planning were to be matched by the right of citizens to 
exercise oversight of municipal spending to ensure that spending patterns reflected 
the aims, objectives and priorities of the integrated development plan. A critical link 
in this chain is the role of the Auditor -General601 who must: 
... transmit a report in respect of the accounts of a local government to the 
chairperson / mayor of the council of the local government concerned and if 
necessary to the Director General of the province. 
However the percentage of Eastern Cape local government books and accounts 
that were not ready for signing or where signed financial statements had not 
been submitted to the Auditor General on the due date, rose from 17,6% in the 
1994-1995 financial year to 45 % in the 1998-1999 financial year6°2 and to 79% 
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for 2000-2001.603 Twenty months after the due date (ie by 31 May 2003),57% of 
municipalities were still regarded as being 'at default' by the Auditor Generai.604 
The fact the books and financial statements of local authorities are not timeously 
available for auditing has a negative effect on public accountability. A serious 
source of concern to my office is the fact that effective financial control over 
transactions is not possible in the absence of books and accounts or where 
records are incomplete.605 
Public oversight in respect of municipal spending hinges in turn of having access 
to the AG's reports through the annual reporting obligations of the municipality set 
out in the Local Government Transition Act of 1993 and more recently the Municipal 
Systems Act of 2000. Under the circumstances described above, the Auditor 
General was unable to service the rights of ordinary citizens by furnishing them 
with a clear picture of how public funds were being managed and expended by the 
municipality. 
7.6 Borrowing the Jargon of Space and System 
Unlike the consultants who compiled the 2002 lOP, none of the NGO staff who 
compiled the 1999 lOP report were qualified town and regional planners (although 
they were able to draw advice from professional planners.)15 Nonetheless, the 
NGO report tries to include comments related more to the spatial and more 
technical aspects of planning. This reflects the pressure on NGO's to legitimate 
their planning support services by 'borrowing' the conventions of the planning 
industry. 
Planning through the town varies; Peddie extension is planned and surveyed, as 
is the town centre. German Village and Durban have not been properly laid out 
and planned for at all times. There is plenty of unused land in and around the 
town, much of it is state -owned though the municipality is still negotiating with 
the government to transfer this land ... .. This area is laid out on a gridiron pattern. 
And at a broader scale : 
Traditional settlement patterns like those found in Tyefu villages tend to be 
sprawling and therefore not conducive to good resource management measures.606 
In the Afesis-corplan document these concessions to the language of space and 
science are fairly modest. Some attempt is made to retain the simple observations 
15 A situation that was not unusual amongst the many consultants who lined up to get some of the 
considerable work generated by the lOP programme. 
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that any reasonably skilled municipal official might make when considering the 
physical appearance of the municipal area. In subsequent drafts of the lOP 
document for Ngqushwa municipality, produced by planning professionals the 
jargon of space and science become more technical. 
The 2002 lOP for example describes four different rural settlement types, 
namely "traditional rural villages established in response to localised agricultural 
resource base" , "Rural villages established in response to commercial-orientated 
agriculture", newly established holiday resorts "based on the local ised resort 
potential of the coastal area" and "minor and isolated farm communities scattered 
within the municipal area." The lOP notes that these rural areas are characterised 
by: 
The absence of settlement hierarchy, that is , nodal and consolidated 
settlements where the provision of better infrastructure and facilities will be 
targeted to ensure efficiency and effectiveness. 
The small size of most of the individual settlements with associated low 
functional thresholds.60? 
The lOP report very usefully describes in some detail, the various land tenure 
systems being operated in Ngqushwa, particularly those systems that had evolved 
in a rural setting i.e. freehold, quitrent, communal and permission to occupy. 
However there is little attempt to relate this complex pattern of land tenure to the 
municipality's likely land administration functions including the fundamental and 
exclusive municipal right to levy property taxes (rates.) 
Little consideration is given to the fact that the Ngqushwa municipality had 
demonstrated little ability to cope with its existing service and public administration 
commitments in the two small urban areas of Peddie and Hamburg. What 
exactly did the planners think that Ngqushwa officials would do with this technical 
description of the vast rural areas that the municipality had failed to impact in 
any significant way? Indeed the implication that the municipality had any form of 
beneficial public service function in the rural areas was patently disingenuous. 
Despite much packaging of data and statistics from Statistics South Africa and 
the Municipal Demarcation Board, it is doubtful that the new lOP document would 
allow any of the municipal staff or councillors to undertake any new analysis or 
formulation of local data that would significantly change the manner in which the 
municipal area was serviced and managed. Indeed the much vaunted promise of 
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all embracing lOPs ignored the fact that previous planning for small towns had gone 
largely ignored even when it broke with the limitations of space and infrastructure 
and tried to include human agency: 
Consultants have drawn up Structure Plans in the past. The most recent 
Structure plan that was located was the Proposed Draft Peddie Structure Plan 
drawn up by Urban Dynamics in February 1995. The Department of Local 
Government and Housing commissioned the Structure Plan. Urban Dynamics 
was requested to rev ise a 1985 Peddie Development Plan. The plan therefore 
includes a " development strategy" which resembles in part the lOP requirement 
for action plans based on institutional capacities. Although the plan contains 
much useful data and development insights, it was not available in the municipal 
offices , and does not appear to have been used in any significant way by the 
current administration.6oa 
Similarly there was very little evidence that the Hamburg municipality had made 
constructive use of a Structure plan prepared by Wankl in and Associates in 1996 or 
of the Zoning Scheme I land use plan that was being prepared by Theart Mgij ima 
and Associates during 1999. The lOP process not only undertook to produce 
more effective plans, it also undertook to remedy the very limited capacity within 
municipalities for strategic th inking. Before effective plans could be produced, the 
planning exercise had to be valued and appreciated for its strategic benefits . This 
proved to be a na'ive undertaking. At its March 1999 conference on lOPs the Cape 
Town based NGO, FCR noted : 
It assumes that municipalities have the capacity to analyse and calculate , 
define, internalise and respond to the full range of community needs. Most of 
the municipalities surveyed, however clearly lacked the strategic capacity to do 
so. The current policy framework assumes that municipalities have at least a 
limited capacity to oversee (and authority to guide) development activity in their 
jurisdictions . In practise they have not succeeded in exercising it.610 
7.7 Local Perceptions and Understanding versus Scientific Information 
By way of contrast, the Afesis-corplan approach to planning embodied the 
idea of valuing and using local knowledge or opinion to frame the development 
challenges that confronted a municipality. These participatory efforts at planning 
were not without their own problems. Indeed there were often instances where 
local knowledge or the collective consensus on a particular issue was entirely at 
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odds with reliable data and records. Nevertheless the NGO approach , drawing 
partly upon Fals- Borda's Participatory Action Research conventions , attempted to 
reconcile the participatory with the scientific. Local knowledge and understanding 
was valued and included but was subject to critical inquiry and the basis for 
criticism was invariably the more extractive and 'scientific' methods of planning . 
Bart Pijnenburg outlines Fals-Borda's explanation of how the two systems come 
together and supplement each other: 
Knowledge is seen as the key to empowerment. The objective of PAR is to 
foster a critical and reflective attitude on the part of local people. There is also 
a need to merge scientific, outside knowledge with local knowledge; "combining 
academic and empirical rationalities appears indispensable to proceed from 
common sense to good sense".611 
Participatory Action Research , adapted with a mix of anthropological and 
sociological conventions, was much favoured by those NGOs who were suspicious 
of lOP as pure techno-science. The method ultimately tried to reflect people's 
understanding and interpretation of their environment as more important than a 
scientifically accurate and statistically defensible representation . In some instances 
this led to 'hopeful ' or even naNe observations like: 
Employment levels are reportedly up over the last five years in Peddie, mostly 
due to development projects, which employ locals.612 
Participatory Action Research embodies the idea of critical reflection applied both 
to scientific data (outside knowledge) and local knowledge. In the lOP experience 
the NGO often found it difficult to apply criticism to the perceptions of local reality, 
particularly when that 'reality' had assumed the status of a popular local belief In 
Peddie for example crime could not be denied as a social factor however the 
local officials and politicians down-played this insisting that the crime was 'non-
violent' in nature. Afesis-corplan felt constrained to reflect this version in the lOP 
documentation but it introduced a very ambiguous dimension to the report: 
Crime is a problem in Peddie, breaking into and stealing from shops is 
particularly common, and is on the increase. Not much of the crime is violent 
however. The local First National Bank (the only bank in town) was robbed at 
gunpoint twice in 1998.613 
Planners might have been expected to bring more rigor to the exercise by clearly 
categorising armed robbery, for instance, as a violent crime and presenting 
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statistics to quantify the prevalence of such incidents. However in matters of safety 
and security the approach of the planning industry, as represented in the Ngqushwa 
Municipality 2002 lOP is even less useful. Safety and security is analysed almost 
entirely in terms of the provision of police stations and about two sentences on local 
efforts at community policing: 
Currently there are 9 police stations and one magistrates court in the study 
area to handle safety and security issues. These are Punzana, Tamara, Nonibe, 
Bell , Hamburg , Qamnyana, Tyefu , Peddie and Moyeni. Concerns were raised at 
Representative Forum meetings about the relocation of Moyeni police station to 
Mpekweni as its current location is far from the catchment communities. 
In addition to the police stations, community pol icing was also established in 
1997, in an attempt to involve community members in crime prevention and 
conflict resolution . These community policing (sic) are confined to major centres 
and the need to spread them out to the rural settlements was highlighted 
during our Representative Forum meetings. Peddie police station needs to be 
upgraded to a fully -fledged pol ice station to incorporate all units that existed 
before in order to be effective to the entire area.614 
This illustrates how planning can misrepresent a particular reality. In this instance 
the problem of crime, which at the time included taxi violence , domestic violence, 
armed robbery etc is reduced down to a manageable problem of providing a form 
of infrastructure (police stations). The problem can thus be 'solved ' because it 
falls within the ambit of the resources and services that the state can provide. 
Government's National Crime Prevention strategy was yielding inconclusive results 
at this time but government was able to build , equip and locate facilities like police 
stations. Thus the lOP addresses itself to the need for these resources. In rural 
terms 9 police stations serving 2246 square kilometres with each station serving 
an average of 10444 people does not seem unreasonable. (By comparison for 
example, the Duncan Village police station in Buffalo City serves about 70 000 
people).615 
Local Observation and Narrative 
An alternative approach is simply to record the observable and offer suggestions 
for improvement de-linked from assumptions about the role of the state and the 
potential of its development programmes. Afesis-corplan placed some importance 
on simple observation of obvious local activities , based on the (perhaps naIve) idea 
that the local stakeholders could be empowered to find solutions to their problems, 
once these were presented in clear and insightful ways: 
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Many households have small vegetable gardens, and there is a church-run 
vegetable project called Masibambane ... farming includes pineapples, oranges, 
cattle, sheep, goats, chickens etc. This is mostly subsistence farming.616 
In contrast the 2002 lOP presented a more 'scientific' and quantified picture of 
economic activities: 
Although agriculture appears to be the main primary activity in the municipal 
area, it accounts for only 11 ,14%. The agricultural economy of the region 
includes an unproductive extensive subsistence agriculture commonly found in 
the traditionally settled Tribal areas and freehold farms. 
While the latter description presents a sounder basis for planning, it is by no 
means clear that the relevant municipal stakeholders would have been able to 
make any more sense of this data than they would of the somewhat pedestrian 
observations of Afesis-corplan. Unlike later planning documents, Afesis-corplan's 
simple description of the recent history and assets of the Peddie municipality create 
a strong sense of the plight of a municipality in a former homeland town and are 
arguably therefore more relevant to the limited capabilities of such a municipality: 
There is currently no assets register; it was destroyed in October 1991 when 
the municipal offices burnt down.16 Many municipal records and assets were 
lost in the fire . During 1999 the municipality was temporarily housed in an 
old house but later moved to new offices that have been renovated. Funding 
for a new building has been received and will probably be combined with the 
community hall across the N2 
Current assets were verbally described as: 
Vehicles: 1 bakkie (LOV), 2 tractors, 3 trailers (1 refuse, 1 sewerage, 
1 delivery) 
Buildings: 1 community hall , 1 library 
Equipment: 1 brush cutter, 1 plough, 
Installations: 1 sewerage purification plant, 1 solid waste tip-site, and 1 sports 
field. 
Office Equipment: 1 computer, 1 fax machine, 1 typewriter, 1 photostat 
machine, 1 telephone and 1 printer, the usual office furniture (filing cabinets, 
desks, chairs etc.) are also evident.617 
16 Note that A-C does not presume to comment on the fact that the register has not been re-created 
over the past 8 years. 
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Planning and De-politicisation 
The IDP habit of treating municipal councils and administrations as apolitical 
entities was integral to the approach that represented local government in 
idealised mode, devoid of any particular social or political context. This proved 
to be particularly shortsighted in places like Ngqushwa where council and the 
administration were caught up in their own conflicts which would inevitably effect 
the implementation of any plan. Unlike most IDP documentation of the time, the 
Afesis-corplan report refers directly to the political situation of the municipality 
i.e. council's internal rifts and conflicts- an aspect that is largely absent in other 
planning documents of the time. Even in the Afesis-corplan report, the political 
dimension arises only from a need to explain why the municipal administration 
appeared to seek contact and guidance from outside the municipality: 
External relations are mostly with LG&H (the provincial Department of Local 
Government and Housing) in the form of grants and funding, as well as 
monitoring, and the odd bit of training. The Town Clerk feels that this is useful, 
and that they (the department) are accessible. At the time of the interviews, the 
officials seemed to need external contact to make up for the serious problems 
within council, which led to poor management in the municipality. 61 s 
At the time of the interviews only 3 of the 8 Peddie councillors were active 
and "there was considerable conflict within council" despite the fact that ANC 
candidates were unopposed in the 1995 elections (the fact that no other parties 
received sufficient nominations to qualify for the role, meant that no polling was 
actually undertaken.)619 
The matter (the inactive council) was effecting the morale of municipal staff 
who found it hard to be positive and (to) move forward when decisions and 
directives from council were absent.62o 
At the end of 1999 Afesis-corplan had begun to test a research tool which would 
track certain measures of political governance in the municipality. Entitled a "Good 
Governance Survey" the research tried to examine the relationship between the 
municipality and local civil society by developing and refining a set of questions 
which could be posed to 3 different groupings i.e. councillors I officials, organised 
civil society and the public. These questions were designed to act as 'indicators' of 
good governance as defined by the Local Government White Paper, the Municipal 
Structures Act of 1998 and the Municipal Systems Act of 2000. In the phase of the 
survey which included Hamburg and Peddie, East London and King William's Town 
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were also included . In total the survey covered 338 randomly selected respondents 
from the 3 groupings across all four towns. The survey did not purport to offer a 
representative sample . 
Table 15: Respondents to Afesis-corplan Governance Survey 1999 
Town Cllrs & Officilas CSO members Public 
Hamburg 5 8 17 
Peddie 4 13 12 
The interviews with the above respondents are not proffered as a formal survey 
but simply an indication of the type of political governance issues that might 
be considered when attempting to present the strengths and weakness of a 
municipality for planning purposes- while most and while the merits and validity of 
the survey method cannot be examined at length here, some of the findings are at 
least indicative of problems at a political level. 
In Peddie 3 of the 4 councillors / officials believed that council and community 
had distinctive roles which complemented each other i.e. there is no confusion 
of roles between non-elected civil leadership and elected public representatives. 
Only 2 of the respondents from community-based organisations held this view. 
In Hamburg there were similar gaps in perception with 4 of the 5 councillors and 
officials affirming the distinction and only 3 of the 8 CSO members.621 In Peddie 3 
of the 4 of councillors and officials claimed that council meetings were open to the 
public (a stipulation of the Municipal Systems Act). Only 3 of the 13 CSO members 
concurred and 46% of the public assented to this view. In Hamburg roughly 50% 
of both the councillor/ official and the civil leadership groupings agreed that council 
meetings were open but only 18% of the public held this view. 622 
In Peddie about 50% of councillors and officials felt that the municipality reports to 
the public how public funds are spent (40% said this did happen and 10% did not 
know). Within the civil leadership / general public group only 16% assented to this 
view (56% said it did not happen and 22% did not know)623 and none of the public 
held this view (54% said it did not happen and 46% did not know) In Hamburg the 
pattern was similar for councillors and officials (50% split) most civil leaders (about 
68%) did not know and only 9% of the public believed such reports were made .624 
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Despite clear evidence of divergent views on the state of local democracy between 
councillors and officials and the constituencies they serve, the majority of CBO 
and public respondents (about 77%) felt that councillors have sound motives 
for standing for public office i.e. the good of the community rather than personal 
advancement. 625 
The survey cited above is more an example of the kinds of issues that are lacking 
from planning than a definitive 'snapshot' of the municipality. The survey did 
point towards factors that would need to be considered in the formulation and 
implementation of any bold new municipal plan. The blurring of roles as leadership 
moved backwards and forwards between informal civic roles and formal political 
functions was apparent to civil organisations and the public but not to those in 
leadership. Basic provisions for the transparent functioning of council, for example 
open council meetings, and the public presentation of reports, were probably 
not being implemented. Despite these lapses, civil society still held considerable 
faith in the good intentions of their local public representatives . By 2000 / 2001 
the amalgamation of municipalities and the growth of municipal administrations, 
already outlined, had introduced further political complexity into the Ngqushwa 
municipality. 
7.8 Corruption 
Municipal corruption is clearly a factor in explaining why sound policies are 
sometimes unable to achieve their practical objectives. Pieterse writes that while 
the developing world has "a long road to travel before we witness the emergence 
of empowered capable, democratic and efficient local government", South 
African local government policy is potentially different in four key respects.626 
Pieterse cites firstly the power of municipalities to influence the political systems 
in respect of control over development resources, secondly, the existence of 
adequate financial resources, thirdly capable administration and finally "reliable 
accountability mechanisms" in respect of the conduct of both elected politicians 
and bureaucrats.627 While the first three assertions have always been subject 
to vigorous debate, it is this last assertion, usually regarded as the forte of 
South African governance, that is increasingly in doubt, despite the strong legal 
framework for public accounting and the existence of Constitutionally entrenched 
watchdog institutions like the Auditor General, the Public Protector and the National 
Prosecuting Authority. 
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The preceding chapters of this paper have shown that lOPs have had little impact 
on irrational and irregular deployment of public resources. Two years after the first 
official lOPs came into being there is little evidence that the lOP framework will fulfil 
Pieterse's expectation that it: 
.. . pull(s) institutional practise towards popular democratic control in a system 
with clear norms and rules and respect for financial durability.62B 
Whereas lOPs purport to govern budgets and expenditure, to entrench public 
oversight and pay lip service to principles of corporate governance, they seldom 
address issues of existing nepotism or political influence over the appointment 
of senior managers for example. For obvious reasons, municipalities are unlikely 
to address corruption as a strategic issue in their lOPs. Nonetheless corruption 
/ irregular financial management was a significant issue within Eastern Cape 
municipalities in the period under discussion. For the period February 1999 to 
June 2002 for example the Special Reports of the Auditor General on Eastern 
Cape municipalities have consistently reflected a range of irregularities related 
to collection of debts, tender procedures, fixed assets registers, leave registers, 
banking, tax payment, management of the revolving fund , stock counts and 
payment of creditors. The Eastern Cape Department of Housing , local Government 
and Traditional Affairs indicated in 2001 that in terms of its monitoring function 
in respect of corruption at municipal level, it had carried out investigations and 
inspected accounting records in 3 municipalities (Tsomo, Mount Fletcher and 
Cookhouse). It had also conducted investigations at a further 14 municipalities 
(Steytlerville, Whittlesea, Cofimvaba, Maclear, Tsolo, Butterworth, Mount Ayliff, 
Ngqeleni , Umatata, Lusikisiki, Aliwal North , Mqanduli, Klipplaat, Elliot and Molteno.) 
Further the Department had taken note of the Auditor-General 's report and made 
intemal investigations in the case of 3 municipalities (Lady Frere, Bedford and, 
Seymour). Thus 20 or 21 % of the provinces 94 transitional local councils had 
undergone some level of corruption inquiry during the 2000 / 2001 financial year.629 
The provincial strategy that flowed from these investigations are not always clear. 
Nyandeni municipality (incorporates former Ngqeleni and Libode) for example , 
has featured in repeated investigations (see above) and adverse media coverage, 
is a case in point. The municipality was visited by a delegation of the Provincial 
standing Committee on Housing and Local Government of the Eastern Cape 
Legislature on 20 June 2001 as part of its routine visit to all municipalities.630 The 
delegation notes its concern with: 
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• the lack of uniformity in tariffs and rates between the two former municipal 
areas of Ngqeleni and Libode 
• continued separation of financial systems between the two towns 
• outstanding debts by other government departments 
• a 180 day-old debt to the department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
(DWAF) 
• a dispute around contributions to the pension scheme 
The delegation was clearly not looking to find fault. The absence of financial 
controls and regulations for example is ascribed to "shortage of personnel"631 with 
the assurance that assistance from the Municipal Support Programme (MSP) and 
the establishment of a treasury department in the new organogram will remedy 
the matter. The existence of a credit control policy and an indigent policy is noted 
but "There is no register as the people who are qualifying are not identified as 
yet. The municipality is waiting for equitable share."632 The municipality has no 
procurement policy or asset register; "the municipality get (sic) quotations and 
select the cheapest. . .for roads they go to tender. Tendering is done by consultants 
employed by the municipality; the consultants do the adjudication and submit 
recommendations to council. There are no leave or recruitment policies but the 
assurance is that the MSP will deal with the matter.633 Municipal vehicles are not 
controlled through logbooks and even though there are only 3 vehicles , the MSP 
has been tasked to set up the system. The delegation reports and therefore tacitly 
accepts the assertion that council meetings are held and that the public participate 
in municipal affairs, including budgeting via ward committee meetings .634 
The general comment of the delegation does not include any reference to 
corruption or irregularity. In the case where R343 000 has been misappropriated 
from housing subsidies to pay salaries, the delegation simply recommends that 
this should be paid back. Whereas its own provincial department has listed the 
municipal ity as under investigation, the delegation simply reports to the legislature 
that the municipality should be reimbursed for traffic fines paid to the Department of 
Transport, that it needs to be 'workshopped' on the guidelines for ward committees 
and that the Department of Housing and Local Government should provide financial 
assistance to pay pensions to municipal staff "who qualify for pension. "635 
Thus in the face of a municipality clearly not in full control of its core functions and 
with virtually no financial and administrative controls in place and acknowledged 
allegations of corruption , the legislature's prescribed solution is to bail the 
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municipality out of its financial predicament and to provide some consultant 
assistance and training on core functions. The value of the provincial government's 
political oversight and monitoring mandate would therefore seem to be quite 
limited . It would seem futile therefore to attache much importance to the avowed 
monitoring function of the province. In this instance the requirement for clean 
and efficient local administration is subverted by the provincial legislature doing 
the bare minimum in terms of performing its oversight and monitoring obligations 
and recommending actions (bail-outs for example) that may actually encourage 
corruption. 
What accounts for this situation? Eastern Cape politicians and civil servants 
regularly condemn corruption and are always anxious to present themselves as 
willing to take strong steps to curb it. The Public Service Accountability Monitor is 
an NGO based at Rhodes University that monitors transparency and accountability 
in the public sector. Its main focus to date has been the Eastern Cape Provincial 
Government. In a 2002 survey of 169 provincial officials from different departments 
the PSAM discovered highly nuanced attitudes to the definition of corruption:636 
• Whereas 895 of respondents thought it was "wrong and punishable" to 
proactively demand bribes or abuse funds, 48% said it was not wrong or 
'wrong but understandable" to accept gifts from citizens for performing 
services which are part of their jobs.637 
• Between 21 - 23% of respondents tended to rationalize corruption on the 
basis that extra payment was required because government officials are 
poorly paid or extra payments and favours help government to function 
more effectively or simply that corruption was unimportant as there are 
more important things to worry about.638 
• Of particular relevance to local government was the fact that 27 reported 
having witness to political patronage (favoring political allies) and 33 % 
said they had witnessed nepotism (awarding jobs or contracts to 
relatives )639 
• A particularly gloomy finding for policy-makers was the perception that 
corruption had increased since liberation. Most respondents (75%) had 
working experience within the public service of the notoriously corrupt 
former homeland regimes. Based on this 42% felt that corruption had 
increased since the "coming of democracy."64o 
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Only 52% of respondents were confident that action would be taken if they reported 
corruption and 68% were concerned about being legally protected if they reported 
corruption .6" The PSAM noted cases that seemed to support the veracity of 
these fears, for example the ex-head of the Eastern Cape Education Department, 
Modidima Mannya was tasked with ridding the department of corruption and duly 
suspended more than 11 officials over a 3-month period . Mannya then received 
numerous death threats and required a bodyguard , however provincial authorities 
withdrew his bodyguard and Mannya and his family were forced to flee the province 
in January 2001 .642 
The lOP process was consciously or unwittingly blind to these basic shortfalls in 
the institutions of local and provincial government. The remedy it offered was one 
of systems creation and procedure while there was ample evidence that these 
solutions were either to be endlessly delayed or subverted. The political and 
administrative culture of municipalities was easily able to incorporate the visionary 
elements of development and democracy while remaining stubbornly resistant 
to its practice at the most modest level. Planning and related procedures were 
in fact readily adopted by those who wished to divert attention away from their 
fundamental abuse of municipal politics for personal gain. 
7.9 Conclusion 
It is perhaps unfair to the broad project of Integrated Development Planning to 
select case studies from the Eastern Cape to test the model. The Eastern Cape 
is not a typical province within the South African nation. As provinces go, it is 
overburdened with development challenges like poverty and its history has set its 
inhabitants some way back of the starting line in the race to the nation anticipated 
in our Constitution. But if lOP success is less likely in the Eastern Cape, it is also 
more important. Not just in the sense that the poor of the province need the 
miraculous outcomes that planning promises but also because planning and lOP in 
particular claim to be able to conquer the worst outcomes of history and tradition. In 
didactic terms therefore the Eastern Cape is the ideal testing ground for lOP. 
At the start of th is chapter there is an attempt to acknowledge the specificity of the 
reg ion and how its experience of colonial ism, apartheid and a complex transitional 
era may have shaped the subsequent pol itical behaviour of its main players. 
In other words, it is acknowledged that in local politics and the emergence of 
governance traditions, the Eastern Cape is probably the equivalent of a "school 
of hard knocks." It is unsurprising therefore that the province has received the 
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preferential allocation of public infrastructure funding, besides the fact that it is 
a political priority for the ANC. And this is where the limitations of planning and 
technical programmes of intervention are revealed. The vast resources ploughed 
into the province almost never realise a concomitant return in the quality of life of 
its citizens. The ruling ANC seems to have a particular problem here. Clearly it 
needs interventions of superior effectiveness to retain the loyalties of its poorest 
constituency however the regional and local elites charged with leading and 
managing those programmes are probably the least skilled and the most prone to 
corruption in the country. Furthermore, should they be challenged, they may call 
upon complicated networks of patronage and loyalty involving tradition, urban/rural 
divides, party hierarchies and even the remnants of the former Bantustan civil 
service. 
The ANC also seems to suffer a particular insecurity about the province perhaps 
believing that if the edifice were to crack in the "home region" then it would only be 
a matter of time before the rest of party machinery around the country begins to 
break up. This in itself may begin to explain the reluctance to take action against 
regional power cliques and the bizarre choices made for leadership of the province. 
At the level of lOP is obviously the political behaviour of local leaders that is 
important and here the chapter has tried to set out some of the experiences of 
transition and negotiated change that may have influenced municipal leadership. 
This needs to be viewed against the attempt to interrogate (superficially) the 
idea that the shortfalls in the new local government system are traceable to weak 
foundations of local democracy. This paper is critical of such a view and attempts 
to show that such a weakness, if indeed it does exist, originates from the failure 
of formalised party systems to build upon what where fairly strong democratic 
tendencies in civil society during the anti-apartheid struggle and even during the 
transition phase. 
Overall the two municipal case studies that are presented raise a number 
of questions about the process of planning. Firstly in a brief look at needs 
prioritization, budgeting patterns and performance management systems in 
Buffalo City, the technicist imperative in lOP is revealed with its paper-thin claim 
to rationality. In this instance lOP functions more as a vehicle for public marketing 
or winning citizens' compliance . Far from the brutal economic rationality that the 
radical critique would anticipate from planning, the Buffalo City lOP provides the 
rationale for expanded programmes and institutional costs that have less and less 
to do with service delivery. Apart from the use of plans to justify inflated institutional 
costs, Buffalo City also reveals how plans are reinvented or revised to justify any 
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level of performance. Provided the planning agency retains control and successfully 
vends the promise of change or to paraphrase Escobar, "breaks with the past" then 
the lOP may be said to be successful. 
Similar trends are discussed in the deeply rural municipality of Ngqushwa. The 
Ngqushwa lOP process is significant because it illustrates the impact of other 
planning-related events like the municipal re-demarcation of 1999-2001 . The paper 
therefore is obliged to examine the extent to which the Municipal Demarcation 
Board juggled its own criteria and stretched its mandate to produce 'unprecedented' 
outcomes - a feature that is typical of what John Friedman terms the "engineering 
model of planning" i.e. that which claims a scientific character and a superiority 
over other forms of decision-making.643 This section shows how a partially defined 
and completely untested vision of what South African local government could 
become, drove a series of hasty decisions about municipal boundaries. The 
effects of these decisions are then traced through the Ngqushwa lOP experience 
and more briefly to other municipal developments around the country. In the work 
of the MOB we begin to find traces of the "authoritarian high modernism" referred 
to by James C. Scott and we see why the supposedly independent Board was 
so useful to political interests within the South African state and how one of the 
most powerful demonstrations of state power or high modernism since apartheid , 
went largely unchallenged. The Ngqushwa lOP is also examined in some depth 
and the methodology of formal lOP is compared with a less formal NGO project 
in the same municipality. Again the focus in mainly rationality and questions of 
resource allocation and it emerges that the 2002 Ngqushwa lOP is mainly a plan 
for accumulation by the local municipal elite based on a model of local government 
that entails long-term dependence on national government. This section also looks 
into those non-rational aspects, corruption for example, of social and political life 
that planning cannot factor and invariably addresses (always ineffectually) through 
systems and procedures. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has attempted to show that a broad consideration of planning theory 
is useful when reviewing the lOP programme in South Africa. Reliance on 
the technical literature, the planning handbooks, government dogma and the 
planning legislation, would lead to the conclusion that lOP is simply about better 
infrastructure, growing local economies, more functional human settlements and 
above all the prioritisation of services for poor people . However as Klosterman 
reminds us in the introductory chapter, this concern with public services , health, 
safety and better amenities is only part of what concerns planning. Planning is 
always about something more and is invariably focused on the vision of a better 
society. Like Ebenezer Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier, the drivers 
of the lOP programme believed that post apartheid South Africa, encumbered 
with its peculiar legacy of skewed service infrastructure and dysfunctional urban 
settlements, could not rely on the groups, individuals and institutions that would 
ordinarily direct societal change. Integrated development planning, socially aware 
and technically precise but most importantly, omnipotent and infused with the 
authority of experts, was the institution to direct that change and ensure that its 
outcome was consistent with the values of the new South Africa . 
The smooth transition from grand apartheid planning to grand post-apartheid 
planning needs to be regarded with wariness. Planning's ability to serve 
ideologically diverse agenda's is frequently overlooked despite the fact that this 
has been one of the enduring lessons of the discipline, reaching as far back as 
the three" iconic" planners discussed in chapter one. This paper has shown for 
example that urban settlement forms under apartheid were elaborately planned 
and that the undoing of these spatial patterns formed much of the rationale for 
post-apartheid planning, namely the lOP process. One of the problems with 
the neo-Marxist view of the instrumentality of planning is the fact that, apart 
from down playing the historical role of planning in socialist societies, it tends to 
underestimate the adaptable functionality of planning in serving groups whose 
interests are less clearly tied to a neoliberal agenda. Fishman's discussion of the 
three iconic planners is also important in that it reminds us that societies become 
'ripe for planning' through a set of social, economic and political circumstances. 
South African planner Allan Mabin acknowledgement of this is worth repeating : 
Over the past century South Africa has been no stranger to reconstruction 
efforts, or to planning as a component of reconstructions. New planning systems 
were created after several major disruptions of society. 645 
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A remarkable degree of continuity is encountered in the visionary roll of planning 
under apartheid and the post liberation planning experience. Whereas the broad 
objectives of planning may change radically, the demonstration and use of the 
power of planning is constant. The allure of planning is the constant theme as its 
power to drawn in potentially dissident perspectives (the example used is the NGO 
sector) is demonstrated time and again. The ambitions of planning are an equally 
important theme. The integrative function of planning is invariably overestimated 
and its social transformation promise is endlessly expounded but seldom realised . 
Broad ranging local strategic planning like lOP suggests a high degree of 
decentralized state authority. However the ambiguity between the local autonomy 
implied in the right to formulate municipal IDPs and the restrictive terms of 
the overall IDP legal and policy framework needs to be critically understood . 
Persuasive notions of entrenched autonomy, as advanced by Oldfield need to 
be treated with a healthy degree of skepticism. The latter it seems can justify 
increasing levels of national oversight provided this is based on 'irrefutable' 
national development principles typically set out in macro policy instruments like 
the National Spatial Development Programme, GEAR and in the Eastern Cape, 
the Provincial Growth and Development Programme. The obvious problem in such 
thinking is the implied existence of a set of incontrovertible principles. However it 
is the interpretation of these principles through the professional and sometimes 
authoritarian logic of planning that should cause real concern and previous critiques 
of IDP have tended to neglect the possibility that planning is in itself is a powerful 
means of capturing and directing development discourse. One instance of this 
examined in this paper, is the manner in which IDP cleverly 'dips into' radical 
critiques of planning and pre-empts much of the criticism - only to draw heavily on 
the basic principles of technical rationality and the crushing logic of the economy. 
In practical terms lOP in South Africa may be regarded as being confronted by 
problems of application. Government began to experience a growing gap between 
its policy ideals and it's real administrative and governing capabilities at local 
government level. The ubiquity of planning helps to explain why the municipal 
government transformation programme remained fixated with high order policy 
matters at a time when it's fundamental incapacity to ensure basic service delivery 
and governance where obviously lacking. This can only be further understood if 
the purposes of policy are not taken at their economic and political face value. 
Clearly modern government, and particularly weak government, does not always 
subscribe to the principle that policy complexity should reflect proven administrative 
capability. This paper explores the disconcerting possibility that the state may be 
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trying to govern through policy rather than with policy i.e. policy replaces good 
administration. 
The intellectual exercise of municipal policy design in a middle-income, developing 
country like South Africa has been widely acclaimed. Apart from international 
recognition and consequently donor support, lOP provided government with a 
strong vision to direct and focus the minds of local politicians and municipal staff. 
More importantly the lOP programme proved effective in capturing the imagination 
of civil society. Initially the policy ideals and intentions managed to dispel criticism 
however the danger of any high-order policy framework is the disjunction it 
creates when practice and implementation invariably occur at a more modest 
level. Thus an excessively idealistic policy framework poses a real problem for a 
new, inexperienced and under-capacitated municipal bureaucracy. Their faltering 
performance is almost inevitably short of the administrative and governance 
standards contained in the policy. 
For political leadership the lOP programme is a double-edged sword as it provides 
both the substance of vote-garnering political rhetoric but also the benchmarks 
against which their administrations will be measured , if not by citizens' than at least 
by their political bosses or other powerful interests like banks and developers. 
Where local public service consistently falls short of the political promises inherent 
in the policy, the glaring gap between policy and practice eats away at the 
legitimacy of the local state and its office-holders. The public not only perceives a 
growing gap between municipal objectives and actual outputs but may see their 
local officials as focused on irrelevant and unreachable goals rather than local 
needs. This dilemma is not unique to the local sphere of government and there are 
a number of factors such as citizen's allegiance to government based on identity 
and political history, which suggest that South African local government may be 
immune to this form of delivery audit or at least the consequences in terms of 
political loyalties. 
Focusing on the gap between policy and practice nonetheless remains useful 
because it shifts away from a more conventional approach that suggests that 
the merit of policy can be assessed separately to that of bureaucratic and 
administrative capacity. Charles Lindblom646 notes that the latter convention, 
assumes that the broad frameworks of values and intent that occupy the world 
of policy-makers can be assessed on their own merit. The administrator's task 
is simply to see that the policy is implemented as the drafter intended and the 
policy designer takes no responsibility for the shortfalls of the policy implementer / 
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administrator. As Lindblom warns, the relationship between policy and technocratic 
decision-making is far more complex and it seems inevitable that policy must finally 
be evaluated on its outcomes. 
Administrative competence is however seldom a hard consideration when 
assessing policy. Edgar Pieterse, while conceding less than ideal and uneven 
capacity across the country, suggests that South African municipalities as a whole 
were relatively well equipped in resource and human capability terms to take on the 
challenge of implementing a policy embodying participatory local government: 
... South Africa seems potentially different because the new local government 
policy framework appears to satisfy four conditions associated with successful 
decentralisation : 'sufficient powers to exercise substantial influence within the 
political system and over significant development activities ; sufficient financial 
resources to accomplish tasks; adequate admin istrative capacity to accomplish 
those tasks; and rel iable accountability mechanisms ... 647 
Ten years after the advent of democratic municipal government, a retrospective 
view might suggest that policy should have been 'tailored ' to fit the demonstrated 
or proven capabilities of the bureaucracy and its political leadership. The 
conventional analysis of implementation strategy tends to focus exclusively 
on constraints in resources, human capacity and institutions plus the need to 
have properly 'orientated' staff. It is invariably assumed that that these must be 
improved, redeployed or real igned to meet the demands of policy. This perspective 
is invariably one of linear and inevitable progression.64s 
The third structural change is to ensure sufficient administrative capacity. 
Government policy documents, including the White Paper on Local 
Government, acknowledge that the transitional municipal structures lack 
sufficient administrative and financial capacity to undertake their mandated 
responsibilities. Effective developmental local government will require 
appropriate staff in each municipality. The transitional municipal structures had 
too many of the wrong (inappropriately trained and inexperienced) staff and too 
few of the right staff. As national and provincial departments look to devolve new 
powers and functions to municipalities, the correct administrative capacity must 
also be built, through the devolution of appropriate staff. As well as capacity 
building at municipallevel.649 
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Attempts to understand the real relationship between policy and administrative 
output seem half-hearted. In February 2003 Dr Meshack M Khosa authored a report 
on behalf of the Centre for Policy Studies which tried to understand the relationship 
between policy-making and implementation by examining eight areas of social 
policy formulation and implementation namely: education, health, water, justice, 
the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), the Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) and the National Crime Prevention Strategy 
(NCPS).650 Khosa quoted from State President, Thabo Mbeki's speech in mid 
2002 where Mbeki suggested that government had good policies and institutions to 
enact these policies but that the real challenge lay in proper implementation. Why 
the state bureaucracy cannot simply implement policies as they were intended, 
seems to genuinely perplex government.651 Khosa identifies two issues implicit in 
government's thinking: 
1. policies adopted since 1994 are appropriate and sound 
2. these policies are being imperfectly implemented 
Khosa suggests that the relationship between policy and implementation is 
"complex and sometimes contradictory, and that it is the articulation of policy-
making and implementation that often results in crises in policy implementation ."652 
The report is a rare attempt to understand the relationship between policy-making 
and implementation and the institutions that undertake these activities, however 
it stops short of commenting on the possibility that the gap between policy and 
implementation may have an effect on the credibility of the policy itself and thus 
its efficacy. Inevitably the key conclusions are that "Implementation problems 
result from unrealistic and optimistic policies; in other words that implementation 
problems flow from the policies themselves" and that even when policies are sound, 
problems arise from the logistical aspects of implementation.653 The problem with 
this critique is the implied remedy through more modest or less ambitious policy 
- while certainly useful to administrators such policies would lack the bold 'breaking 
with the past' element that is required to ensure their political support. 
What distinguishes the South African IDP programme from 19th century planning 
and more recent market driven programmes was that IDP did not "almost always 
assumed the continued poverty of the poor and the privileges of the rich."65' In fact 
the abiding rationale for IDP was for more state resources to be directed to pro-
poor strategies through clearly formulated targets and greater efficiencies. However 
the outcomes and financial impact of planning as illustrated by the Ngqushwa 
and Buffalo City case studies , suggest a new form of accumulation and self-
beneficence that appears to lie behind the fa9ade of the new model of 'democratic 
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and developmental ' municipalities. One of the important techniques employed in 
such planning exercises is the manipulation of rationality that Flyvbjerg identified in 
the Aalborg experience. In Buffalo City's this entailed manipulation of the planning 
process to validate previous plans that had gone awry and to justify the building of 
a vast managerial empire within the municipal administration . 
In point of fact, it is this manipulation of rationality with varying degrees of 
sophistication , that forms the common thread in both the Buffalo City and 
Ngqushwa case stud ies. In contradiction to stated policy intentions both IDPs 
provided a rationale for increasing staffing and associated costs while critical 
aspects of service provision like operation and maintenance were neglected and in 
general budgets did not match stated principles or strategies. Increasing numbers 
of senior managers and the establ ishment of entities like development agencies 
and non-profit companies did little to reduce the municipality's reliance on paid 
conSUltants and advisors provided by donor agencies. Th is occurred against a 
background of the planned nett decrease of R18m in infrastructure spending in 
Buffalo City between 2003 and 2007. The IDP notes and discusses this key issue 
but does not translate its rhetoric into preferential resource allocation. Only in 2004 
/2005 was the need to upgrade or replace most of the sewerage infrastructure 
fully reflected in the budget and by then it was arguably, too late as the space for 
discretionary spending had been greatly reduced . Buffalo City makes reference 
to intergovernmental agreements and planning frameworks that are ostensibly 
cooperative and supportive but in the final analysis , and when actually attempting 
to resolve problems like the release of land for new settlements, these frameworks 
become contradictory and restrictive . This problem is also illustrated in grand scale 
by the Ngqushwa study where pol icy incoherence resulted from an un-declared 
dispute between the National Treasury / Department of Finance and the Municipal 
Demarcation Board. While the former had framed a long-term pol icy of reduced 
local government dependence on the national fiscus, the MDB was framing a model 
that included a strata of small municipalities existing primarily as 'welfare ' entities. 
Buffalo City, arguably more viable and self-sustaining as a local organ of state , 
found within this new vision an excuse for less financial prudence. Whereas the 
2002 IDP framed over ambitious development objectives completely beyond the 
means of Buffalo City, new plans tried to justify the resulting lack of achievement 
and created a rationale for further planning. The looming crisis of a R62 million bad 
debt provision was not resolved and the pattern of potentially disastrous cutbacks 
on maintenance and the stripping of assets continued. At the same time Buffalo 
City looked increasingly to national government to cover its financia l shortfalls. 
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Ngqushwa illustrates many of the same issues as Buffalo City but also includes 
the questionable outcomes of the demarcation process where two small under-
performing municipalities were merged on the basis of an untested assumption 
that a newly empowered district sphere of government would fill capacity and 
resource gaps. The Ngqushwa IDP thus set the municipality on a path to 
increasing dependency on national government accompanied by a progressive 
de-linking of affordability issues from local socio-economic patterns and concerns. 
Like Buffalo City, the Ngqushwa IDP comprises a narrative where policy intention 
and actual practice merge or become very blurred. Intention is equated with reality 
but certain 'realities' e.g. the fact that the bulk sewerage treatment works services 
a tiny percentage of the population , are filtered out in order not to negate the 
master narrative of the plan. The IDP failed to factor recent administrative history 
into its formulations for the future. It failed to acknowledge for example that even 
minimal municipal service provision by the previous transitional local councils of 
Hamburg and Peddie had generated public debt and that larger projects flowing 
from the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme would deepen the debt 
trap. Most of the IDP strategy is formulated around and limited to an anticipated 
state response and where citizens are supposed to participate, it is strictly within 
the context of the hegemony of the local state. The local state, in the form of the 
municipality, was in fact largely absent. Its service obligations, apart from refuse 
collection, where mostly performed by the private sector and paid for with revenue 
it had not collected . The 2002 IDP entirely avoided this issue and set in place 
policies and measures that would further escalate financial overheads and said 
nothing to the long-standing problem of debt collection . It specifically ignored those 
brief but telling periods where more financially responsible policies had prevailed 
resulting for example in a not insignificant collection of property rates. 
In more pedagogical terms Bond might simply assign these failures to the 
inevitable capture by neo/iberalism while Pieter Le Roux 655 might suggest that 
these were simply the result of the new ANC government's imperfect attempts to 
find a balance between redistributive economic policy (the RDP) and pressure 
from capital for fiscal discipline656 Leroke657 drawing upon the seminal argument 
of Fanon, might point out that this is simply another 'gravy train' phenomenon and 
strongly resonant with the emergence of a new 'national elite' anticipated by Fanon 
for the postcolonial state in Africa . Denied the opportunity to accumulate capital 
under colonial rule, the national middle class is forced to use the organs of the new 
state to fight their way back into the capitalist order. 
179 
However it is Swilling et al writing in an earlier decade to the Buffalo City and 
Ngqushwa case studies, who best capture the spirit of what was to become a 
chronic and seemingly irresistible trend in local government. Planning and IDP 
specifically not only failed to prevent this trend but helped carry it to its logical 
conclusion : 
There is undoubtedly much absurdity when it comes to 'majestic' displays 
of authority and pomp, to say nothing of the time and resources consumed. 
The efforts that communities make to address their own understanding 
of globalisation often get stuck in a disembodied theatrical performance 
of what passes for power, authority and modernity. The appearance of 
majesty, importance and efficacy, as manifested through spectacle, formality, 
bureaucracy, ceremony and the fac;:ade of urban modernity (mansions, lUxury 
cars), is corrupted and made banal as it now can be applied to countless 
occasions and locations. Grandiose but empty ceremonies attended by 
excessive consumption have become all too familiar. These, however are easily 
seen through by everyone ... . the spectacle is supported because in the absence 
of viable alternatives, the collective mockery of the caricature is an act of self-
recognition ."658 
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INTERVIEWS 
The following unstructured interviews were undertaken: 
Mr J. Geldof, Afesis-corplan manager, East London 17 April 1998 
Mrs Gloria Stuurman, resident and community leader in Hamburg 4 May 1998 
Mr M. Kota, mayor of Seymour Municipality, Seymour 16 July 1998 
Mr M. Sigabi mayor of the Stormberg District Council, Queenstown, 
3 September 1998 
Mrs N. Ncawe, mayor of Hamburg Municipality in Hamburg 10 December 1999 
Dr S. Noruka, Director Environmental Services, East London Municipality, 
East London 29 May 1998 
Mrs N. Ncawe, mayor of Ngqushwa Municipality in Hamburg 13 March 2000 
Mr J. Badenhorst, ward councillor, Buffalo City Municipality, East London 
12 December 2000 
Mr D. Xlotyeni, ward councillor of Ngqushwa Municipality in Hamburg 
24 November 2001 
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